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ABSTRACT 
 
NATALIE FIXMER-ORAIZ: Maternity in Crisis: Con(tra)ceptive Politics in Millennial 
Imaginaries 
(Under the direction of J. Robert Cox) 
  
 This dissertation is broadly situated at the nexus where contraceptive technologies, 
cultural (re)production, rhetorical theory, and feminism meet. I am primarily concerned 
with the discursive terrain in which reproductive politics unfold, particularly surrounding 
the recent emergence and significance of con(tra)ceptive technologies imagined to 
manage reproductive “emergencies.” I use the term “con(tra)ceptive technologies” 
broadly to reference internalized, disciplinary and/or social mechanisms that function as 
sites for the expression and negotiation of cultural anxiety/desire, and work to 
(re)configure and/or (re)inscribe the meaning of pregnancy, reproduction, and 
motherhood. In part articulated by a “politics of life itself” and framed within the context 
of neoliberalism, I argue that these technologies circulate within, and are given velocity 
by, broader cultural configurations that privilege a “posting” of feminism, race politics, 
and the events of 9/11. As such, this project examines the unfolding of “emergency” 
reproductive technologies as potential sites for the rearticulation and/or undermining of 
differential biopolitical power formations, and the constituting of “legitimate” maternity 
and citizenship in contemporary imaginaries.  
 Each chapter examines a distinct site where this cultural work is occurring—for 
example, the contentious debates surrounding the availability of emergency 
 iv 
contraception, Nadya Suleman’s high-profile motherhood as a disciplining force within 
the complex terrain of assisted reproductive technologies, and the recent obsession with 
crisis teen pregnancy in popular media. While these sites may seem divergent in 
character, critical communication theories invite the mapping of their overlaps and 
continuities to ask broader questions at the intersections of power, meaning, and culture. 
Thus, my analysis is largely centered on the circulation of narratives within popular 
culture through news, film, and television, with a generated sensitivity to the ways in 
which they cohere, signify, and constitute meaning and subjectivities. I argue that 
discursive figurations of reproductive “crises” work to negotiate cultural anxieties 
surrounding con(tra)ceptive technologies through a narrow (re)inscription of the borders 
of “authentic” or “legitimate” motherhood, and that this contributes to a disciplining of 
women that fractures along myriad lines of social difference. In this way, my research is 
explicitly attuned to the functioning of power, and articulated to a vision of reproductive 
justice. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
CON(TRA)CEPTIVE POLTICS IN MILLENNIAL IMAGINARIES 
 
 
Technology is not neutral. We’re inside of what we make, and it’s inside of us. 
We’re living in a world of connections—and it matters which ones get made and 
unmade. 
Donna Haraway, You Are Cyborg 
 
 
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, reproduction is both all the rage, 
and much to be enraged over. From substantive scientific investments in new 
reproductive and genetic technologies, to raucous political debates over contraceptive 
access and sex education, from mediated fixation on larger-than-life families to the 
commodification of maternity itself through chic form-fitting clothing and baby 
accessories, reproduction has commanded the cultural spotlight with considerable verve 
and regularity. The obsession is not entirely new, of course. Struggles over, and attention 
to, issues of reproduction and maternity possess a long and significant history,1 but in this 
dissertation I posit that something different is going on. It is a difference informed by the 
conditions of late capitalism and afforded resonance through a “posting” of feminism, 
race politics, and the events of 9/11—cultural forces that have coalesced to inform a 
particular (maternal) structure of feeling marked by crisis.  
                                                
1 See, for example, Linda Gordon, The Moral Property of Women: A History of Birth Control Politics in 
America (Chicago: University of Illinois Press: 2007), Dorothy Roberts, Killing the Black Body: Race, 
Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty (New York: Pantheon Books, 1997), Rickie Solinger, Pregnancy 
and Power: A Short History of Reproductive Politics in America (New York: New York University Press, 
2005). 
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Extending from these concerns, my project aims to explore the recent emergence 
and significance of con(tra)ceptive2 technologies imagined to manage reproductive 
“emergencies.” My use of the term “technology” is both expansive and particular. It 
signifies both material innovation, as well as internalized, disciplinary and/or social 
mechanisms, all of which function as sites for the expression and negotiation of cultural 
anxiety/desire, working to (re)configure and/or (re)inscribe the meaning(s) of pregnancy, 
reproduction, and motherhood. Thus, my research examines the unfolding of emergency 
reproductive technologies as potential sites for the rearticulation and/or undermining of 
“differential” (Sharma) biopolitical power formations, and the constituting of maternity 
and proper citizenship in contemporary imaginaries. 
 The following questions frame this dissertation: What are the technologies 
emerging and circulating in contemporary contexts that contribute to the cultural marking 
and management of reproductive emergencies? In what ways might these technologies 
operate as sites at which certain ideologies, cultural practices, assumptions, and/or power 
formations are imagined, negotiated, or reinscribed, particularly within a broader 
discursive apparatus that hinges on the management and pre-emption of emergency? 
What is the relationship of these technologies to biopolitics; or, how are emergency 
reproductive technologies collectively articulated and materially deployed in ways that 
discipline, (re)produce, or otherwise (re)figure reproduction and the meaning of 
motherhood? Finally, what are the implications for feminist, cultural, and rhetorical 
theories and for reproductive politics more generally? 
                                                
2 Controlling fertility occurs along two general vectors—attempts to prevent pregnancy and attempts to 
encourage and/or enhance pregnancy. My work engages both conceptive and contraceptive technologies; 
when citing their patterns of overlap, I refer to “con(tra)ceptive” technologies to note a range of 
reproductive technologies that, in spite of substantive distinctions in their indicated medical use, are 
nonetheless discursively situated/embedded within similar logics and relationships of power. 
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 These questions sketch the parameters of inquiry for my research and anticipate 
its practical and theoretical directions. This introductory chapter, then, grounds such an 
inquiry within particular disciplinary, intellectual, and cultural and political conversations 
in three ways. First, I provide a brief rationale for my study, suggesting the potential and 
significance of this work within the discipline of communication studies. I then work to 
situate this study within relevant bodies of literature, highlighting points of overlap and 
departure, and indicating in what ways my research might compliment and extend 
existing scholarship. Finally, I elucidate how a specific set of communication theories 
might be used to address the questions posed here, and conclude with a preview of 
chapters that highlights the specific cultural moments engaged in this project. 
Why Emergency Con(tra)ceptions? Why Now?  
 Reproduction has readily occupied contemporary imaginaries in myriad and 
distinct ways. First, it is the site for continued scientific exploration, innovation, and the 
development of “new and improved” techniques aimed to encourage control over 
fertility. Increasingly sutured to bioengineering and the study of genetics, “reprogenetics” 
has emerged as a scientific and medical field that weds assisted conception to genetic 
selection (Roberts, "Race, Gender"). As such, reprogenetics is concomitantly interrogated 
by scholars and activists concerned about its potential use to exacerbate and concretize 
what Shellee Colen terms “stratified reproduction”—“power relations by which some 
categories of people are empowered to nurture and reproduce, while others are 
disempowered” (qtd. in Ginsburg and Rapp 3). In addition, countless variations on 
traditional hormonal contraceptives promise new “choices” for women, and, as I will 
argue, accompanying sets of responsibilities; for instance, freedom from the “burden” of 
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monthly menstruation (Mamo and Fosket), or the possibility of avoiding pregnancy after 
unprotected sex (see chapter three of this dissertation). Finally, mediated celebrations of 
large, reproductively enhanced families abound in pop culture; exemplars include reality 
TV stars the Gosselins of (Jon and) Kate Plus 8, Michelle and Jim Bob Duggar of 19 
Kids and Counting, and celebrities Brad Pitt and Angelina Jolie with their high-profile 
assemblage of children. Much like other technologies of reproductive management, these 
celebrations are highly contingent on, and bracketed through, race and class politics. 
These fissures and divestments are evidenced in more or less overt social practices and 
discourses, for instance, in the overwhelming public response to Nadya Suleman (more 
commonly referred to as “Octomom”) or in the social/legal status of low-wealth mothers 
in the post-welfare state (Mink, Welfare's End; Roberts, Killing the Black Body; Solinger, 
Beggars and Choosers). This list is far from exhaustive; it does, however, illuminate the 
ubiquity and significance of reproductive politics in contemporary culture.  
 To locate these patterns and practices within the fabric of social life is not to mark 
a profound break with history or a moment unprecedented in its potentials and 
possibilities. Indeed, the celebration of certain kinds of “life,” and attendant disparaging 
of others, has historically delineated the borders and shaped the meaning of social and 
individual (re)production. Reproduction has long been imagined as a site for the 
negotiation and management of complex cultural anxieties and, often at the expense of 
women, is situated in the midst of contentious/complex social, political, and economic 
policy debates. As historian Rickie Solinger reminds us, “Official discussions about 
reproductive politics have rarely been women-centered. More often than not, debate and 
discussion about reproductive politics—where the power to manage women’s 
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reproductive capacity should reside—have been part of discussions about how to solve 
certain large social problems facing the country” (Pregnancy and Power 4, emphasis in 
original). Scholars like Solinger, Angela Davis, and Dorothy Roberts have documented 
with painstaking precision the relationship between pregnancy and power in U.S. history 
and the multiple histories of reproductive politics that are consistently undermined by 
racism, classism, and sexism. From the earliest moments of the slave trade—when 
parental status was legally codified to privilege the interests of white slave owners over 
those of the bonded African (-American) women who bore children, many times as a 
result of rape—to the forced sterilization of low income women, immigrant women, 
women of color, lesbians, and/or women with disabilities through state funded programs 
throughout most of the twentieth century, what is made abundantly clear is that 
pregnancy—and maternity itself—are privileges of race, class, age, ethnicity, marital 
status and ability.   
 Despite historical continuities and overlaps, I argue that something different is 
going on. It is a difference exemplified in, and illuminated by, at least three distinct 
cultural influences, including contemporary biopolitics, deepening neoliberalism, and a 
posting of feminism, race politics, and 9/11. First, contemporary theorists (Roberts, 
"Race, Gender"; Rose; Samerski; Sharma) have begun to grapple with the ways in which 
biopolitics has transformed and adapted within the context of late capitalism. Biopower, 
originally theorized by Michel Foucault as “numerous and diverse techniques for 
achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations” (The History of 
Sexuality 143), has shifted from state governance over the health of the population, to a 
sustained investment in “biological citizenship” (Rose). This form of citizenship, Nikolas 
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Rose explains, hinges on individual responsibility and risk management: “individuals 
themselves must exercise biological prudence, for their own sake, that of their families, 
that of their own lineage, and that of their nation as a whole” (Rose 24). Furthermore, 
biological citizenship is both accompanied and extended by new forms of authority: 
“ethopolitics—the politics of how we should conduct ourselves appropriately in relation 
to ourselves, and in our responsibilities for the future—forms the milieu within which 
novel forms of authority are taking shape" (Rose 27). A thorough naming and 
investigation of these emergent mechanisms of governing reproduction, maternity, and 
women themselves, reside at the center of this study. 
 A second mark of distinction for the contemporary engagements with 
reproduction is their thorough embeddedness within, and co-optation by, neoliberalism. 
To be sure, this is one of the defining dimensions of biological citizenship for Rose, and 
thus is central to a contemporary biopolitics that hinges on individualized choices and 
privatized responsibilities. Beyond this, however, there is a kind of “posting” work going 
on here that assumes the successes of feminist and civil rights movements are complete, 
adopting the language of (certain aspects of) feminism and antiracism, while 
simultaneously working to subvert their fundamental tenets and more transformative 
potentialities. Critical studies interrogating postfeminism as a set of cultural assumptions 
and practices tied to late capitalism and post-civil rights discourses3 prove useful in 
                                                
3 See, for instance, Angela McRobbie, "Postfeminism and Popular Culture: Bridget Jones and the New 
Gender Regime," Interrogating Post-Feminism: Gender and the Politics of Popular Culture, eds. Yvonne 
Tasker and Diane Negra (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), Sarah Projansky, "Mass Magazine Cover 
Girls: Some Reflections on Postfeminist Girls and Postfeminism's Daughters," Interrogating Postfeminism: 
Gender and the Politics of Popular Culture, eds. Yvonne Tasker and Diane Negra (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2007), Kimberly Springer, "Divas, Evil Black Bitches, and Bitter Black Women: African 
American Women in Postfeminist and Post-Civil-Rights Popoular Culture," Interrogating Postfeminism: 
Gender and the Politics of Popular Culture, eds. Yvonne Tasker and Diane Negra (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2007), Pamela Thoma, "Buying up Baby: Modern Feminine Subjectivity, Assertions of 
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exploring the recent complex, even conflicting, discursive terrain in which the politics of 
con(tra)ceptive technologies unfold. As Yvonne Tasker and Diane Negra explain, “What 
appears distinctive about contemporary postfeminist culture is precisely the extent to 
which a selectively defined feminism has been so overtly ‘taken into account,’ as Angela 
McRobbie has noted, albeit in order ‘to emphasize that it is no longer needed’” (1). Silja 
Samerski’s study of genetic counseling implicates this logic in reproductive politics as it 
articulates “choice” to cover over a kind of “compulsory self-determination”: “the call for 
responsible decision making under the shadow of genes and risk must be understood as a 
social engineering technique . . . . the professional imputation of this new autonomy 
makes women powerless while holding them responsible” (Samerski 744). In other 
words, “choice” no longer means what it did. Mainstream feminisms of the 1960s and 
70s’ claims to a “woman’s right to choose” are, and have been, easily absorbed and 
appropriated by a broader discourse of consumption that troubles inclusion and solidarity 
within feminist communities (Solinger, Beggars and Choosers; Tasker and Negra), and 
perhaps even undermines the original vision of mainstream advocates/thinkers. 
Contemporary scholarship must respond, then, to the complexities and nuances of 
postfeminist culture, its emphasis on, adaptation to, and co-optation by late capitalism 
and consumerism. 
Finally, con(tra)ceptive politics are newly distinct for their location within a 
cultural context affectively marked by 9/11 and accompanying notions of “emergency” 
and “crisis.” Several scholars note significant trends in post-9/11 governmental practices. 
These include a rearticulation of collective identity contingent upon indiscriminate 
                                                                                                                                            
'Choice,' and the Repudiation of Reproductive Justice in Postfeminist Unwanted Pregnancy Films," 
Feminist Media Studies 9.4 (2009). 
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patriotism, an adherence to a resurging conservativism and normative “family values,” 
and a vision of nation that has eclipsed privacy and dissent.4 It is, as Jennifer Gillan 
explains, “both a makeover of, and a return to, 1950s style Containment Culture that 
divides the world into two camps, fetishizes national security, and establishes uncritical 
support as a value unto itself, and makes ‘personal behavior part of a global strategy’” 
(196). Proliferating rhetorics of emergency and crisis serve these processes, suspending 
normative practice in favor of exceptional practice, discarding “business as usual” where 
the rules no longer apply. In this dissertation, then, I use post 9/11 to signify a certain 
period of time during which the exigence of emergency is collectively felt and filtered 
into routine ways of relating to one another and to the world, one in which state power is 
exercised in ways that enabled collective anxieties surrounding the notion of crisis in 
general to emerge and proliferate. Importantly, this exigence—and the prior two 
influences—are less a claim about the “effects” of 9/11, than they are an attempt to 
understand and map the ways in which logics of crisis and emergency are given 
increasing salience and velocity in post 9/11 imaginaries.  
As ongoing, organizing and disciplining forces, “emergency” and “crisis” help to 
retool not only the concept of nation as it refers to collective life and practices, but also 
the ways in which families and individuals are imagined to contribute to the 
(re)production of nation and national identity. In short, within post 9/11 US culture, the 
logic of emergency possesses a resonance that adheres not only to security checks at 
airports and the defense of national borders, but is similarly vested in domesticity, and 
                                                
4 See, for example, Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (New York: 
Verso, 2006), Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (New York: Picador, 
2007), Setha Low and Neil Smith, eds., The Politics of Public Space (New York: Routledge, 2006), Don 
Mitchell, The Right to the City: Social Justice and the Fight for Public Space (New York: Guilford Press, 
2003). 
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specifically, in the differential protection and proliferation of domestic bodies—of 
reproducing national identity through the bodies of certain women. Thus, these logics 
inform the cultural milieu within which understandings of reproductive technologies 
circulate, shaping the meaning and experience of reproduction itself, and carrying with it 
a set of material, political, and disciplinary implications.  
This dissertation project, therefore, interrogates how various technologies of 
reproductive emergencies function alongside, and are given velocity by, this broader 
rhetorical and affective landscape. In what ways might these imaginaries cohere to create 
a specific set of meanings, to refigure, manage and discipline reproductive bodies, and to 
perhaps reinforce, rework, or otherwise transform relationships to cultural 
(re)production? As a communication scholar invested in feminism generally, and 
reproductive justice more specifically, it becomes necessary to pose questions regarding 
the contours and mechanisms of contemporary biopolitics and emergency con(tra)captive 
technologies, so that we might more fully understand their implications and possibilities, 
so that we might locate spaces of opportunity, antagonism, agency, and resistance. 
Continuities and Departures 
 While the rationale for this study suggests several bodies of literature from which 
I intend to draw, this section more thoroughly reviews the relevant intellectual 
conversations and theoretical frameworks that ground my project, with specific attention 
to significant continuities, overlaps, and points of departure. I envision that this project 
will extend from four broad areas of scholarship, which are feminist critiques of 
reproductive politics and technologies, cultural studies of science and technology, 
rhetorical theory and criticism, and contemporary work on biopolitics.  
 10 
Reproductive Politics and Technologies 
 Feminist scholarships and activisms have been engaged with reproductive 
technologies for centuries. Rightly so, as the exigence for such work is clear. Mainstream 
celebrations of “progress” and “technology” obfuscate the long, disquieting histories of 
material practices in which the use of science has curtailed, rather than enhanced, some 
women’s reproductive autonomy in ways that fracture along myriad lines of social 
difference. As such, scholars and activists alike are pressed to question the implications 
of these technologies, and their deployment in particular medical, cultural and political 
spaces, for women in general and reproductive justice more specifically. This body of 
scholarship is extensive and diverse; for the purposes of my work here I will focus on two 
significant themes that arise from this literature, namely, the multiple histories of 
reproductive politics that are constituted through differential relationships of/access to 
social and political power, and second, an historically cultivated and theorized skepticism 
towards reproductive technologies specifically, and science as a discipline more 
generally. 
 First, attention to reproductive politics necessarily involves sustained 
interrogation of the ways in which privilege informs the histories of women’s experiences 
concerning reproduction, maternity, and the negotiation of power in America.5 Examples 
of these distinctions are many and diverse, but include, for instance, the definition of (and 
the cultural value assigned to) motherhood itself. Dorothy Roberts (Killing the Black 
Body) traces this definition back to the antebellum period of American history, when 
                                                
5 See, for example, Anne Balsamo, Technologies of the Gendered Body: Reading Cyborg Women (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 1996), Angela Y. Davis, Women, Race, and Class (New York: Vintage Books, 
1983), Valerie Hartouni, Cultural Conceptions: On Reproductive Technologies and the Remaking of Life 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), Roberts, Killing the Black Body, Solinger, 
Pregnancy and Power. 
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white women’s most important social responsibility was to reproduce new members of 
the white race. Black women, on the other hand, were defined through slave labor first 
and foremost; their children were legally designated as slaveholder’s property. In this 
way, women in bondage were, quite literally, denied motherhood through law. Roberts 
argues that similar racist assumptions concerning motherhood continue to this day. 
Detailing the politics of welfare reform, involuntary sterilization and long-term birth 
control measures wielded against predominantly Black women through public policy, as 
well as the explosion of new reproductive technologies and the racism these practices 
tend to perpetuate, Roberts asks: “What does it mean that we live in a country in which 
white women disproportionately undergo expensive technologies to enable them to bear 
children, while Black women disproportionately undergo surgery that prevents them from 
being able to bear any?” (Killing the Black Body 285). 
 It is not solely divergent histories that fracture a sense of inclusivity or cohesion 
within reproductive politics; in addition, mainstream, liberal feminist movements for 
reproductive choice have centered largely on the concerns of white, middle-class, 
heterosexual women. As Angela Davis explains, “class bias and racism crept into the 
birth control movement when it was still in its infancy. More and more, it was assumed 
within birth control circles that poor women, Black and immigrant alike, had a ‘moral 
obligation to restrict the size of their families.’ What was demanded as a ‘right’ for the 
privileged came to be interpreted as a ‘duty’ for the poor” (Davis 210). Questions 
concerning contraception, reproduction, and who may and may not become a mother are 
not bereft of politics; they are embedded within relationships of power and privilege. 
Race and class remain at the center of these divisions between women; interrogating their 
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past and present manifestations becomes an essential component of any rigorous inquiry 
into reproductive politics and/or technologies. In other words, like any other set of 
technological-cultural innovations, emergency reproductive technologies neither emerge 
nor exist in a vacuum. Understanding these histories, patterns, and practices surrounding 
reproduction contextualizes and makes meaningful contemporary relationships between 
power and maternity. 
 A second significant theme within the reproductive technologies literature is its 
rather tenuous relationship to science and reproductive technologies themselves. Much 
scholarship contains the residue of technological determinism, and perhaps 
understandably so, given its deeply troubled and problematic histories. However, 
theoretical positions that assume reproductive technologies are fixed, acting on the world 
in predetermined and monolithic ways, are becoming increasingly less common as the 
social and political role of science/technology in both public and private life is more or 
less assumed. Critiques of scientific objectivity are now commonplace within feminist 
literatures and build on a foundation informed heavily by feminist standpoint theories and 
science studies. Sandra Harding’s classic text, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? 
argues that science is always already a form of politics. Noting that “science contains 
both progressive and regressive tendencies” (10), Harding is careful to reject both a 
narrative of technological progress and a narrative of scientific neutrality, insisting that 
we remain sensitive to science as a socially produced, and thus, socially located, 
episteme. She argues that the privileged status of the natural sciences often obscures its 
social and cultural origins: “social desires are frequently defined as technological needs;” 
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(37) the popular and medical discourses surrounding con(tra)ceptions reveal that they are 
no exception.  
 Thus, scholarship grounded in feminist standpoint epistemologies maintain a 
healthy skepticism towards scientific inquiry and research, and assume the normative 
investments of science: “As powerful sources of cultural meaning, [the sciences] 
establish, reflect, maintain, and enforce the borders of an incessantly fluid status quo—
categories, identities, bodies, and relations that count as natural” (Hartouni 25). Working 
explicitly on questions of reproduction and technology from a communication 
perspective, Valerie Hartouni’s departure from much of the literature that precedes her 
lies in her refusal of technological essentialism. Examining the ways in which 
reproductive technologies are written onto and through the body politic, Hartouni seeks 
to interrogate how reproductive technologies function as a kind of episteme of the social 
body: “[m]ore interesting to consider, and for that matter more pressing, is how socially 
significant differences were (and continue to be) produced under the auspices of 
disengaged discovery” (22). For this dissertation, the provocation of Hartouni’s work 
resides in the suggestion that these technologies disrupt and make vulnerable social 
productions of the “natural.” In this way, a thorough interrogation of reproductive 
technologies becomes an opportunity to examine cultural assumptions and hierarchies, 
relationships and negotiations of power, with an eye toward contingency, instability, and 
vulnerability.6  
                                                
6 Hartouni is not the only communication scholar to work at these intersections; the scholarship of Celeste 
Condit and Nathan Stormer is both prominent and influential in this regard as well. Their work is discussed 
at greater length in a later section of this chapter. 
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Culture and Technology 
 Hartouni’s work is also comfortably situated within a wealth of prominent media 
and cultural studies scholarship that assumes technology to be inextricably wed to 
cultural assumptions and power formations. Indeed, just as technologies are understood 
as thoroughly woven into the fabric of cultural life, so too, in this view, is culture 
informed by and infused with the technological: “the reduction of technology to ‘gadget’ 
or ‘tool’ negates considering it as an activity constituted in sets of social practices . . . . 
Humans set technology in motion, but it too, in fulfilling expectations, also has the 
potential to introduce unforeseen changes to social relations and practices” (Hills 544). 
Culture and technology cannot possibly (or usefully) be extracted or divorced from the 
other. In Andrew Feenberg’s words, “technology is not a destiny but a scene of struggle” 
(Critical Theory 14), and is, in this way, tied to broader struggles against hegemony: 
The narrow focus of modern technology meets the needs of a particular hegemony 
. . . Under that hegemony technological design is unusually decontextualized and 
destructive. It is that hegemony that is called to account, not technology per se, 
when we point out that today technical means form an increasingly threatening 
life environment. It is that hegemony, as it has embodied itself in technology, that 
must be challenged in the struggle for technological reform. ("Democratic 
Rationalization" 663) 
 
Thus, critical work accounting for the epistemological function of technology becomes a 
particularly rich mode of inquiry for understanding, challenging, or otherwise disrupting 
cultural patterns and relationships of power. 
This approach, which foregrounds the complex, and mutually constitutive, 
relationship between culture and technology, provides a useful lens through which to 
interrogate the various (economic, social, political, and historical) forces that help to 
shape con(tra)ceptive technological meanings and significance. It also allows for an 
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exploration of the kinds of institutions and/or social relationships that are perhaps 
(re)enforced or undermined in this process of meaning-making. This is precisely the kind 
of theoretical orientation assumed by Carolyn Marvin in her study of the electric light and 
the telephone. She writes: “In the end, it is less in new media practices…than in the 
uncertainty of emerging and contested practices of communication that the struggle of 
groups to define and locate themselves is most easily observed” (5). For Marvin, 
electricity specifically and technologies more generally are better understood not as 
inevitable, determining forces in socio-political contexts, but rather as contingent sites for 
the expression of anxiety, fear, and desire onto which codified social roles are projected 
and played out. Rather than assume the ontological force of technology, my focus in this 
project is to interrogate its epistemological function, to illuminate the various ways in 
which it is imagined to negotiate social relationships and shape cultural and political 
communities. This critical orientation informs my approach to emergency con(tra)ceptive 
technologies. 
 Second, my approach to technology integrates Foucaultian definitions and 
assumptions that articulate technology as a range of practices, behaviors, and various 
modes of governance. In Technologies of the Self, Foucault names four different modes 
of technologies, including technologies of production, of sign systems, of power, and of 
the self: “These four types of technologies hardly ever function separately, although each 
one of them is associated with a certain type of domination. Each implies certain modes 
of training and modification of individuals, not only in the obvious sense of acquiring 
certain skills but also in the sense of acquiring certain attitudes” (18). For Foucault, the 
interaction and exchange between these forms of technology becomes the site for modes 
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of governance; he defines governmentality relative to technology as “contact between the 
technologies of domination of others and those of the self” (19). In other words, as Ann 
Balsamo succinctly states, technology for Foucault names “the process of connection 
among discursive practices, institutional relations, and material effects that, working 
together, produce a meaning or a ‘truth effect’ for the human body” (21). I suggest, then, 
that con(tra)captive technologies might include various cultural practices or technes as 
sites at which reproduction and maternity is managed through discourses of crisis, 
emergency, and disaster. Working to extend the meanings of emergency con(tra)ceptions, 
I am fundamentally concerned with contemporary relationships between pregnancy and 
power, and the reinscription and/or negotiation of biopower at a variety of contemporary 
locales.  
Rhetorical Theory and Criticism 
Drawing from the intellectual traditions that allow us to broaden and rethink the 
notion of technology prefigures a turn to other social and cultural sites where similar 
technologies of reproductive emergencies are unfolding. Reclaiming rhetoric itself as a 
form of techne that works to “create not only new relations of power but also new 
subjectivities” (Lauer 47), various contemporary artifacts reveal collective anxieties 
about, and profound governmental investment in, the reproduction of particular bodies, 
classes, and cultures. In my research, I am interested in exploring not only public 
struggles over Plan B® emergency contraception and various technologies of 
reprogenetics, but also the cultural narratives regarding reproduction and technology that 
reflect and enforce a logic of emergency, crisis, and desire for control. While cultural and 
media studies scholarship provide a set of critical tools for making connections—for 
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mapping the broader discursive terrains in which contemporary reproductive politics 
unfold—rhetoric is uniquely positioned to critically account for the specificities of this 
terrain, interrogating particular moments, texts, events, places, or artifacts as they shape 
the contours and qualities of contemporary reproductive politics in America.  
Three areas within contemporary rhetorical scholarship seem particularly useful 
in this endeavor. The first is critical rhetoric. A theoretical orientation explicitly attuned 
to the discursive form and function of power, critical rhetoric aims to reveal and 
demystify mechanisms of power that structure and inform social practices (McKerrow). 
Critical rhetoric, in this way, assumes the political dimensions of rhetorical practice and 
inquiry; it is committed to illuminating discipline and marginality as written into the 
assumptions, norms, and practices of public life and culture. Alongside cultural studies 
scholarship, critical rhetoric also takes seriously the significance and impact of vernacular 
voices and popular culture, and eschews the notion of a singular, discrete text in favor of 
an understanding of cultural and rhetorical texts as situated within broader discursive 
formations. Extending from this literature, my interest lies primarily in what John Sloop 
refers to as “the politics of doxa” (Sloop 168), the myriad ways in which dominant 
(popular) discourses operate alongside one another to constrain, discipline, or otherwise 
function ideologically. 
Second, rhetorical scholarship that takes seriously the materiality of discourse and 
its constitutive function helps to ground and orient my approach to these cultural 
moments. 7 While critical rhetoric suggests the materiality of rhetoric, this notion has 
                                                
7 See, for example, Carole Blair, "Contemporary U.S. Memorial Sites as Exemplars of Rhetoric's 
Materiality," Rhetorical Bodies, eds. Jack Selzer and Sharon Crowley (Madison, WI: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1999), Dana L. Cloud, "The Materiality of Discourse as Oxymoron: A Challenge to 
Critical Rhetoric," Western Journal of Communication 58 (1994), Michael C.  McGee, "Text, Context, and 
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been substantially explored and developed in its own right, and demands that we consider 
different questions within, and implications for, our work. As Carole Blair argues, “we 
must ask not just what a text means but, more generally, what it does; and we must not 
understand what it does as adhering strictly to what it was supposed to do” (23). 
Rhetoric’s materiality, then, implies at least two shifts in more traditional understandings 
of rhetorical theory and criticism (Blair). The first is that discourse exceeds description or 
persuasion. Rhetoric is constitutive of our communities, our relationships, of that which 
we perceive to be (and experience as) real. In this way, rhetorical criticism as a mode of 
inquiry presents the possibility of disrupting normative assumptions and behaviors that 
fuel relationships of power, privilege, and marginality. This trend in contemporary 
rhetorical criticism is exemplified in a variety of ways, but for example and of particular 
relevance to this study is the exploration of “risk” as a rhetorical concept that is socially 
constructed rather than an objective and a priori phenomenon (Scott, “Kairos as 
Indeterminate”), but that nonetheless possesses a significant material force that shapes 
public policies and flows of capital, among other things. The second shift that material 
rhetoric inspires refers to the unpredictable currencies of rhetorical iterations. In other 
words, “rhetoric has material force beyond the goals, intentions, and motivations of its 
producers, and it is our responsibility as rhetoricians not just to acknowledge that, but to 
try to understand it” (Blair 22). Thus, contemporary rhetorical scholarship that grapples 
with the material force of discourse, that seeks to explore the co-articulation of various 
texts, and that is explicitly attuned to rhetoric’s political import and significance, informs 
                                                                                                                                            
the Fragmentation of Contemporary Culture," Western Journal of Communication 54 (1990), Raymie E. 
McKerrow, "Critical Rhetoric: Theory and Praxis," Communication Monographs 56 (1989), John M. 
Sloop, "Disciplining the Transgendered: Brandon Teena, Public Representation, and Normativity," Western 
Journal of Communication 64.2 (2000). 
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my orientation as a scholar and provides a strong foundation for my exploration of 
con(tra)ceptive technologies in contemporary culture. 
Finally, a significant body of rhetorical scholarship attends explicitly to issues of 
reproduction, politics, and culture;8 thus, many scholars working in this area help to 
further inform and ground my work. Celeste Condit has written extensively on genetic 
technologies and reproductive politics. Her work posits and critically engages significant 
complexities and interdependencies between culture, technology, power, and discourse, 
and is particularly attentive to the cultural forces that shape and inform women’s 
“choices.” Nathan Stormer’s decidedly Foucaultian engagement with biomedical 
discourses and technologies explores the ways in which processes of reproduction are 
imagined by/articulated through science in the production of an expansive “pro-life” 
narrative. Stormer argues that “contemporary knowledge of reproduction is 
rhetorical…such rhetoric invites identifications with a particular form of population 
politics” ("Embodying Normal Miracles" 174). In other words, for Stormer, the very way 
we think through and about issues of conception, pregnancy, and childbearing is 
circumscribed by a science that aims to maximize the (re)production of human life. 
                                                
8 See, for example, Celeste Condit, Decoding Abortion Rhetoric: Communicating Social Change (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 1990), Celeste Michelle Condit, The Meanings of the Gene: Public 
Debates About Human Heredity (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1999), Celeste M. Condit, 
"Women's Reproductive Choices and the Genetic Model of Medicine," Body Talk: Rhetoric, Technology, 
Reproduction, eds. Mary M. Lay, Laura J. Gurak, Clare Gravon and Cynthia Myntti (Madison: University 
of Wisconsin Press, 2000), Jessica Enoch, "Survival Stories: Feminist Historiographic Approaches to 
Chicana Rhetorics of Sterilization Abuse," Rhetoric Society Quarterly 35.3 (2005), Sara Hayden, "Teenage 
Bodies, Teenage Selves: Tracing the Implications of Bio-Power in Contemporary Sexuality Education 
Texts," Women's Studies in Communication 24.1 (2001), Sara Hayden and Lynn O'Brien Hallstein, eds., 
Contemplating Maternity in an Era of Choice: Explorations into Discourses of Reproduction (Blue Ridge 
Summit, PA: Lexington Books, 2010), Mary M. Lay, Laura J. Gurak, Clare Gravon and Cynthia Myntti, 
eds., Body Talk: Rhetoric, Technology, and Reproduction (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2000), 
Carol Mason, Killing for Life: The Apocalyptic Narrative of Pro-Life Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2002), Nathan Stormer, "Embodying Normal Miracles," Quarterly Journal of Speech 
83.2 (1997), Nathan Stormer, Articulating Life's Memory: U.S. Medical Rhetoric About Abortion in the 
19th Century (New York: Lexington Books, 2002), Nathan Stormer, "In Living Memory: Abortion as 
Cultural Amnesia," Quarterly Journal of Speech 88.3 (2002). 
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Finally, Susan Merrill Squier’s recent work on “liminal lives,” cultural narratives, and 
biomedical technologies foregrounds a rich and nuanced means of understanding 
literature, culture, science, and technologies alongside one another, as co-constitutive of 
and circulating within similar logics and apparatuses of power: “I understand both 
literature and science as technologies because they incorporate ‘institutionalized 
discourses, epistemologies and critical practices’ to define what is knowable and to bring 
those objects into being” (Squier 3). I see my work building on, and in conversation with, 
this rich body of scholarship that resides at the intersections of rhetoric and cultural 
studies. 
Rethinking Biopolitics  
 For scholarship engaged with questions of power, technology, and discourse, the 
work of Michel Foucault continues to be influential and provocative. While Foucault has 
been critiqued for overlooking gender in his canon of work, feminist theorists have taken 
on the task of exploring the possibilities (and problematics) of Foucaultian notions of 
biopower, discipline, and governmentality for studies of gender, sexuality, and the body.9 
This body of literature is quite extensive, and proves particularly useful in exploring the 
constituting and significance of reproductive technologies within public discourses, 
reproductive policies, and women’s private lives. Discourses of disciplinarity are far from 
monolithic, however, and fracture, once again, along lines of race and class. As Dorothy 
                                                
9 See, Balsamo, Technologies of the Gendered Body: Reading Cyborg Women, Sandra Bartky, "Foucault, 
Femininity, and the Modernization of Patriarchal Power," Feminism and Foucault: Reflections on 
Resistance, eds. Irene Diamond and Lee Quinby (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1988), Susan 
Bordo, Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture and the Body, 10th Anniversary ed. (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2003), Irene Diamond and Lee Quinby, eds., Feminism and Foucault: 
Reflections on Resistance (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1988), Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, 
"Fetal Images: The Power of Visual Culture in the Politics of Reproduction," Feminist Studies 13.2 (1987), 
Silja Samerski, "Genetic Counseling and the Fiction of Choice: Taught Self-Determination as a New 
Technique of Social Engineering," Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 34.4 (Summer 2009), 
Stormer, "Embodying Normal Miracles." 
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Roberts ("Race, Gender") suggests, these fissures and delineations between women are at 
once familiar in their pattern of influence and inscriptions of power, and simultaneously 
shifting in response to contemporary modes of governance and the nuances/necessities of 
late capitalist culture. 
 As referenced earlier, recent scholarship suggests that subtle transformations in 
biopolitical landscapes are taking place. As Nikolas Rose explains, the “complex of 
marketization, autonomization, and responsibilization gives a particular character to the 
contemporary politics of life in advanced liberal democracies” (4). Rose’s project is to 
chart a new biological citizenship and its accompanying forms of privatized, 
individualized authority. My own work relies heavily on his theorizing of contemporary 
biopolitical formations, with perhaps one significant caveat. Rose argues that the focus on 
biological citizenship necessitates a move away from thinking biopolitics alongside 
eugenics: “What we have here, then, is not eugenics but is shaped by forms of self-
government imposed by the obligations of choice, the desire for self-fulfillment, and the 
wish of parents for the best lives for their children. Its logics and its costs deserve 
analysis on their own terms” (69). 
 Certainly, Rose provides a nuanced analysis of contemporary biopolitics, noting 
their significant points of departure from the earlier mechanisms of power elucidated by 
Foucault. And yet, his dismissal of eugenics as a useful analytic through which we might 
understand and interrogate the logic of biopower is too hastily asserted (Roberts, "Race, 
Gender"). To the extent that the notion of biopolitics/biopower continues to illuminate 
and account for mechanisms of governance, albeit in a different form, so too might we 
need to rethink the ways in which eugenics itself has adapted and transformed in response 
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to contemporary modes of governance. If we understand eugenics as “the belief that 
reproductive strategies can improve society by reducing the births of socially 
marginalized people” (Roberts, "Race, Gender" 796), the eugenic horizons of 
contemporary biopolitics are no less present or possible. They are perhaps obfuscated in a 
shift toward the governing of life at an individualized or even molecular level, but 
significant continuities are worthy of our attention. To the extent that “[t]he eugenic 
approach to social problems locates them in reproduction rather than social structure and 
therefore seeks to solve them by eliminating disfavored people instead of social 
inequities” ("Race, Gender" 796), contemporary biopolitics may well exemplify, express, 
and enforce eugenic logics. 
 Perhaps a more nuanced way of thinking about eugenics or reproductive 
stratification within the context of contemporary biopolitics is through the lens of what 
Sarah Sharma calls “differential biopolitics.” Sharma argues that, “[a] differential theory 
of biopolitics is necessary, not just to point out [complexity and multiplicity]…but in 
order to consider the various technologies of power/self and the affective dimension of 
these investments and reductions into human life” (139). Her extension of biopolitics as 
“differential” accounts for complexity, difference, and nuance; it illuminates and 
interrogates systematic inclusions and exclusions that are both indicated and exacerbated 
by the form/functioning of biopower. As Sharma explains, “[t]he biopolitical regulation 
of life reduces certain life to bare life. At the same time it also invests in the lives of 
others, as in the maintenance of lifestyles. In other words both reductions and 
investments cultivate docile and productive bodies” (139). Thus, differential biopolitics 
explicitly theorizes a means of grappling with difference, an important dimension of any 
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serious attempt to theorize power, if largely overlooked in most literature on biopolitics. 
Sharma’s work invites a thorough investigation of the (micro)technologies of self-
government that are distributed differentially, or otherwise stratified, and that reinscribe a 
particular (gendered, racialized, classed) social order. Questions of difference and power 
are paramount in charting the shape and function of reproductive histories; as such, 
Sharma’s theoretical contributions to biopolitics figures prominently in my analysis. 
Having provided a brief overview of the relevant intellectual conversations and traditions 
that I intend to draw from and extend, I turn now to the methodological approaches that 
might illuminate and usefully inform my study. 
Critical Methods of Inquiry 
 My modes of critical reading extend from the aforementioned relevant bodies of 
literature, respond to the particular sites of inquiry on which my project is centered, and 
include critical discourse analysis, articulation theory, and a specific orientation to 
culture.  
Critical discourse analysis traverses a broad theoretical and disciplinary 
landscape; generally, it assumes that language and power are inextricably linked, and 
explores “the role of discourse in the (re)production and challenge of dominance” (van 
Dijk 249). Its goals and assumptions overlap somewhat with those of the critical rhetoric 
program in its emphasis on the constitutive function of discourse, and the recognition of 
discourse as thoroughly embedded within hegemonic structures and practices. Drawing 
from these perspectives, my research attends to a close reading of cultural texts, with 
sensitivity toward their relationship(s) to broader discursive formations. Once again, 
Foucault’s work proves useful in this endeavor. For Foucault, a discursive formation is a 
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“system of dispersion…between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic 
choices” where one might locate “a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and 
functionings, transformations)” (Archaeology 38). Building on this understanding, Laclau 
and Mouffe underscore that such a formation “is not the expression of any underlying 
principles external to itself—it cannot, for instance, be apprehended either by a 
hermeneutic reading or by a structuralist combinatory—but it constitutes a configuration, 
which in certain contexts of exteriority can be signified as a totality” (106). In other 
words, unity amongst a set of discourses is less determined a priori than it is a critical 
task that can uncover and interrogate structures of power and marginality. This is 
precisely what my research aims to do. 
 Furthermore, such a task resides at the center of articulation theories and 
methodologies.10 Articulation “provides a way of describing the continual severing, 
realignment, and recombination of discourses, social groups, political interests, and 
structures of power in a society. It provides as well a way of describing the discursive 
processes by which objects and identities are formed or given meaning” (Grossberg, 
Nelson and Treichler 8). Articulation is additionally theorized as a creative process “of 
thinking relations and connections as how we come to know and as creating what we 
know. Articulation is, then, not just a thing (not just a connection) but a process of 
creating connections, much in the same way that hegemony is not domination but the 
process of creating and maintaining consensus or of co-ordinating interests” (Slack, 
                                                
10 See, for instance, Ronald Walter Greene, Malthusian Worlds: U.S. Leadership and the Governing of the 
Population Crisis (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999), Lawrence Grossberg, We Gotta Get out of This Place: 
Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture (New York: Routledge, 1992), Stuart Hall, "On 
Postmodernism and Articulation," Journal of Communication Inquiry 10 (1986), Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (New York: 
Verso, 2001), Jennifer Daryl Slack, "The Theory and Method of Articulation in Cultural Studies," Stuart 
Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies, eds. David Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen (New York: 
Routledge, 1996).  
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"Theory and Method" 114). While the concept itself is abstract and pliant, as Grossberg 
et al. point out, it is sufficiently pointed in its application and use. Drawing from Stuart 
Hall, Ronald Walter Greene’s use of articulation theory to study the population crisis as a 
governing apparatus allowed him to “focus on how discourse strategies, populations, and 
institutions exist independently of one another but are brought together for a particular 
purpose” (10). My research is methodologically attuned to a similar task—to locate, 
chart, and question discursive imaginings that wed certain kinds of pregnancies, 
maternities, and technologies to broader discourses of crisis and emergency—and will 
certainly benefit from articulation theory.  
Finally, my dissertation, which foregrounds this critical task of mapping and 
articulation, is bolstered and informed by Raymond Williams’ theory of culture, which he 
defines “as the study of relationships between elements in a whole way of life. The 
analysis of culture is the attempt to discover the nature of the organization which is the 
complex of these relationships” (The Long Revolution 63). For Williams, this inquiry 
hinges on locating what he terms a “structure of feeling,” or “a felt sense of the quality of 
life at a particular place and time: a sense of the ways in which the particular activities 
combined into a way of thinking and living” (The Long Revolution 63). Williams 
acknowledges that this structure of feeling is elusive and rather difficult to grasp, but in 
studying the fragments of culture, and particularly focused on the arts, one can begin this 
kind of analysis. Thus, my project is largely centered on the circulation of narratives 
within popular culture through news, film, and television, with a generated sensitivity to 
the ways in which they cohere, signify, and constitute meaning and subjectivities. 
Williams envisioned a radical potential for this work in its epistemological and heuristic 
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import, for the analysis offers to make “interpretation conscious, by showing historical 
alternatives; to relate the interpretation to the particular contemporary values on which it 
rests; and, by exploring the real patterns of the work, confront us with the real nature of 
the choices we are making” (The Long Revolution 69). 
My sites of analysis, which are outlined at the close of this section, include the 
contentious debates surrounding the availability of emergency contraception, the figure 
of Nadya Suleman as a disciplining force within the ethopolitical terrain of assisted 
reproduction, and the recent obsession with crisis teen pregnancy in popular media, 
including Juno, Glee, 16 and Pregnant, and Teen Mom. While these sites may seem, at 
the outset, divergent in character and implication(s), critical discourse analysis and 
theories of articulation invite the mapping of their overlaps and continuities as we ask 
broader questions at the intersections of power, meaning, and culture. As Marshall 
McLuhan states, “amid the diversity of our inventions and abstract techniques of 
production and distribution there will be found a great degree of cohesion and unity. This 
consistency is not conscious in origin or effect and seems to arise from a sort of collective 
dream" (22). Thus, without laying claim to causality or intentionality, my project takes 
these cultural moments as its artifacts, with an invitation to think these texts alongside 
one another, and as co-constitutive with a contemporary “collective dream.” Placing them 
at the center of this study, I ask how they cohere, diverge, and create meaning within 
women’s lives specifically, and U.S. social and political culture more generally; I ask 
how they reveal collective anxieties and desires concerning, and profound governmental 
investment in, the reproduction of particular bodies, classes, and cultures, and with an eye 
toward how we might intervene on behalf of reproductive justice. 
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As such, my project proceeds as follows. The second chapter provides an 
overview and synthesis of theoretical material, in which I clearly identify and define what 
I mean by “emergency” con(tra)ceptives and provide a more nuanced discussion of the 
problems that subsequently arise and circulate alongside them. This theoretical work 
foregrounds my critical orientation and posits an initial rethinking of technology toward 
the possibility of reproductive justice.  
In the third chapter, I examine the public debates surrounding the application for 
over-the-counter status for Plan B® emergency contraception. I explore the ways in 
which EC is imagined to disrupt normative sexuality and pregnancy prevention, and 
argue that EC is subsequently managed through a rhetoric of “exception” and 
“emergency.” Imbuing some women with a “right to choice” and reducing others to 
scripted “responsible choices,” this discursive imagining functions to discipline 
reproductive bodies through a differential biopolitics (Sharma) and suggests the 
discursive limits and vulnerabilities of “choice” itself.  
Chapter four explores the cultural crisis signaled by, and concomitantly managed 
through, the figure of Nadya Suleman within the complex terrain of assisted 
reproduction. Specifically, I map the borders of “fit” maternity as it intersects with 
assisted reproductive technologies. Even as these techniques are celebrated as expanding 
“choice” and “self-determination” in motherhood, instances like Nadya Suleman suggest 
a clear delineation between biological enhancement and distortion or monstrosity; a 
designation that seems to hinge less on bio(techno)logical capacity for bearing children 
than it does on assumed cultural legitimacy in raising them.  
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Next, the fifth chapter is concerned with the increasing presence and significance 
of crisis teen pregnancy narratives in popular culture as represented in Juno, 16 and 
Pregnant, Glee, and Teen Mom. From reality television to independent film, I argue that 
these narratives exemplify a set of collective anxieties, fears, and desires regarding 
reproduction and motherhood. Gingerly articulating a perceived crisis in teen pregnancy 
to an “epidemic” of infertility, the logic of emergency configures adoption as a social 
technology for redress. These narratives ultimately serve to reproduce the legitimacy of 
certain kinds of families, asserting maternity not as a biological tie, but as a social status 
and cultural designation. 
In closing, I discuss the theoretical and political implications of this study, 
exploring the potentials and possibilities for intervention on behalf of reproductive justice 
as well as a trajectory for further inquiry. 
Towards a Politics of Possibility 
Technological, cultural, and political imaginations work in tandem to constitute 
technologies of reproductive emergencies within public discourse, in private life, and 
with profound implications for the meaning of maternity, pregnancy, and the ability of 
women to claim a kind of reproductive dignity. While it is certainly true that reproductive 
technologies enable and produce physical effects on the body, my project posits the 
possibility that they also engender another set of material effects alongside the physical—
an expansion (and subsequent contraction) of discursive possibilities through which 
women’s reproductive rights and choices—their experiences of sexuality, maternity, 
indeed of the body itself—are negotiated and constrained. In foregrounding an analysis of 
the kind of discursive conditions under which certain kinds of material effects are 
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produced/made possible, my research aims to build on and extend the aforementioned 
bodies of literature as it examines a set of cultural sites where this work is occurring.  
In so doing, I anticipate this research makes possible at least two different 
theoretical contributions/interventions. First, it stands to clarify the communicative 
dimensions of reproductive politics, with a specific focus on technology. While certainly 
attuned to the social histories of reproductive technologies, this project does not focus on 
a charting of material effects. Rather, I am working to map the discursive unfolding of 
emergency reproductive technologies as “sites of struggle” between a material ontology 
and a set of cultural anxieties—as sites where the rearticulation and/or undermining of 
“differential” (Sharma) biopolitical power formations, and the constituting of maternity 
and proper citizenship in post-9/11 imaginaries, might occur. Second, this mapping 
process allows for an expansion of the perceived and available modes of intervention. In 
other words, it empowers “ways of thinking, being, and acting in the world as possible or 
not” (Slack, "Communication as Articulation" 225). Understanding the communicative 
and discursive dimensions of reproductive politics invites us to think beyond the form, 
function, and implications of a particular discursive formation, to imagine other 
potentialities in the negotiation and management of power/knowledge, and to assert the 
possibilities of a more robust reproductive justice.  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
RETHINKING TECHNOLOGY FOR REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE 
 
 
  
There has never been a shortage of experts ready to pronounce on women’s 
nature and women’s bodies. The biological revolution of the second half of the 
twentieth century has, however, raised the stakes.  
Sally Gregory Kohlstedt and Helen E. Longino 
 
 
Reproductive technologies have been central to feminist politics and scholarship 
for decades, with clear and substantive reason. The first chapter of this dissertation 
provides an overview of contemporary reproductive politics as they overlap and cohere 
meaningfully with shifts in technological terrains, suggesting briefly the various ways in 
which technologies have been implicated in processes of differentiation, biopolitical 
regulation and control. In this second chapter, I am able to expand and provide greater 
depth and critical nuance to an exploration of the reproductive technologies that inform 
this study and the theoretical perspectives that ground my approach to them. First, I work 
to clearly define what I mean by con(tra)ceptive technology, providing a brief but 
detailed account of the specific technologies informing this project. Second, I explore the 
various ways in which reproductive technologies are rhetorically defined, ontologized, 
and contested in a variety of popular contexts and scholarly literatures. Drawing on work 
in critical/cultural studies allows me to suggest a means of thinking about reproductive 
technologies differently in order to shed light on their discursive dimensions and 
epistemological functions. I conclude with a few suggestions as to how this work extends 
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existing literatures, sketches possibilities for interventions on behalf of a more just 
reproductive politics, and provides the critical and theoretical foundation for the 
remainder of this study. 
Con(tra)ceptive Technologies 
Whether articulated to increased choice and autonomy in reproductive decision-
making, or to dystopian visions of a Huxlian “brave new world,” what is certain is that 
the landscape of reproductive technology is continually shifting, expanding, and 
contracting in myriad directions. The first task, then, is to provide a framework within 
which we might thoughtfully engage these technologies, to begin with a survey of the 
histories, uses, and technical dimensions of various con(tra)ceptions.  
In the first chapter, I briefly defined my use of the term con(tra)ceptive 
technologies as referencing a range of practices aimed at controlling fertility. Studies of 
reproductive technologies generally assume substantive distinctions between those 
technologies designed to prevent pregnancy and those designed to encourage or enhance 
conception, thereby focusing either on assisted reproductive technologies or 
contraceptive technologies exclusively. Such distinctions are, of course, materially 
present, theoretically imperative, and useful in many respects. My work, however, 
contributes to bodies of literature that attempt to think these technologies together in spite 
of such differences. In so doing, I aim to identify spaces of continuity and coherence, to 
chart the ways in which many of these technologies, in spite of significant differences 
with regard to their indications and use, are nonetheless discursively situated within 
similar logics and relationships of power. I use the term con(tra)ception or 
con(tra)ceptive technologies, then, to underscore and explore patterns of overlap between 
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assisted reproductive technologies and contraception, while simultaneously 
acknowledging their unique characteristics.  
Myriad con(tra)ceptive technologies currently exist on the U.S. and global 
markets. Of particular interest in this study are those discursively marked by emergency 
or crisis in contemporary cultural contexts. Subsequent chapters identify and investigate 
the cultural sites where the rhetorical labor of emergency unfolds; for now, I focus on an 
explanation of the individual technologies, their histories and functions within a vast 
medical, cultural, and political landscape. 
Emergency Contraception 
Emergency contraception (EC), colloquially dubbed the “morning after pill,” 
refers to several methods of preventing pregnancy after unprotected sex. The most 
common methods are oral medications that include synthetic hormones, more 
specifically, a progestin called levonorgestrel. The progestin found in EC is more 
concentrated than in daily birth control pills, and thus able to prevent pregnancy for up to 
five days after unprotected sex.11 Levonorgestrel works “by inhibiting or delaying 
ovulation, or by preventing implantation of a fertilized egg in the uterus” (The Henry J. 
Kaiser Family Foundation), and importantly, this medication cannot harm or terminate an 
existing pregnancy. Contrary to popular belief, emergency contraception itself is nothing 
new; indeed, the practice of combining regular birth control pills and taking them after 
unprotected sex dates back almost to the inception of hormonal birth control itself. This 
                                                
11 The second form of emergency contraception is a copper IUD, which must be inserted by a medical 
doctor shortly after unprotected sex. This method is not nearly as common, nor is it authorized by the FDA 
for use as an emergency contraceptive. 
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“off-label”12 use of the pill began to circulate within the medical community in the mid-
1960s, when a Dutch physician administered a concentrated dose of estrogen to a 13-
year-old victim of rape to prevent pregnancy. Over the next decade, physicians began to 
experiment with and prescribe this method in what they would determine to be 
“exceptional” circumstances.  
In 1974, the first scientific study of emergency contraception was published in a 
medical journal by Canadian doctor A. Albert Yuzpe; the standard regimen for EC that 
ensued bore his name and consisted of a combination of regular birth control pills taken 
twelve hours apart. The Yuzpe regimen, however, remained relatively obscure, and it 
wasn’t until 1997 that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) officially 
sanctioned this practice and solicited pill manufacturers for a new drug explicitly 
designed for “emergency” use (United States Cong., Emergency). At this invitation of the 
FDA, two small drug manufacturers developed emergency contraceptives—Preven® 
(approved for sales in the U.S. in 1998; removed from the market in 2004) and Plan B® 
(approved in 1999).13 Between the years of 1997 and 2006, emergency contraception was 
approved by the FDA but available only by prescription. For five of those nine years, the 
makers of Plan B® petitioned for over-the-counter status, and an increasingly contentious 
public debate ensued. At its height, the controversy ensnared public health officials, 
                                                
12 The FDA does not intervene in the practice of medicine, but rather regulates which medications are 
available for sale in the U.S., and how they are to be distributed (over-the-counter, or by prescription only). 
An off-label use of a drug, then, refers to “use for an indication, dosage form, dose regimen, population or 
other use parameter not mentioned in the approved labeling” (United States Cong. Emergency 3). 
 
13 In August 2010, another form of EC was approved for sale in the U.S. Ella® consists of ulipristal acetate, 
a selective progesterone-receptor modulator thought to prevent pregnancy through the same mechanisms as 
levonorgestrel/Plan B® by either preventing/delaying ovulation or preventing implantation. However, as a 
selective progesterone-receptor modulator, Ella® makes it possible to selectively enable the intended effect 
of the medication, while simultaneously diminishing undesirable side effects. It is, thus, more effective in 
preventing pregnancy, and provides a larger timeframe within which to do so. As of this writing, it is 
available only by prescription.  
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advocacy organizations, medical associations, FDA commissioners and committee 
members, media outlets, members of Congress, the Government Accountability Office, 
and even the Bush Administration. These debates reside at the center of my analysis in 
chapter three. 
Assisted Reproductive Technologies  
 Medical efforts to encourage, enable, and/or facilitate pregnancy are broadly 
encompassed by the term assisted reproductive technologies (ART), for which there is no 
standard definition. Most agency and industry definitions are remarkably narrow—
alternative, or “artificial,” insemination is excluded from the World Medical 
Association’s definition (World Medical Association); the American Society for 
Reproductive Medicine includes only treatments that involve “laboratory handling of 
eggs, sperm, and/or embryos” (American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Infertility). 
My study builds on the work of scientists, policy experts, and advocates at the Center for 
Genetics and Society, defining ART as “a variety of technologies, some used to initiate 
pregnancy, and others more specifically used to increase likelihood of pregnancy and/or 
to test for the presence of certain genes so prospective parents can choose which embryos 
to implant after in vitro fertilization” (Galpern 5). This definition encompasses a range of 
hormonal and surgical interventions, including alternative insemination, fertility 
enhancing medications, in vitro fertilization (IVF) and its accompanying procedures 
(zygote intrafallopian transfer and gamete intrafallopian tube transfer), egg retrieval, egg 
and sperm donation, cryopreservation, intracytoplasmic sperm injection, preimplantation 
genetic screening/diagnosis (PGS/PGD), ooplasmic transfer, and surrogacy.  
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 The Center for Genetics and Society’s definition is useful in that it provides a 
comprehensive framework for understanding various medical interventions designed to 
boost or otherwise facilitate fertility and pregnancy. And yet, even this more liberal 
definition remains somewhat abbreviated in its inclusions. ARTs are not simply about the 
initiation of pregnancy, but as an industry, are invested in the initiation of maternity and 
familial opportunity. It is a difference that matters, in at least two respects. First, 
understanding the distinction between facilitating fertility/pregnancy and enabling 
mother/parent-hood suggests the necessity of incorporating adoption into conversations 
about technology, reproduction, and justice. As a social or reproductive technology, 
adoption has been largely ignored within medical, advocacy, and academic communities 
otherwise committed to exploring various dimensions of contemporary reproductive 
technologies, which is a significant gap that my work aims to redress.14 Second, this 
clarification highlights the social and cultural dimensions of ART, more fully explored in 
chapters four and five that illuminate collective investments in (re)producing a particular 
kind of motherhood and family. These inclusions and clarifications will be elaborated 
further in subsequent chapters; for now, suffice it to say that ART refers to and 
encompasses a range of social and medical technologies designed to address infertility 
and facilitate pregnancy, as well as mother- and family-hood. 
 Several assisted reproductive technologies demand attention. First, alternative 
insemination (AI) “refers to several different procedures, all of which involve inserting 
sperm into a woman’s body, the differences referring to whether the sperm is placed in 
her vagina, uterus, cervix or fallopian tubes” (Galpern 9). The recorded history of this 
                                                
14 The exception here is the scholarship of Rickie Solinger (Beggars and Choosers), whose work will 
inform much of my subsequent analysis regarding adoption within the context of reproductive justice. 
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technology is traced back hundreds of years to the late seventeenth century, when Dutch 
scientist Anton van Leeuwenhoek observed sperm through the newly invented 
microscope (Foote). Leeuwenhoek’s discovery led to scientific experimentation with 
insemination in animals, first in dogs and rabbits, and shortly followed by dairy cattle and 
swine in the modernization of agriculture.15 The use of AI in response to human 
infertility was experimental during the 1860s and successfully conducted as early as 1884 
in U.S. medical practice, although this first case went unreported for twenty-five years 
due to social and scientific stigma.16  
Medical and cultural attitudes have since shifted significantly, and dimensions of 
AI use today are various and many; the reasons include both male and female infertility,17 
the procedure can be done at home or in a medical facility, with sperm frozen or fresh, 
from a donor or partner. According to the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, 
sperm quality is based on “volume (amount), motility (movement), and morphology 
(appearance and shape)” (Infertility). In the case of male infertility due to poor sperm 
quality, two AI options are available—placing sperm directly into a woman’s uterus to 
encourage fertilization (intrauterine insemination or IUI) or the direct injection of a single 
                                                
15 While assisted reproductive technologies are perhaps more colloquially understood in reference to human 
reproduction, much of the development and use of ART is in animal husbandry, the production of animals 
for human use and consumption, and most often deployed in factory farm settings. While somewhat 
tangential to my current project, I believe feminist scholarship and activisms regarding reproductive justice 
do little to address the political and ethical dimensions of these issues. Current frames of reproductive 
“choice” and autonomy do not travel well across species. Whether or not they should, or to what extent 
they might, are concerns I mark here for future exploration. 
 
16 The human history of AI, much like other histories of reproductive politics and technologies, is mired in 
eugenics philosophy and practice, and is similarly interrogated by feminist scholarship; see Cynthia R. 
Daniels and Janet Golden, "Procreative Compounds: Popular Eugenics, Artificial Insemination and the Rise 
of the American Sperm Banking Industry," Journal of Social History 38 (2004). 
 
17 Approximately one-third of infertility in couples is attributed to men, one-third to women, and the 
remaining third is attributed to a combination of problems. Roughly twenty percent of infertility cases are 
unexplained; see American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Frequently Asked Questions About 
Infertility, 2011. 
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sperm into an egg in a medical lab (intracytoplasmic sperm injection or ICSI). If no 
sperm are present in the male partner’s semen, sperm donation is often recommended. 
Whether from a donor or partner, sperm used in the AI process is generally “washed,” 
meaning that sperm and semen are separated in order to eliminate dead or slow sperm or 
any chemicals present that may be contributing to infertility. AI is also recommended for 
several forms of female infertility, single women and lesbian couples. In cases where 
women have mild endometriosis, problems with ovulation, cervical abnormalities, or 
even unexplained infertility, intrauterine insemination is often suggested as a potential 
solution.  
 In vitro fertilization (IVF) is one of the more culturally familiar assisted 
reproductive technologies. In 1978, Louise Brown made world headlines as the first “test 
tube baby;” a host of affiliated developments in ARTs has followed, such as births from 
frozen embryos and sperm (cryopreservation), egg donation, and gestational surrogacy. 
The process of IVF is a significant investment of time, money, energy, technical and 
medical expertise; its stages involve several distinct ARTs, including those that facilitate 
ovarian stimulation, egg retrieval, fertilization, embryo culture, and embryo transfer 
(American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Assisted Reproductive Technologies). The 
first stage of this process, ovarian stimulation or ovulation induction, is initiated by the 
woman taking prescribed fertility-enhancing drugs, either orally or by injection, to 
stimulate the production of one or more eggs per cycle; oral medications are not as 
effective and thus less common in IVF/ART cycles.18 These hormones function by first 
inhibiting, and then hyperstimulating, the ovaries. According to the American Society for 
                                                
18 Fertility-enhancing drugs are not solely used for the purposes of IVF. They can be prescribed on their 
own for treatment of infertility, or used in conjunction with AI methods to increase the likelihood of 
conception. 
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Reproductive Medicine, timing is critical in this process. Ultrasound monitoring tracks 
the development of ovarian follicles and, in conjunction with blood tests, reveals the 
proper timing for the retrieval of eggs. The process, of course, is not without risk or 
potential failure—in 2008, approximately eleven percent of ART cycles were cancelled 
in this early stage, due either to a lack of physiological response to ovarian stimulation 
medications, or, more rarely, to ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome (OHSS) (United 
States Dept. of Health and Human Services, 2008 Assisted Reproductive Technology).
 In subsequent stages of IVF, a woman’s matured eggs are retrieved or “harvested” 
most often by transvaginal ultrasound aspiration, a surgical procedure done under light 
anesthesia in which a needle is guided by ultrasound through the vaginal wall and into the 
ovarian follicles where the eggs can be suctioned out. In the event that the ultrasound is 
unable to access one or both ovaries, operative laparoscopy can retrieve eggs through use 
of a small telescope inserted through the naval (American Society for Reproductive 
Medicine, Assisted Reproductive Technologies). Eggs are then fertilized in a laboratory, 
either in an IVF culture medium, which provides an ideal environment for the sperm and 
egg to unite, or by means of direct insemination of the egg by needle (intracytoplasmic 
sperm injection). Even when ICSI is used, there is a possibility that fertilization will fail 
to occur, as only “40% to 70% of the mature eggs will fertilize after insemination or 
ICSI” ("Assisted Reproductive Technologies"). An embryo, defined as a fertilized egg 
that has begun the process of cell division, has a window of one to six days in which to be 
transferred to the uterus in traditional IVF processes.19 Some women elect to have a mild 
                                                
19 Two variations on IVF currently exist, zygote intrafallopian transfer (ZIFT) and gamete intrafallopian 
transfer (GIFT). Both report lower rates of success, tend to be more expensive, and are less common than 
traditional IVF. ZIFT places a one cell embryo, or zygote, into a woman’s fallopian tube via laparoscopic 
surgery. It is widely acknowledged to be the most invasive ART treatment. Following traditional modes of 
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sedative; no anesthesia is medically required. One or more embryos are inserted through 
the women’s cervix and into her uterus via a long tube with a syringe on one end, called a 
transfer catheter. Success rates for IVF vary significantly and depend on several factors. 
The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention tracks ART statistics, voluntarily 
reported by the majority of fertility clinics across the country. In 2009, the most recent 
year for which data are available, 146,244 IVF cycles (including ZIFT and GIFT) 
resulted in 45,870 live births (deliveries of one or more living infants) and 60,190 infants 
(American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Assisted Reproductive Technologies). In 
other words, approximately thirty-one percent of IVF cycles resulted in live birth. 
 In vitro fertilization has proven requisite to the revival of surrogacy arrangements 
in recent years. As an alternative means for conceiving and birthing children, traditional 
surrogacy spans a variety of cultures and can be traced back to ancient Babylonian law 
circa 1800 BCE (Ali and Kelley 47). As Deborah Spar notes, “[w]omen across the globe 
have long used others to bear the children they could not conceive, relying on a 
combination of tradition, coercion, and affection to create the desired result” (290). 
However, in the absence of medical technology, surrogacy arrangements historically 
dictate that the surrogate or birth mother is also, necessarily, a biological parent, having 
contributed half of the genetic material through her egg. Until recently, then, surrogacy 
arrangements have been relatively rare in the United States given the host of affective, 
ethical, and legal concerns within which they are embedded.  
Assisted reproductive technologies, on the other hand, offer the scientific capacity 
to separate egg from womb, arguably diminishing a surrogate’s claim to biological or 
                                                                                                                                            
egg retrieval, GIFT allows fertilization to happen inside the woman’s body by placing both egg and sperm 
directly into the fallopian tube. It is a method available only to women with healthy fallopian tubes, and is 
often considered by women or couples whose religious beliefs may oppose traditional forms of IVF.  
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genetic motherhood. A gestational surrogate, or carrier, refers to “a woman giving birth 
to a child formed from the fertilized egg of another woman” (McEwen 275). Thus, 
globalized political economies, advanced technological innovations, and contractual 
agreements that straddle international borders (and laws) and link women from a range of 
socio-economic and ethnic backgrounds are producing what is colloquially referred to as 
a “booming” industry of trans/national gestational surrogacy.20 While legal oversight and 
regulation of surrogacy arrangements remain vague and ambiguous, varying significantly 
from country to country and even from state to state within the U.S., gestational 
surrogacy is nonetheless regularly incorporated within the scientific, medical, and 
professional literature regarding ART options.21  
This brief overview defines the basic form and function of the con(tra)ceptive 
technologies informing this project. I turn now to a discussion of the various ways in 
which these technologies are rhetorically ontologized and contested in a variety of 
popular contexts and scholarly literatures. 
                                                
20 The complexity of questions raised by trans/national gestational surrogacy does not escape the attention 
of this scholar. In perhaps some of the oldest recorded accounts of surrogacy, intricate relationships of 
kinship, coercion, and dominance abound. Judeo-Christian texts reference Bilhah, Zilpah, and Hagar, three 
servants/handmaids who bore children on behalf of Rachel, Leah, and Sarah (respectively). While little 
attention is devoted to the complexities of these arrangements in biblical texts, what is clear is that 
inequities between surrogates and intended mothers are written onto and through the practice of surrogacy 
itself from its early inception. “Handmaids” may no longer be socially or politically palatable, but 
contemporary articulations of surrogacy within the context of ART ushers in a host of new questions for 
feminist scholarship and advocacy. I mark this here as a site for future exploration. 
 
21 See, for example, the American Society for Reproductive Medicine; U.S. Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention; World Medical Association. Within this literature, adoption is similarly posited as an 
alternative to, or even an extension of, fertility treatment. Given that adoption does not involve medical or 
technological innovation, but rather, hinges on social and legal innovation, it exceeds the parameters of this 
particular chapter. That said, the use of adoption as a social technology figures prominently in my analysis 
in chapter five. 
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Ontology and Technology 
Myriad cultural forces coalesce to inform the ways in which con(tra)ceptive 
technologies come to mean in collective imaginaries and individual lives. This section 
attends to the mainstream, scientific, and feminist discourses that work to configure the 
role of these technologies as ontological, natural, or otherwise fixed. I begin with a 
discussion of mainstream and scientific discourses that articulate reproductive technology 
to notions of progress and the natural/biological, then turn to a discussion of feminist 
literatures that contest these meanings, charting the problematic histories of reproductive 
technologies and their material effects for women. 
Reproductive Technology as (Natural) Progress 
 Not unlike other forms of technology that emerge and circulate within culture, 
reproductive technologies are often hailed and embraced with enthusiasm within 
mainstream and scientific communities, simultaneously (and ironically) configured as 
embodiments of scientific progress and as a natural unfolding of events. Indeed, the 
notion of technology as enrichment and improvement is intimately connected to cultural 
constructions—the assumed ontology—of technology itself; innovation is commonly 
conflated with improvement of material, ethical, cultural conditions. Science and 
technology, then, become sites for the imagined proliferation of progress and evolution, 
and they are assumed to function as exceptional and unproblematic goods. Popular 
discourses exemplify this logic regarding reproductive technology at a wealth of cultural 
sites and in various ways. In this first section I will illustrate this claim using oral 
contraception as a specific example. First, I examine the pill at the time of its original 
introduction onto the U.S. market. Second, and somewhat differently, I draw from 
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research on a more recent contraceptive, Seasonale, to explore how this logic is expressed 
within contemporary contexts.  
First, the discursive figuration of oral contraception in popular newspapers and 
periodicals was characterized by an overt celebration of progress and technology. Indeed, 
since its highly anticipated FDA-approved entrée in the U.S. in 1960, the pill has been 
hailed as a medical breakthrough of profound importance. In 1966, Newsweek declared: 
“For the eighth consecutive year, the U.S. birth rate has declined, the contraceptive pill is 
being used by large numbers of U.S. Catholic women, and new contraception techniques 
promise to blunt the worldwide population explosion . . . . The most revolutionary change 
in the last 50 years, of course, is the birth-control pill” ("Death of a Taboo" 94). 
Emphasizing its newness and radical potential, a 1962 article in Ebony explained that the 
pill “is a totally new method of contraception different in every respect from the 
conventional methods which have been used from many years . . . . [It has] a record of 
effectiveness which no other contraceptive has matched” (Guttmacher 126). 
The comparison of the pill to previous methods frequently emphasizes the vast 
difference between modern science and earlier “primitive” techniques: “Both drug 
companies and academic research institutes have recently spent fortunes trying to isolate 
a contraceptive on the ‘nature knows best’ reasoning, and they have failed dismally. The 
truth is that…[plant derived substances] are neither as good nor as safe as the artificial 
products now available” ("Contraception" 76). There is an explicit and profound 
distinction made here between the natural and the artificial. In this particular figuration, 
science and synthetics possess a clear advantage to anything nature can provide on its 
own. In this way, modern science and technology are continually and readily articulated 
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as a means of improving, extending, or perfecting nature through innovation; a process 
for ensuring human evolution. In other words, science is imagined as necessarily building 
upon, controlling, and allegedly improving nature within the broader cultural narrative of 
progress. 
 This unfettered faith in contraceptive technological innovation occasionally is 
extended to, and situated alongside, other forms of modern convenience and 
consumption: “Just as we have adjusted our lives to the television set and the automobile, 
so in 20 years time we shall take the pill for granted, and wonder how we ever lived 
without it” (Hacker 140). The analogy is striking and revealing. Certainly, the writer 
remarks here upon the cultural imprint of these particular technologies, the transformative 
ways in which we have imagined and integrated them into public and private life. The 
pill, like cars and television sets, becomes a signifier of modernity and a “natural” 
“unfolding” of human progress. Simultaneously of interest in this analogy are the forms 
of convenience and consumption negotiated through these technologies, and the parallel 
experiential claims we might anticipate concerning contraception; indeed, the 
convenience and consumption (of sex and sexuality) become a primary site of contention 
over the morality of the pill, particularly in traditional, domestic, white, middle-class 
settings. 
 Thus, the pill serves as one example of the celebration and enthusiastic embrace 
of technological progress, and there are certainly others that have been explored within 
the vast body of literature pertaining to reproductive technologies.22 More recently 
                                                
22 See, for example, Barbara Duden, Disembodying Women: Perspectives on Pregnancy and the Unborn 
(Boston: Harvard University Press, 1993), Gordon, Moral Property, Susan Perry and James L. Dawson, 
Nightmare: Women and the Dalkon Shield (New York: Macmillan, 1985), Petchesky, "Fetal Images: The 
Power of Visual Culture in the Politics of Reproduction.", Roberts, Killing the Black Body. 
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however, progress has been somewhat reconfigured to accommodate contemporary 
biopolitical configurations, and the “politics of life itself” (Rose). As Rose argues, newer 
technologies of biological enhancement and optimization are less about mechanical 
extensions of the body (i.e. the cyborg) or external controls over nature, than they are 
implicated in a process that seeks to manage the body on a micro level, to augment or 
reconfigure what’s taken to be “natural”:  
Unlike these uses of robotics and computing, which seem to make the human 
being less biological, the new molecular enhancement technologies do not attempt 
to hybridize the body with mechanical equipment but to transform it at the 
organic level, to reshape vitality from the inside: in the process the human 
becomes, not less biological, but all the more biological. (20, emphasis in 
original) 
 
Thus, in the era of a “politics of life itself,” our organic, biological selves are enabled and 
enriched through technological intervention. Technologies are no longer divorced from or 
superior to nature; rather, they offer a way for us to access our better nature(s) through 
extension and “optimization.” In this way, contemporary biotechnologies of life are 
imagined to produce a more “natural” self.  
Laura Mamo and Jennifer Ruth Fosket’s study of Seasonale, an extended-cycle 
oral contraception23 approved by the FDA in 2003, helps to anchor and explore biological 
optimization and enhancement within a concrete, contemporary setting. Mamo and 
Fosket attend closely to the communicative dimensions of Seasonale’s advertising 
campaign, arguing that Seasonale is discursively constituted as a “lifestyle drug” that 
promises “a refashioning of the material body with transformative, life-enhancing 
results” (Mamo and Fosket 925). That is, in lieu of an emphasis on effectiveness in 
                                                
23 Extended cycle contraceptives lengthen the number of days women take hormonally active pills, which 
ultimately functions to suppress/reduce menstruation (Hollander). Seasonale advertises that its users only 
experience four menstrual periods a year.  
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pregnancy prevention (which is, of course, a notable absence within a contraceptive 
campaign), Seasonale purports to offer a solution to the “problem” of menstruation and 
reinscribes familiar cultural pathologies onto the female body: 
[T]he marketers of Seasonale frame menstruation itself, in essence, as a side 
effect of medication . . . . eliminating these unnatural periods seems perfectly 
reasonable, and thus Seasonale is normalized. Indeed, changing cultural ideas 
about menstruation was an important first step in the marketing of Seasonale. 
These changing ideas reconfigure our experiences of our bodies and can then, 
theoretically, be turned into changing practices—taking pharmaceuticals—that 
will reshape the body in congruence with the new ideas. (934) 
 
In other words, menstruation is rhetorically shaped and coded as “unnatural” in order to 
encourage and legitimize the use of Seasonale as an extended cycle contraceptive. As 
such, Seasonale functions perfectly within contemporary biopolitical configurations that 
privilege interventions onto the micro forms of “life itself.” As a lifestyle drug, it marks a 
shift away from technological control over nature, to forms of optimization and 
enhancement that work to transform what is considered to be natural—i.e. the body itself, 
its internal processes and biological functions. 
 These two examples illustrate the ways in which contraceptive technologies are 
rhetorically naturalized and sutured to notions of progress—either through a discourse 
that posits science/technology as a force that harnesses and exceeds nature to encourage 
human progress, or through a positing of science/technology as that which optimizes and 
brings into existence a better, more natural/biological life. What is clear in both instances 
is that reproductive technologies are definitively located within popular imaginaries as 
sites for the extension and progress of “natural” human life. Even within mainstream 
feminist communities, these technologies are overwhelmingly embraced as empowering 
women’s reproductive “choice” and sustaining “desirable” cultural and population 
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growth. Most fundamentally, reproductive technologies are assumed as a kind of 
ontology; they are envisioned as intrinsic, constitutive, and natural, a force with 
predetermined, progressive material effects for individual women, families, and society 
as a whole. 
Reproductive Technology as a Contested Cultural Force 
Given common cultural celebrations of “progress” and “technology” as entirely 
unproblematic and constructive, feminists concerned with reproductive justice have been 
pressed to question the implications of reproductive technologies, and their deployment 
in particular medical, cultural, and political spaces, for women. A wealth of scholarship 
has emerged in response to the constitution of reproductive technologies as natural, 
progressive, and/or empowering. Given the (multiple, differentiated) histories of material 
effects, much of the theoretical engagement with reproductive technology voices 
(warranted) suspicions and charts their problematic effects and uses.  
Much of this scholarship is broadly situated within feminist science studies, which 
critique the claim to scientific objectivity, and articulate the cultural, historical, and 
political dimensions of scientific inquiry: “Science does not stand above the world, or 
apart from its conflicts; it is rather the science of a given society. Its communal practice 
reflects the needs of the dominant sector, and its way of thinking increasingly reflects the 
dominant ideology” (Berman 250). Thus, feminist standpoint epistemology24 recognizes 
science as both rooted within and as an extension of politics. There is no “pure” science 
that is “misused” and/or “abused;” science is inextricably wed to its social, cultural and 
historical origins. As Sandra Harding notes in her classic study: “the sciences are part and 
                                                
24 Feminist standpoint epistemology is an extensive body of literature that draws on/includes the work of 
Nancy Chodorow, Carol Gilligan, Sandra Harding, Nancy Hartstock, Patricia Hill Collins, bell hooks, 
Alison Jaggar, and Evelyn Fox Keller, to name a few. 
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parcel…of the social orders from which they emerge and which support them. ‘Science 
versus society’ is a false and distorting image” (Harding 37). Subsequently, feminist 
epistemology rejects both a narrative of technological progress and a narrative of 
scientific neutrality. Rather, science is positioned as a socially produced, and thus, 
socially located, episteme, even if its social and cultural origins are often obscured: 
“social desires are frequently defined as technological needs” (Harding 37). The popular 
and medical discourses surrounding reproductive technologies reveal that they are no 
exception. 
For example, much feminist scholarship has interrogated the complex and 
insidious relationship between birth control, eugenics, and population control.25 
Examples from history abound. In response to then-President Teddy Roosevelt’s 
accusation of “race suicide,” white and middle class “pro-birth control feminists began to 
popularize the idea that poor people had a moral obligation to restrict the size of their 
families, because large families create a drain on the taxes and charity expenditures of the 
wealthy and because poor children were less likely to be ‘superior’” (Gordon qtd. in 
Davis 209-210). State-funded family planning programs as early as the 1930s targeted 
low-income communities of color; while these communities otherwise had difficulty 
accessing quality health care and medical services, birth control was encouraged and 
made readily available through government programs (Davis; Gordon, Moral Property; 
Roberts, Killing the Black Body). As Ronald Walter Greene explains, by mid-twentieth 
                                                
25 See Phillida Bunkle, "Calling the Shots? The International Politics of Depo-Provera," The Racial 
Economy of Science: Toward a Democratic Future (Race, Gender, and Science), ed. Sandra Harding 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993), Davis, Women, Race, and Class, Greene, Malthusian 
Worlds: U.S. Leadership and the Governing of the Population Crisis, Roberts, Killing the Black Body, 
Solinger, Pregnancy and Power.  
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century the use of family planning was central in maintaining U.S. power in global and 
domestic settings; it was, in fact, “the primary solution to the population crisis” (85). In 
other words, when it came to contraception, women of privilege were given rights as 
other women were assigned responsibilities. 
Semi-permanent and long-term methods of hormonal contraception have received 
more extensive critique for embeddedness within racist, classist, and imperialist 
structures. In the wake of the Dalkon Shield catastrophe, a well-documented instance of 
inadequate testing and corporate cover-up for profit,26 technological interventions on the 
reproductive body have been met with deep suspicions within feminist communities. 
Norplant, for instance, is a synthetic hormone surgically implanted underneath the skin, 
which boasts effectiveness in preventing pregnancy for up to five years (Roberts, Killing 
the Black Body). Developed by the Population Council for use in developing nations,27 
Norplant was originally touted for its convenience and long-lasting effectivity. 
Throughout the 1990s in the U.S., Norplant was enthusiastically embraced by lawmakers 
as a method of reproductive regulation and aggressively marketed to women receiving 
public assistance: “At a time when legislatures nationwide are slashing social programs 
for the poor, public aid for Norplant became a popular budget item” (Roberts, Killing the 
Black Body 108). Many states proposed, and several passed, legislation providing 
                                                
26 See Gordon, Moral Property, Perry and Dawson, Nightmare: Women and the Dalkon Shield. The 
Dalkon Shield was a brand of an intrauterine device, available in the U.S. from 1971-1974 and eventually 
removed from the market by the FDA for safety concerns. The Dalkon Shield caused at least twenty deaths 
in the U.S., and was the source of severe infections, pelvic inflammatory disease, sterility, and other long-
term or permanent damages to women’s bodies and lives. The manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield did not 
destroy these defective and dangerous contraceptives in the wake of U.S. controversy: “as the awareness of 
dangers grew in the United States, it dumped thirty-five thousand shields on the international market. The 
company later refused to notify third-world users of the IUD’s dangers, agreeing only to alert foreign 
embassies. Today many women still have Dalkon Shields inside their bodies” (Gordon, 334). 
 
27 These origins, of course, warrant suspicion in and of themselves. 
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significant financial incentives for the use of Norplant for women receiving Medicaid, 
AFDC, and other forms of public assistance. Furthermore, while implantation of Norplant 
was promoted through various state incentives and often free of charge to low-income 
women, these same programs refused to pay for Norplant’s removal. For the many 
women experiencing the severe (and, at times, life-threatening) side effects of Norplant,28 
this kind of legislative incentive was anything but the promotion of reproductive 
autonomy and “choice.” As Dorothy Roberts writes in her thorough and devastating 
exploration of Norplant’s social/political/legal history, it “served as a means for doctors 
and government officials to dictate their [poor Black women’s] procreative decisions” 
(Killing the Black Body 122). Notably, while the use of Norplant in the U.S. and 
European countries has been suspended, it and its predecessor, Norplant II, remain a 
fixture on the international market, particularly within developing nations. 
 Contraception has not been the only site at which feminist scholarship has 
questioned the popular assumptions and scientific assertions regarding reproductive 
technology. Visualization technologies, such as obstetric ultrasound, have been 
extensively interrogated and critiqued within feminist scholarship and, in particular, 
along two general vectors. First, the ultrasound has been critically theorized in 
relationship to medical authority, women’s subjectivities, and their experiences of 
pregnancy; it is a relationship characterized by what Rosalind Petchesky refers to as a 
“panoptics of the womb, whose aim is ‘to establish normative behavior for the fetus at 
various gestational stages’ and to maximize medical control over pregnancy” (Petchesky 
                                                
28 Side effects of Norplant include heavy bleeding, cramping, weight gain, anxiety, nervousness, nausea, 
vomiting, dizziness, headaches, rashes, hair loss, ovarian cysts, and mild to severe depression. The severity 
of these side effects, combined with Medicaid policies that refused Norplant’s removal, led to documented 
instances of women, in moments of desperation, carving the devices out of their arms with kitchen knives 
(Roberts).  
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277). Thus, the ultrasound, for many scholars,29 is implicated in a process that both 
disembodies and disempowers women, shifting the locus of pregnancy’s expertise away 
from women and privileging instead scientific investigation and the empirical forms of 
knowledge yielded by visualization techniques. Janelle S. Taylor’s ethnographic study 
provides an illustration of the processes of surveillance and compulsory normativity 
enforced by use of obstetric ultrasound,30 particularly with regard to prenatal bonding 
theory, which “implicitly suggests that women need both medical technology and the 
assistance of the medical professionals in order to form the proper emotional attitude 
toward their fetuses” (Taylor 23, emphasis in original).   
Furthermore, obstetric ultrasound is not only implicated in a process of 
disembodying women, but also, some scholars argue, in a process of lending scientific 
authority and velocity to abortion opponents’ claims regarding the “sanctity” of 
embryonic life and fetal personhood (Casper; Duden; Petchesky; Stabile; Taylor). As 
Monica J. Casper explains: “[s]cience, technology, and medicine are important and 
authoritative worlds in which definitions of life are propagated and subsequently 
represented in other worlds…the ‘meaning of life’ in these worlds is invested with 
greater claims to truth and universality” (105). As such, fetal personhood is asserted with 
                                                
29 See Duden, Disembodying Women: Perspectives on Pregnancy and the Unborn, Lynn M. Morgan and 
Meredith W. Michaels, eds., Fetal Subjects, Feminist Positions (Philadelphia, PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1999), Petchesky, "Fetal Images: The Power of Visual Culture in the Politics of 
Reproduction", Janelle S. Taylor, "Image of Contradiction: Obstetrical Ultrasound in American Culture," 
Reproducing Reproduction: Kinship, Power, and Technological Innovation, eds. Sarah Franklin and 
Helena Ragoné (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998). 
 
30 The critique of what Silja Samerski titles “compulsory self-determination” is also revealed in some of the 
feminist literature that interrogates ART. See Lisa C. Ikemoto, "Eggs as Capital: Human Egg Procurement 
in the Fertility Industry and the Stem Cell Research Enterprise," Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and 
Society 34.4 (2009), Dorothy Roberts, "Race, Gender, and Genetic Technologies: A New Reproductive 
Dystopia?," Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 34.4 (Summer 2009), Samerski, "Genetic 
Counseling and the Fiction of Choice: Taught Self-Determination as a New Technique of Social 
Engineering."  
 51 
increasing vigor through visualization technologies, which in turn assume a kind of 
cultural force. Some scholars note the effective mobilization of fetal imagery to animate 
anti-abortion movements’ recruitment, garner media attention, and legitimate antiabortion 
rhetoric more broadly (Mason; Petchesky; Stabile); others assert the necessity of feminist 
response to such imagery within the context of these social/political debates: “As the 
fetus looms larger and larger in the legend of pregnancy, the politics of abortion must 
adjust accordingly. This is not a matter of conceding ground, but rather of making 
explicit the ground of women’s reproductive freedom” (Michaels 130). The exigence for 
this work is increasingly clear. Recent legislative trends suggest the significance of fetal 
imagery in abbreviating women’s rights and authorizing coercion, codified, for example, 
in state mandates for medically unnecessary ultrasounds for women seeking abortion 
services.31 
Feminist interrogations of obstetric ultrasound and contraception are just two 
topical examples of the extensive literature engaged with, and critical of, reproductive 
technologies. Embedded within feminist science studies more broadly, this work draws at 
least implicitly on critiques of scientific objectivity to illustrate the complexities and 
problematics of assuming science necessarily implies objective, neutral, and universally 
accessible “progress.” These studies extend and elaborate the various forums and 
practices in which the logics of scientific authority unfold with significant, differential, 
and at times dire, material implications for women. This work, then, is essential in 
beginning to disrupt articulations of science as inherently progressive and beneficial, to 
                                                
31 While these legislative trends exceed the parameters of this dissertation, I mark it here for further 
exploration and inclusion in my book project. 
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begin to understand the complexities, multiplicities, and ambiguities embedded within 
relationships between women, culture, and reproductive technologies. 
And yet, the residue of a kind of technological determinism remains apparent. The 
critique of science is often used to articulate the force of reproductive technologies in the 
opposite direction. In other words, while deconstructing assumptions regarding the 
“progressive” or “beneficial” characteristics of technologies, much of this literature 
simultaneously assumes and supports a reciprocal claim; that, embedded within a broader 
cultural system that marginalizes women and minorities, these technologies work to 
reinscribe and uphold dominant ideologies and power formations. This argument 
exemplifies a kind of cultural determinism; it assumes that shifts in cultural practices and 
beliefs instigate the development and use of particular technologies. While certainly 
reproductive technologies sometimes function in precisely this way, in the process of 
uncovering the material effects of these technologies, much of this scholarship also 
assigns a kind of fixed ontology to, and assumes a set of a priori effects for, 
con(tra)ceptive technologies. While these technologies certainly have material effects 
(which include, for example, the cultural perception of “crisis” and disruption that this 
project aims to interrogate), I wish to draw from critical/cultural theories to think about 
reproductive technologies differently. My project works to privilege the epistemological 
function(s) of reproductive technologies, in lieu of their ontological status, to ultimately 
locate possible points of intervention and modes of resistance. In other words, I am 
interested in the possibilities that emerge when we focus less on charting material effects 
and foreground instead an analysis of the discursive conditions under which such effects 
are made possible.  
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Rethinking Technology 
 A significant body of media, technology, and cultural studies scholarship has 
theorized relationships between technology and culture in a way that resists technological 
or cultural determinism, and works instead to chart intricate overlaps and 
consubstantialities between the two.32 Indeed, it seems somewhat facile to assume the 
relative impotence or overwhelming dominance of either culture or technology over the 
other. Still, the regularity with which these assumptions prevail in social, scientific, and 
scholarly communities is profound. Interrogating the relationship between technology 
and culture, generating an understanding the myriad of economic, social, historical, and 
political forces that shape technological unfoldings is imperative in beginning to unseat 
some of these assumptions. For Raymond Williams, the stakes are materially significant 
and substantive:  
If technology is a cause, we can at best modify or seek to control its effects. Or if 
the technology, as used, is an effect, to what other kinds of cause, and other kinds 
of action, should we refer and relate our experience of its uses? These are not 
abstract questions. They form an increasingly important part of our social and 
cultural arguments, and they are being decided all the time in real practice, by real 
and effective decisions. (Williams, Television: Technology and Cultural Form 20) 
 
Following Williams’ theorizing of cultural materialism, much cultural studies scholarship 
has taken seriously the task of theorizing and thinking culture/technology together, in an 
                                                
32 See, for example, Ann Balsamo, Technologies of the Gendered Body: Reading Cyborg Women, Andrew 
Feenberg, Critical Theory of Technology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), Andrew Feenberg, 
"Democratic Rationalization: Technology, Power, and Freedom," Philosophy of Technology: The 
Technological Condition, eds. Robert C. Scharff and Val Dusek (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 
2003), Ken Hillis, “On the Margins: The Invisibility of Communications in Geography,” Progress in 
Human Geography 22 4 (1998): 543-66. Carolyn Marvin, When Old Technologies Were New: Thinking 
About Communications in the Late Nineteenth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), Lisa 
Parks, Cultures in Orbit: Satellites and the Televisual (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), Lynn 
Spigel, Welcome to the Dreamhouse: Popular Media and Postwar Suburbs (Console-Ing Passions) 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001), Raymond Williams, Television: Technology and Cultural 
Form, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 1990). 
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attempt to move away from the binary often inscribed through processes of theorizing 
culture and technology as discrete entities.  
Understanding culture and technology as more thoroughly integrated allows us to 
explore the ways in which technology functions as a site for the negotiation of meaning 
and power. Andrew Feenberg’s work is particularly useful in exploring the intricacies 
that mark technological culture, with a generated sensitivity to the ways in which 
technologies are necessarily reflective of and inextricably tied to cultural assumptions 
and power formations. While Feenberg acknowledges the force/imprint of technology, he 
remains sensitive to their social and political dimensions as “scene[s] of struggle.” And in 
lieu of claiming technology as neutral, Feenberg theorizes technology as “ambivalent,” in 
order to recognize the social values and interests embedded in technological design, 
while simultaneously admitting the unfixity of these origins. In this way, for Feenberg, 
critical interrogations of technology constitute an essential dimension of struggles against 
hegemony (Feenberg, "Democratic Rationalization"). Or, in the words of Carolyn 
Marvin, they allow us to examine cultural “arenas for negotiating issues crucial to the 
conduct of social life; among them, who is inside and outside, who may speak, who may 
not, and who has authority and may be believed” (Marvin 4). Thus, foregrounding the 
complex of relations between technology and culture provides an opportunity to explore 
various dimensions of con(tra)ceptive technologies with a sensitivity to discursive 
fissures, vulnerabilities, and the re-making/mapping of power onto individual bodies and 
publics, and the available modes of intervention in these processes.  
Thus, following the work of Williams and others, I wish to explore the 
contingencies embedded within con(tra)ceptive technologies’ material and cultural 
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dimensions. In particular, I attend to the discursive ruptures provoked by con(tra)ceptive 
technologies and signaled by rhetorics of “emergency.” Tracing such rhetorics in popular, 
political, legal, and scientific culture, with dedicated attention to the ways in which they 
intersect with and inform reproductive technologies, provides a rich site for the 
investigation of how we collectively manage and assuage cultural anxieties, fears, and 
desires, and to maintain those practices, beliefs, and structures which are culturally 
imagined as “natural.” As Ken Hillis notes:  
[T]echnology achieves its greatest affect after a disappearing act—when it 
becomes so commonplace that it is accepted as an indispensable ‘second nature’. 
This disappearance or ‘forgetting about’ is also the naturalization of the 
technology-as-conduit metaphor, though on a day-to-day basis, any material or 
cultural technology must recede into the ‘background’ of a place if it is to have 
any meaningful affect. (546-547)  
 
Discourses of “emergency” and “crisis” signal the disruption of technological 
disappearance, points at which normative modes of con(tra)ceptive practice have been 
violated or transgressed. Public, rhetorical management and negotiation of the 
“emergency” becomes the means by which the ‘forgetting about’ is rigorously re-
membered and culturally realigned. Thus, critical attention to these moments of rupture 
reveal the forms of discursive labor necessary to (re)legitimize and discipline 
technological use as well as its users; it also suggests other modes of rhetorical possibility 
on behalf of a more just reproductive politics. 
This approach is suggested in a few of the literatures engaged with reproductive 
technologies, and it is from here that I ground and extend the rethinking of technologies 
towards a reproductive justice. Communication scholars such as Ann Balsamo and 
Valerie Hartouni interrogate the meaning and significance of reproductive technologies 
by reading them alongside prominent cultural narratives and practices. For my own 
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project, the provocation of their work resides in the suggestion that if reproductive 
technologies provoke a kind of cultural anxiety, it is because they exist as sites upon 
which we must continually remap assumptions in order maintain certain hierarchies. New 
technologies seem to present the opportunity to lay bare our ideological problematics and 
highlight the work it takes to maintain and sustain these beliefs and practices. Perhaps it 
is also, then, the opportunity to de-naturalize these assumptions and practices, to begin 
the work of interrogating and dismantling hierarchies that prohibit a more libratory 
(reproductive) politics.   
Rethinking con(tra)ceptive technologies in this way provides a point of departure 
for addressing women’s disparate histories and experiences, a space from which to assert 
the possibilities for a more thorough and robust reproductive justice through an analysis 
of the presence and significance of reproductive technology in women’s lives, and culture 
more broadly. These technologies are often, and increasingly, implicated in the troubled 
and differential histories of reproductive politics. However, far from being theorized or 
interrogated as a set of cultural forces, both material and discursive, con(tra)ceptive 
technologies are assumed to possess a kind of fixed ontology; they are imagined to act on 
the world (and on women’s bodies) in specific and (over)determined ways. Certainly, it is 
true that reproductive technologies enable and produce particular physical effects on the 
body. That said, my project posits the possibility that they also engender another set of 
material effects—an expansion (and subsequent contraction) of discursive possibilities 
through which women’s reproductive rights and choices—their experiences of sexuality, 
maternity, indeed of the body itself—are negotiated and constrained. In foregrounding an 
analysis of the discursive conditions under which certain material effects are produced or 
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made possible, I argue that we are better able to understand, challenge, and re-envision 
these relationships. Indeed, I believe our ability to do so profoundly informs the 
possibilities for reproductive justice in the twenty-first century. 
Thus, having offered a theoretical framework for the questions I aim to address in 
this dissertation, I turn now to my critical sites of inquiry, the first of which explores the 
recent public debates surrounding use and availability of emergency contraception in the 
U.S. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
ACCESS TO EXCESS: EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION AND THE POLITICS OF 
“TOO MUCH CHOICE”  
 
Amy Cappiello was 24 years old the night the condom broke. She sat up in a 
panic, thought about her job on Capitol Hill and her grad school commitments, 
and cried. Then there was the fact that she and her boyfriend had only been 
seeing each other for two months. It was just not the time for her to become 
somebody’s mom. With her boyfriend, Cappiello went right to the emergency 
room at George Washington University Hospital. There, a doctor and nurse 
introduced her to the concept of emergency contraception . . . . [which] Cappiello 
took. To her relief, she didn’t become pregnant. “Not being married, making less 
than $30,000 a year and going to grad school, having a baby would have been a 
nightmare,” Cappiello says now, a year later. “Not only was I not physically 
ready in terms of being able to provide a stable environment for a baby, but 
emotionally I was nowhere near ready to have a baby thrust upon me. We would 
have handled it, but it would have been devastating.”  
--Suzanne Redfearn, Preparing for a Mistake 
 
 
 Contraception is often coded as empowering women’s reproductive choice, and 
for many women, this is inarguably the case. Stories like Amy’s exemplify and bolster 
this collective imagining. And yet, within the broader scope of contemporary public 
debates concerning emergency contraception and its accessibility for American women, a 
focus on personalized accounts is exceedingly rare. Amy’s story is a narrative respite in a 
sea of politically contentious dispute over scientific evidence, religious beliefs, and social 
morality. What, then, does her story reveal? She is, in many ways, the embodiment of the 
contemporary white, middle class American dream for women, made possible by the 
gains of twentieth century feminisms. Young, full of promise, pursuing higher education 
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and a career in government, Amy is on the road to success. Hers is a narrative that 
assumes upward economic mobility and hinges on access to resources. As Amy herself is 
clear to note, however, her circumstances bar her from responsibly bearing children (yet). 
She is not in a long-term relationship, makes less than $30,000 annually, and is in school. 
Thus, the emergency identified and addressed here is not simply a broken condom. The 
emergency is also the potential pregnancy under Amy’s current circumstances—a clear 
threat to American dream-ness, white, middle class, heteronormative identity and 
lifestyle. The use of the term “nightmare” is both fitting in its candor and revealing in its 
broader cultural context.  
 Cultural assumptions regarding birth control and women’s reproductive “choice” 
suture the two tightly together. “Choice” has become a political and colloquial referent 
for the unencumbered right to determine when, whether, and with whom to have children. 
As such, it is invariably wed to notions of individual women’s autonomy and 
empowerment. But imagining birth control solely in this way is deeply troubled and 
troubling. This characterization privileges the experiences of middle-class white women, 
and ignores myriad histories of material practices in which contraception has been 
utilized to curtail, rather than enhance, women’s reproductive autonomy. In an attempt to 
guard against state sanctioned reproductive coercion, advocates have argued for birth 
control methods that place the locus of control in the hands of women. EC appears to do 
just that—most often, the method is administered by the woman herself and, in a 
significant departure from other contraceptives, EC is designed to be taken after 
unprotected sex. Close examination of EC’s discursive figuration, however, of how this 
form of contraception is imagined to shape sexuality, reproduction, and social 
 60 
relationships, calls this facile equation into question. Thus, this chapter explores the 
mediated discourses that work to craft and anchor EC within contemporary U.S. cultural 
imaginaries. In so doing, I ask how these discourses figure in challenging or reinscripting 
reproductive (bio)politics, and consider the implications for rhetorics of choice 
specifically, and issues of reproductive justice more broadly.  
 The debates concerned with the availability of Plan B® reside at the center of this 
study. From 2001 to 2006, while the makers of Plan B® petitioned the FDA for over-the-
counter status, increasingly contentious public debates ensued, entangling a range of 
vested interests and parties from women’s rights and health organizations to the 
Government Accountability Office and the Bush Administration. As FDA officials 
wrestled with the parameters of EC’s availability, the perceived significance and 
implications of an “unprecedented” means of managing pregnancy prevention—and 
specifically, a means of preventing pregnancy “after the fact”—provoked a range of 
responses and expressed anxieties. These moments are uniquely and explicitly rhetorical; 
they are best critically interrogated and understood as a set of forces that work to anchor 
and discipline the role of this technology in women’s lives. The Plan B® debates 
demonstrate significant cultural investments in how emergency contraception comes to 
mean and function—including its “legitimate” use (and users). A number of sources 
would provide insight into an exploration of EC’s discursive figuration, illuminating the 
various ways in which EC is imagined to negotiate social relationships and shape cultural 
and political communities. To the extent that mediated accounts provide access to 
mainstream public voices and cultural sentiments that ultimately function to inform 
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public policy decisions regarding the use and regulation of EC, my focus here is on media 
coverage of the EC debates.33  
 This chapter proceeds, then, in three sections. First, in the critical reading of these 
popular discourses, I explore the ways in which EC occupies highly contested and 
nebulous ontological ground within reproductive politics, transgressing the borders and 
chasms between birth control and abortion as a hybrid technology that produces 
remarkable cultural angst and un-ease. One of the fundamental questions animating 
public debate is concerned with how to make sense of EC, how to determine whether this 
technology is a method of birth control, a form of abortion, or not quite either. This 
question is raised in both implicit and explicit terms, as EC is regularly posited as 
occupying an amorphous and unsettling space between contraception and abortion. In this 
way, the defining characteristics that anchor EC’s imagining in social and political 
culture are unstable, unfixed, and continuously open to interrogation. Furthermore, this 
instability between birth control and abortion indicate cultural anxieties regarding an 
excess of choice, sexuality, and reproduction in American women’s lives. Second, I argue 
that in response to this instability, EC is managed through a rhetoric of “exception” and 
“emergency” that functions to discipline reproductive bodies through a “differential 
biopolitics.” Drawing from Sharma’s theoretical contributions to the study of 
contemporary biopolitics, I argue that this differential biopolitics imbues some women 
with a “right to choice” and reduces others to scripted “responsible choices.” Finally, I 
                                                
33 For this chapter, I studied all articles having to do with EC published in prominent newspapers and 
periodicals with national circulation, including The New York Times, The Washington Post, The New York 
Times Magazine, Time, and Newsweek, between the dates of January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2006. 
These ten years are particularly significant for the EC debates because 1997 marks the original approval of 
EC for prescription sale in the U.S.; 2006 marks Plan B®'s final approval by the FDA to go “behind the 
counter” for women eighteen and older. While not all articles are included in the direct quotations provided 
in this study, each readily inform my analysis of these discourses and contribute to my overall argument.  
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turn to the significance of these debates for the meaning and function of “choice” as a 
public claim to empowerment and autonomy. Rather than supporting or extending such 
claims, I argue that these debates, in working to figure and fix EC, suggest the 
vulnerabilities and discursive limits of choice itself, and signal the necessity of thinking 
reproductive politics and technologies differently and, more specifically, within a 
framework of justice.  
Nebulous Conceptions for Emergency Contraception 
I feel very strongly that this shouldn’t be about abortion politics…This is a way to 
prevent unwanted pregnancy and thereby prevent abortion. This should be 
something that we should all agree on.  
Dr. Susan F. Wood, Assistant Commissioner of Women’s Health, US FDA 
 
The pill acts to prevent a pregnancy by aborting a child…the emergency in this 
case is a baby.  
Judie Brown, Director and Co-Founder of the American Life League 
 
The introduction of EC began with little political fanfare and an emphasis on 
scientific progress and technological promise. In 1997, even prior to the introduction of 
Plan B® and Preven®, Time was quick to celebrate the implications of the FDA’s initial 
decision to approve regular birth control for “morning-after” use. “The Good News” 
section of a regular health update declares: “America wakes up to MORNING-AFTER 
PILLS” (emphasis in original). “The FDA has okayed the use of megadoses of ordinary 
birth-control pills, taken within 72 hours of sex, to prevent pregnancy. The regimen, 
which is 75% effective, is already widely used in Europe” (Adams and Crumley). Much 
of the public discourse surrounding (and constituting) EC at its official entry onto the 
U.S. market reflected a similar emphasis on Western innovation and medical progress, 
and concomitantly assumed political neutrality. These assertions, however, were 
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relatively short-lived and quickly overwhelmed by moral panic and scientific dispute 
regarding the use and function of EC in the United States.  
Even the earliest iterations of EC’s discursive imagining reveal the nebulous and 
contentious scientific, cultural, and political terrain in which this contraceptive begins to 
unfold. For example, just as EC is celebrated as a “new and improved” technique for a 
long-standing medical practice, these descriptors are tempered by discordant explications 
of its functioning: “Preven’s dose of hormones keeps a fertilized egg from implanting in 
the uterine wall. It’s available only by prescription, but it’ll stop a pregnancy 72 hours 
after sex” (Rogers). As this quote suggests, one of the fundamental tensions that marks 
the discursive entry of EC into American life at the turn of the century is its tenuous and 
unstable location within reproductive politics. EC is articulated as both, but not quite 
either, abortion or birth control. Still, it is figured as a defining issue within contemporary 
abortion politics:  
[T]he abortion pill and the emergency contraception pill—because of their ease of 
use, the mechanisms by which they work and the fact that they are taken after 
sex—have blurred the line between contraception and abortion and have added a 
new wrinkle to the traditional anti-abortion movement. (Shorto) 
 
This fundamental conflation quickly becomes the site for the expression and embodiment 
of myriad cultural anxieties, a site that demands discursive negotiation and redress if EC 
is to be publicly justified for over the counter use. Thus, I turn now to examine this 
common conflation of abortion and birth control, and the “exception”(al) means of 
negotiation that emerge as a result. 
Post-Prevention Contraception 
 As post-prevention contraception, EC is simultaneously defined as birth control, 
while disarticulated from birth control. It oscillates between the new and the familiar, the 
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exception and the rule, with regularity, but little ease. Indeed, its apparent instability and 
unfixity as a reproductive technology is a site for continual rhetorical struggle. First, EC 
is regularly asserted as a method of contraception, but continually marked, and indeed 
circumscribed, by the extraordinary: “Plan B, as the name implies, is the backup when 
Plan A fails. It’s the second chance to avoid pregnancy after sex. It’s what you can do 
instead of waiting in a high state of anxiety” (Goodman). The notion of exception both 
permeates and animates this imagining. EC is figured as post-prevention contraception—
an opportunity to eclipse fear and distress by pre-empting the possibility of pregnancy or 
abortion when all other modes of one’s regular preventative practice(s) have failed. The 
use of EC is clearly the exception, as opposed to the rule—or more precisely, an 
addendum to the rules: “And if the condom breaks? Or a woman forgets to take her pill? 
There’s something for emergencies now, too, a last stop before pregnancy” (Stepp). This 
is, it would seem, not your everyday birth control.  
And yet, at times EC is precisely that—ordinary, commonplace, and 
unremarkable. Particularly for advocates in favor of increasing access and loosening 
restrictions, aligning EC with everyday birth control is used to compel legitimacy. A 
medical director for Planned Parenthood states that “[EC] is one of the safest medicines 
we have available, and it can prevent unplanned pregnancies,” (qtd. in Davey and 
Belluck). EC’s hormonal constitution is often cited as evidence of its normalcy: “The 
pills are essentially birth control pills in higher doses. But as their name suggests, they 
are not intended as regular birth control. They are for what advocates say they hope are 
rare instances of unprotected sex, or when, say, a condom breaks” (Zernike). This 
delicate dance tends to eclipse clear definitional categories. Here, and in much of the 
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public discussion regarding the ontological location of emergency contraception within 
reproductive politics, there is a clear conflation of terms. EC is simultaneously figured as 
not-at-all birth control and just like birth control; it is both unremarkable and everyday, 
extraordinary and exceptional. 
 The exception that marks and legitimates EC is, in part, affectively mobilized by 
the medication’s tenuous relationship to abortion itself. At times, the abortion pill, or 
mifepristone,34 functions simply as a counterpoint to distinguish emergency contraception 
and clarify its use: “Unlike Mifeprex or mifepristone, previously known as RU-486, 
which can induce an abortion safely during the first 49 days of pregnancy, morning-after 
pills do not cause abortion, advocates say” (Rein and Timberg). Citing “advocates” in 
this way questions the distinction between EC and mifepristone, even as it is asserted. 
And indeed, the differences between these two medications are not always entirely clear; 
at times they are thoroughly confused. Summarizing noteworthy medical advances in 
2003, Time stated that “Plan B, as the two-pill regimen would be called, would enable 
women to end pregnancies within 72 hours of unprotected intercourse” (Bjerklie, Park 
and Song). Such verbage clearly suggests EC as a method of terminating pregnancies, 
and implicitly invokes the abortion pill. While the technical language was corrected in a 
later issue, the original description merely exemplifies a common conflation of terms that 
tends to muddle and complicate EC’s constitution. Throughout rhetorical attempts to 
anchor EC, the abortion pill is continually invoked to position and define emergency 
contraception. It is simultaneously conflated with EC and disarticulated from EC’s 
                                                
34 Mifepristone is used to terminate a pregnancy within the first 49 days of gestation (this is the FDA’s 
recommended guidelines for use; many medical facilities will use mifepristone within the first 63 days of 
gestation). While entirely distinct from EC in its synthetic composition and use, mifepristone is also 
(perhaps obviously) used after unprotected sex and was approved for sale in the U.S. in September 2000, 
just over a year after Plan B. Confusion of these medications in mediated and public forums abound. 
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function and intent. The instability of EC within reproductive politics invites a particular 
logic to help manage cultural fears surrounding excess, a theme to which I now turn. 
Access to Sexual Excess, or the “Morning After” Problematic 
 Amidst muddled and contentious debates surrounding EC’s nebulous character 
and location within reproductive politics, cultural anxieties begin to surface regarding 
women’s, particularly young women’s, (excess) sexuality. Certainly, these concerns 
mimic a similar impulse in response to the introduction of the birth control pill in 1960 
and, to the extent that EC poses a unique set of circumstances, invite a new logic—
namely, that of emergency—to manage female sexuality. As a contraceptive method 
designed to be taken after unprotected sex (a noteworthy and significant departure from 
other methods of birth control), EC is assumed to heighten convenience regarding the 
consumption of sex and sexuality, and is therefore problematized through moral rhetorics 
that characterize this technology as contributing to, if not wholly creating, sexual excess. 
In other words, because EC is thought to be easy, convenient, it trivializes sex and 
encourages promiscuity. The proposal for over-the-counter status, the fact that EC 
“would not only be sold in drugstores, but could also be as available as aspirin, on 
supermarket shelves or in convenience stores or gasoline stations,” (Kolata) rapidly 
accelerates the circulation of these concerns. To the extent that a morning after pill might 
“encourage” women’s sexual pleasure and independence through a proliferation of 
reproductive choice(s) and the removal of “consequences,” it is simultaneously imagined 
to threaten a myriad of cultural norms, practices, and relationships of power.  
 The “problem” of women’s sexual excess is overwhelmingly wed to age. 
Embedded within a climate of Bush-era family values politics, teen sexuality is intensely 
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scrutinized and constrained through unprecedented funding for abstinence-only 
education, father-daughter “purity balls” celebrating (or enforcing) teenage girls’ 
commitment to virginity, and teen princess pop stars like Jessica Simpson and Britney 
Spears publicly discussing their “True Love Waits” pledges. Young women’s sexual 
expression quickly becomes a volatile site for debate regarding the moral dimensions of 
EC: 
If Plan B goes over the counter…what stops teenage girls from using these pills as 
regular birth control? Will we get to the point where 14-year-old girls are feeding 
quarters into restroom vending machines for something other than tampons? Will 
we see a rise in sexually transmitted infections? (Stepp) 
 
Over-the-counter EC is figured as access to excess—the impending seduction of too 
much choice. Indeed, increased availability of emergency contraception is thought to 
rival, perhaps even eclipse, the pill in validating irresponsible sex and rewarding 
“deviant”—or otherwise undisciplined—sexual behavior by evacuating it of 
“consequence,” and by removing young women from the medical gaze altogether. As the 
president of conservative Christian public policy organization Concerned Women for 
America queries: “How can you make it available OTC [over the counter] for most 
women and not have it get into the bodies of girls for who it has not been approved 
without prescription?” (Wright qtd. in Kaufman). In the midst of heightened neo-
conservatism and the resurgence of the religious right, this explicit reference to young 
women’s (or “girls”) bodies positions EC as a direct threat to white, middle-class purity 
and virtue. Drawing on common representations of American girls in postfeminist 
culture, girls at the center of the EC debates are rhetorically figured as “at risk.” They are 
“endangered by the world around them (including the proliferation of choices in part 
provided by feminism and postfeminism) and their personal choices within this context” 
 68 
(Projansky). EC threatens young women in positing the possibility of unplanned sex 
without material (or, more specifically, maternal) consequence. It offers superfluous 
choice and warrants sexual excess; in other words, it provides young women the 
opportunity to make “bad” choices. 
 However, it is not just teens for whom explicit and expressed fears of sexual 
excess circulate; single women in general are figured to be “at risk.” Reporting on the 
reactions of New Yorkers to the FDA’s eventual easing of restrictions on access to EC, 
Vasquez and Hammer write that one woman “could not decide whether she was glad the 
morning-after pill would soon be more readily available. Several of her friends have 
already used the pill multiple times.” Throughout much of this discourse, there seems to 
exist a categorical limit that differentiates an authentic emergency from assumed 
carelessness. EC is regularly claimed to enable and even encourage frivolous and 
irresponsible sex: “Knowing a backup is available over the counter…might make her 
more likely to have unprotected sex. ‘Some girls are probably going to get careless…If I 
didn’t get so sick I would use it more often’” (Vasquez and Hammer). Women, it seems, 
are not to be trusted with this kind of decision-making. Indeed, left to their own devices 
and without the supervision of a medical professional, women will overuse, even abuse, 
this method of contraception.  
 And in some ways, how could they not? The name “morning after pill” evokes 
and substantiates fears surrounding the threat of sexual excess: “No more trauma over 
‘Am I or am I not?’ No more decisions on whether to abort, adopt, or go ahead and raise 
a child you can’t afford. The morning-after pill, known as Plan B, erases the night 
before” (Stepp). In a rare moment of candor and clarity, this reporter for The New York 
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Times underscores a significant and profound source of cultural distress. The “morning 
after” implies a “night before”—a euphemism for scandalous or “deviant” sexual 
behavior. The “morning after” assumes shame, guilt and regret for actions in violation of 
normative codes of conduct. Thus, any “morning after pill” is already thoroughly marked 
by and constituted through social and moral aberration. Well-behaved women don’t have 
a “morning after” because they never had a “night before.” Thus, how can a pill, aimed 
only to alleviate ills brought on by one’s own bad behavior, be properly coded as a 
woman’s rightful choice? This is, of course, precisely the problem—it cannot. The 
mainstream frame of reproductive "choice" becomes a problematic, and ultimately 
ineffectual, public claim within the context of the EC debates, illustrating the rhetorical 
limits of choice with profound clarity. If not through a claim to choice, then, how is this 
tension negotiated; how is EC effectively legitimized? In the next section, I argue that in 
the wake of intense disruptions perceived and provoked by EC’s tenuous location within 
reproductive politics and culture more broadly, science and the logic of “emergency” and 
“exception” are used to compel legitimacy. These rhetorics work to effectively 
overwhelm and undermine the morning after problematic of sexual excess and “too 
much” reproductive choice in two related, if differentiated, ways. 
Science, Emergency, and Differential Biopolitics 
 In order to bracket and refute claims regarding the erosion of female morality in 
the wake of EC, science becomes the broader terrain in which rhetorical claims regarding 
EC’s “proper” function and use tempers questions of sexual purity and moral decay, 
while simultaneously introducing concerns regarding another kind of “excess” wed to 
reproduction itself. Through the logic of emergency, science is deployed to harness and 
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manage cultural anxieties, discipline reproductive bodies, and to (re)inscribe a 
“differential” biopolitics (Sharma) that affords some women choices, and others, 
responsibilities. In other words, a theory of differential biopolitics aids in understanding 
how science is affectively (and differentially) mobilized to legitimize EC, an argument to 
which I now turn. 
 First, science is posited as a direct challenge to the articulations between EC and 
promiscuity. In response to the morning after problematic, repeated scientific accounts of 
EC’s behavioral banality and women’s sexual restraint become a common refrain: 
“Studies indicate that improving access to emergency contraception neither encourages 
sexual activity by adolescents nor causes women to abandon their regular methods of 
contraception” ("A Public Health Victory"). Hard data are offered in support of these 
claims: “studies showed that making [EC] available did not prompt women to use it 
repeatedly. Of 540 women in one study, Dr. Camp said, 10 used it more than once” 
(Zernike). Another report in The Washington Post draws a parallel between EC-inspired 
anxieties and those that circulate around other matters of sexual and reproductive health 
and rights: 
When sex education was introduced in schools, some Americans predicted that 
young people would start copulating like rabbits. Talking about sex would make 
kids have sex. Carefully controlled studies showed that hasn’t been the case for 
the current generation . . . . It looks as if young women have learned something 
about abstinence and sex, and they don’t make decisions about either because of 
what they can buy. (Stepp) 
 
In this way, scientific demonstration of women’s sexual restraint—their adherence to EC 
as a method of exception and only in cases of emergency—becomes the grounds through 
which EC is domesticated and proven palatable to broader U.S. publics. Research studies 
are regularly cited to counter the fear that this contraceptive technology will encourage, 
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enable, and condone (young) women’s sexual impulses. Hinging on popular and 
ideological assumptions of neutrality and freedom from bias, a discourse of science still 
works to position EC within a moral conceptual terrain as it articulates women as 
(appropriately) sexually disciplined, whose behavior is suspended, and indeed separate, 
from the availability of certain contraceptives. 
 A rhetoric that frequently reverts to the exception disciplines reproductive bodies 
into traditional modes of maternity and proper feminine sexuality. As mentioned earlier, 
EC is rhetorically framed as a form of birth control for emergency—and not ordinary—
circumstances. Positioning EC as a method of exception allows for a circumvention of the 
problem of undisciplined or otherwise promiscuous sex, and renders EC compatible with 
mainstream, normative values regarding maternity and sexuality. In a particularly explicit 
example, EC is declared “not a form of birth control. It is there in case the birth control 
method fails. The condoms breaks, the diaphragm slips. A woman forgets to take her 
pills. Or she has sex when she wasn’t planning on it” (Trafford). Here, the use of EC is 
figured to designate extra care and responsibility in pregnancy prevention. 
Simultaneously, a variety of exceptional circumstances are identified so as to underscore 
an overwhelming presence of discipline and normative family planning measures within 
these scenarios, consequently recasting women’s use of EC as similarly responsible, 
disciplined, and normative. Implicit is the suggestion that EC is the “non-choice” that 
resides between the selection of a regular method of birth control, and the politicized 
right to an abortion—in other words, EC becomes the inevitable (and responsible) middle 
ground between one choice eclipsed and another suspended altogether. The discourse of 
emergency, then, works to articulate EC to extraordinary circumstance and, in so doing, 
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disciplines its use (and women themselves) into normative codes of sexuality and 
“responsible” choices. 
 Discourses of science and the logic of emergency extend beyond a demonstration 
of individual restraint, however, and are implicated in the process of differential 
biopolitics. Science is mobilized in such a way that the fear of sexual excess is not simply 
deflated or minimized, but is entirely eclipsed by the circulation of a related, 
differentiated fear—that of reproductive excess. In other words, scientific studies of EC 
prove not only women’s sexual restraint, but focus specifically on the potential of EC to 
address large scale social ills of unwanted or unplanned pregnancies and abortion: “The 
[FDA] committees’ overwhelming endorsement of making this kind of emergency 
contraception more widely and easily available has moved the nation a vital step closer 
toward a change in government policy that could sharply reduce unwanted pregnancies 
and, in turn, the need for abortions” (“A Public Health Victory”). Throughout this 
discourse there exists a troubling slippage between how individual women may feel about 
their pregnancies (i.e. as desirable or not), and social attitudes about who is “fit” for 
motherhood. A repeated emphasis on reducing “unwanted” pregnancies plays on 
longstanding race and class bias regarding the politics of motherhood, and effectively 
relocates concern from the sexual excess of women to the reproductive excess of certain 
women—namely, young, unmarried, and/or low-income women.  
 This troubling pattern is far from anomalous, but rather, is thoroughly embedded 
within broader cultural attitudes and public policies regarding reproduction. Historian 
Rickie Solinger (2005) points out that reproductive politics are often disarticulated from 
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the rights and dignity of individual women and imagined to provoke and sustain 
widespread social ills: 
[R]eproductive-politics-as-a-way-to-solve-problems reflects a belief that the 
social, economic, political, and moral problems that beset our country can be 
solved best if laws and policies and public opinions press women to reproduce or 
not in ways that are consistent with a particular version of the country's real 
needs. When social or economic or "values" problems persist, politicians and 
others claim that this is because women persist in reproductive misbehavior. (9)  
 
EC adheres to this trend, one that posits control over women’s fertility as the solution to 
social ills. First and foremost, it is contextualized in broad cultural terms, and is clearly 
aimed at relieving the social epidemic of “unwanted” pregnancy and abortion. The logic 
of emergency once again infuses discussions of EC’s potential, which center on its ability 
to address these broader cultural concerns. Prior to the arrival of the over-the-counter 
debate in the U.S., early reporting focused on the loosening of restrictions to EC access in 
Europe and was framed in this manner:  
In the last decade, Britain has experienced a steady increase in the number of 
teenage pregnancies, unwanted pregnancies and abortions. In 1998, the last year 
for which figures are available, 22 percent of pregnancies ended in abortion. In 
addition, in a country struggling to promote a family-based agenda, 51.2 percent 
of new babies were born to unwed mothers. (Lyall) 
 
While this statistic was corrected a week later (the correct percentage of single mothers 
being 37.8), the anxiety expressed here is palpable; EC is explicitly imagined as redress 
for widespread and pressing social emergencies—specifically, the reproductive excesses 
of certain women. There is a rather frank articulation of which trends are deemed 
problematic—in this case, teenage and single mothers are isolated demographics amongst 
otherwise “unwanted” pregnancies and the overall rate of abortion. Indeed, single 
motherhood is cast in glaring opposition to the meaning of family itself. 
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 Identifying and demonizing young and/or single women is neither unprecedented, 
nor should it be surprising when located within a history of reproductive politics in which 
certain women (mostly young, low-income, and/or of color) are socially and discursively 
figured as “unfit” mothers. Reproduction, pregnancy, and even maternity itself, have long 
been coded as privileges of race, class, age, and social status. And as a particular faction 
within broader reproductive politics, contraception is no exception. While the early birth 
control movement, laying claim to voluntary motherhood, originated within radical labor 
and socialist movements of the early twentieth century, these alliances were quickly 
dissolved as birth control campaigns found mainstream support and expression in the 
eugenics movement (Davis; Gordon, Moral Property). In collaboration with eugenics, the 
birth control movement was "robbed of its progressive potential, advocating for people of 
color not the individual right to birth control, but rather the racist strategy of population 
control" (Davis 215, emphasis in original). In this way, birth control for some women 
was coded as a right, for others, an expectation and responsibility that served a racist 
conception of nation. 
 In its design and potential use, EC may depart from contraceptive history in 
significant ways, not the least of which is its potential to place the locus of reproductive 
control and bodily integrity in the hands of women themselves. This is undoubtedly one 
reason EC is so deeply unsettling and politically volatile. And it is at precisely this 
moment—a moment of suspension between normative practice and the possibility (or 
threat) of something new—that the rhetorical and discursive politics of innovation are 
most visible and significant. Indeed, interrogating the discursive dimensions of EC 
reveals that this form of contraception is imagined and, subsequently, disciplined within 
 75 
the same technological tradition of managing social ills through women’s bodies, and 
more insidiously, in attempts to manage the reproduction of certain populations in 
particular. Questions concerning contraception, reproduction, and who may and/or may 
not become a mother, are not bereft of politics; they are immersed within social 
relationships of power and privilege. Here, then, I wish to question which pregnancies are 
coded as “unwanted” and precisely who is allowed to name them as such, to underscore 
and interrogate the social and rhetorical articulation of EC as a solution to a set of moral 
and/or cultural problems. It becomes necessary to ask what kind of inclusions/exclusions 
the “emergency” delineates, which “choices” are deemed responsible and thereby 
defensible, and whose interests are being served.35  
 The use of science, its role in figuring excess and disciplining reproductive 
bodies, carries substantively distinct implications for women in different social 
locations—in other words, age, wealth, income, class, race, and marital status matter. 
“Differential biopolitics” can account for this reproductive stratification in the context of 
contemporary biopolitical configurations; it provides a means of grappling with the 
complex ways in which women are differently disciplined into normative codes for 
behavior. As developed within Sharma's work on the "non-place," differential biopolitics 
is explicitly theorized in relationship to space and place; hers is a spacialized rethinking 
of biopower that articulates the ways in which it works on and through differentiated 
bodies. My work extends the concept of differential biopolitics as “particular to the non-
                                                
35 Perhaps not surprisingly, the final ruling on Plan B’s OTC application was an unprecedented one. EC 
was made available behind the counter without a prescription, to women eighteen and older. Pharmacists 
were authorized to dispense Plan B to adult women, leaving pharmacists in a powerful position to 
determine who is ultimately provided access to EC. The history of pharmacist dispensing of EC is, itself, 
mired in controversy over “conscience” clauses and the right of a pharmacist to refuse women’s requests. 
While these issues extend beyond the scope of this dissertation chapter, I mark it here as a point of further 
exploration for my book project. 
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place” (Sharma 130) or spaces of transit, in suggesting its theoretical significance and 
import within reproductive histories and (bio)politics. As evidenced within the context of 
the EC debates, social location coheres meaningfully with emerging forms of discipline. 
For women of privilege, the central concern with sexual and moral purity is tamed 
through scientific demonstration of discipline and responsibility. “Rights” to EC are then 
properly conferred. Simultaneously, scientific justifications for EC that center on its 
macro implications—its potential capacity to reduce unwanted pregnancy and abortion—
promises to harness the reproductive excess of “unfit” mothers, thus eclipsing rights and 
assigning responsibilities for women marginalized by age, income, race, sexuality and/or 
class. EC, whether through the differential biopolitics of reduction or investment, enables 
a strict enforcement of traditional “family values,” while simultaneously disciplining 
“choice” back into white, middle-class, mainstream frameworks, an argument to which I 
now turn. 
Differential Discipline and the Discursive Limits of Choice 
 Thus far, I have focused on the public imagining of emergency contraception, the 
contingent and nebulous ontological terrain it is thought to inhabit, and the precarious 
relationships among excess, morality, and science it is thought to traverse and resolve 
through rhetorics of exception and emergency. Here, I turn to the specificity of this 
negotiation as it relates to the notion of choice and its implications for reproductive 
politics more broadly.  
 Rhetorics of choice are largely absent within the contentious debates that ensued 
regarding Plan B’s over-the-counter application. This noteworthy departure from 
mainstream frameworks for birth control and abortion is perhaps not surprising upon 
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close examination. Choice is politically and culturally incompatible with a “morning-
after” contraceptive that is—by nature of its very name—already marked by assumptions 
of careless and promiscuity, by superfluous individual control. In this context, “choice” 
becomes difficult to defend and maintain.. In the midst of heightened cultural anxieties 
regarding the sexual and reproductive excesses of women, what became necessary was 
not a defense of choice, but a demonstration of discipline. This is precisely what the 
rhetoric of emergency worked to do, properly circumscribing EC within the bounds of 
“acceptable” use. To the extent that EC is constituted through a logic of exception and 
emergency, as a reasonable and responsible attempt to avoid having to choose abortion, 
EC is disciplined and legitimized as a “choice.” At best, then, choice is culturally 
palatable and socially defensible only to the degree that it is wed to planning, 
responsibility, and normative sexuality, reproduction, and motherhood. Or perhaps, more 
insidiously, the logic of exception mobilizes a suspension of reproductive freedom and 
choice insofar as it assigns duties to women culturally deemed less “fit” for maternity. 
EC is subsequently ontologized within this space as the non-choice of necessity. In either 
instance, the debates concerning EC’s over-the-counter status lay bare the more 
problematic complexities and discursive limits of an “inalienable right to choose.” 
 While the EC debates illustrate well the discursive limits of choice, they are 
hardly aberrations with the broader context of reproductive politics. Rather, it provides 
yet another example of the inability of “choice” to fully encapsulate and advance full 
reproductive dignity and justice for all women. Choice has been critiqued along these 
lines by feminist scholars and activists alike.36 As a discourse of consumption, choice is 
                                                
36 See, for example, Davis, Women, Race, and Class, Laura Mamo and Jennifer Ruth Fosket, "Scripting the 
Body: Pharmaceuticals and the (Re)Making of Menstruation," Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and 
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troubled in at least two ways. First, in lieu of possessing a claim to inalienable rights or 
justice, women’s reproductive decisions are easily trivialized and denied through the 
language of choice. “Choice” is easily reduced to whimsical behavior or brash decision-
making, as opposed to being located within myriad social and political structures that 
sharply delineate its borders. Choice is, at best, a derivative of rights—a kind of “rights 
lite”: “by the end of the 1970s, fathers were recognized as having rights, fetuses were 
granted rights, and ‘children’s rights’ were newly and broadly acknowledged. Women, on 
the other hand, were accorded only ‘choice’” (Solinger, Beggars and Choosers 193). 
Thus, in the realm of reproduction, women’s claims to autonomy, freedom, and/or 
protection under the law are rhetorically and materially relegated to a kind of peripheral 
status, subsumed within a discourse that assigns rights to every imaginable party within 
the process of conception and childbearing except the woman herself. Unlike possessing 
a claim to reproductive rights, equality, or justice, women’s reproductive choice is 
rendered vulnerable to market analysis, public scrutiny, and social judgment. This 
marginalization enables the wholesale denial of reproductive choice for many women. 
Like any other consumptive practice, subject to the inequities exacerbated through free 
market capitalism, choice is accorded through one’s ability to pay. Roberts (Killing the 
Black Body) refers to this as a negative conception of liberty, which allows states to 
guarantee legal, but not economic, access to reproductive choice. As such, women’s 
decisions are largely determined by income: wealth equals access to a range of maternal 
                                                                                                                                            
Society 34.4 (Summer 2009), Roberts, Killing the Black Body, Samerski, "Genetic Counseling and the 
Fiction of Choice: Taught Self-Determination as a New Technique of Social Engineering.", Rickie 
Solinger, Beggars and Choosers: How the Politics of Choice Shapes Adoption, Abortion, and Welfare in 
the United States (New York: Hill and Wang, 2001). 
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and reproductive options; poverty or a reliance on public funding for health care 
translates into governmental regulation of one’s reproductive health-care decisions.   
 Second, within the context of contemporary biopolitics, neoliberalism, and vastly 
shifting technological landscapes, the language of choice itself has been effectively co-
opted and used against women to signal a kind of “compulsory self-determination” 
(Samerski). For example, expanding possibilities made available through genetic 
testing—informative, biological, genetic, and so on—have quickly transformed the 
expectations and requirements of proper prenatal care. In other words, genetic screening 
and testing, and its accompanying sets of decisions and duties, are newly incorporated 
into a host of bio/technological requirements of responsible mothering in the age of 
biological citizenship, all under the auspice of autonomy and reproductive choice 
(Roberts, "Race, Gender"). As Roberts explains, this logic recasts and reinscribes long-
standing ideologies with regard to reproduction and difference: “reprogenetics 
incorporates a seemingly benign form of eugenic thinking in its reliance on reproductive 
strategies to eliminate genetic risk rather than social strategies to eliminate systemic 
inequities” (795). In short, “choice” no longer resonates nor signifies in the same ways; it 
has been absorbed by the logic of capitalism. Its attendant duties and responsibilities 
trouble not only inclusion within feminist communities, but also the very notion and 
availability of reproductive freedom itself.  
In this way, the EC debates offer another demonstration of the ease with which 
choice is co-opted and distorted within dominant ideological frameworks and used to 
reinforce the status quo. In the case of the EC over-the-counter debates, these 
vulnerabilities are revealed and exacerbated to the extent that a “morning after” 
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contraceptive always already invites the assumption of carelessness and promiscuity from 
the “night before.” Choice, in this context, becomes a difficult rhetorical framework 
within which to assert women’s reproductive self-determination and dignity. Indeed, 
what becomes exceedingly clear in these debates is that choice is only culturally legible 
and defensible to the extent that it is sutured to notions of planning and responsibility, 
terms clearly imbued with a kind of doxa that excludes the possibility of sex, 
reproduction, or motherhood outside of culturally legitimate and authorized settings. 
Access to EC over-the-counter is subsequently bracketed by a narrow set of 
circumstances that are rhetorically clarified through a logic of emergency, with 
differential biopolitical implications. Some women are accorded rights, others 
responsibilities—distinctions that continue to deepen, rather than redress, divisions 
between women within the context of reproductive politics. At best, choice is inadequate 
in securing reproductive rights for all women; at worst, it works to reinscribe the very 
inequities and disparities it ought to dismantle, all under the banner of feminism. 
 For far too long women’s access to sexual, reproductive and maternal rights have 
hinged on race, class, and other forms of privilege. To the extent that a concern for all 
women’s health and lives are not located at the center of mainstream debates concerning 
reproductive justice, to the extent that public discourse is centered on addressing broader 
social issues through the management of con(tra)ceptive technologies and women’s 
bodies—we continue to dwell in this treacherous terrain. The over the counter debates 
exemplify the disciplining of EC’s more radical possibilities, including the potential to 
(re)locate reproductive control squarely in the hands of women. These debates also 
clarify the discursive limits of “choice” as a framework to secure all women’s access to 
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health and justice. Perhaps in an era of deepening neoliberalism and cultural investment 
in (consumer) "choice" as synonymous with freedom, our ability to interrogate and 
problematize discursive apparatuses that privilege some women at the expense of others, 
to explore, imagine, and articulate alternative possibilities, will bring us one step closer to 
a more radically inclusive maternal and reproductive dignity. 
 This critical and ethical imperative, residing at the heart of this dissertation 
project, is extended and complicated in the next chapter, which explores a recent moment 
in the ever-volatile cultural and political terrain of assisted reproductive technologies. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 (IN)CONCEIVABLE, OR, THE RHETORICAL LABOR OF “OCTOMOM” 
 
[T]he distinction between social technologies and new reproductive ones is 
formal at best: not only are individuals being reproduced, but so too are the 
social relations that organize and render them recognizable as such. 
Valerie Hartouni, Cultural Conceptions 
 
Infertility treatment for an unemployed, single mother of six? Eight embryos in 
one womb? There must be a proper word in the medical literature to describe this 
achievement. I think the word is “nuts.” 
Ellen Goodman, Miami Herald 
 
All I wanted was to be a mom. That’s all I ever wanted in my life. 
Nadya Suleman 
 
When news first broke of the Suleman birth, anticipated reception was awe and 
celebration—it was, after all, a triumph of modern reproductive medicine in many ways. 
On January 26, 2009, Nadya Suleman gave birth to octuplets in a hospital southeast of 
Los Angeles, assisted in conception by a fertility specialist and in birth by a team of at 
least forty-six medical staff. Believed to be septuplets until the last moment of delivery, 
the Suleman eight were only the second set of octuplets in U.S. history and, within a 
week, were the longest surviving. But what was initially heralded as a story of medical 
miracle was not to last. A single, thirty-three year old woman receiving food stamps and 
disability payments with six young children already at home, Suleman was quickly 
located at the center of a media firestorm that questioned a range of vested interests, 
 83 
responsible parties, medical practices and personal decisions, from the ethics of fertility 
therapies—their regulation or lack thereof—to the sanity of Suleman herself. 
To this day, Suleman remains a fixture in popular culture and a point of 
contentious debate, featured regularly in tabloid culture, mainstream media, fertility 
industry and public policy disputes. Her story has inspired a musical, a doll with eight 
detachable babies, a made-for-television documentary, and a reality series. The rumors 
have been vicious and many, some fueled by contradictions between Suleman’s self-
described actions, and others revealed by the legal investigation into the medical practice 
of her fertility specialist, Dr. Michael Kamrava. In mainstream media, Suleman is 
consistently depicted as self-obsessed and attention-seeking, and less routinely but not 
infrequently described as insane, pathological, a welfare cheat and/or scammer, proof of 
all that is wrong with California/America/the welfare state. The blogosphere has proved 
frighteningly misogynist, containing references to Suleman as a “child hoarder,” 
“psychotic bitch,” “Octo-cu-t” [sic], and a “dirty specimen of a mammal.” She and her 
publicist(s) have received multiple death threats; in a particularly xenophobic post, 
Suleman was accused of getting IVF treatments in Mexico and “crawling across the 
border” to give birth (Bowe). 
The vitriol regularly aimed at Suleman is deeply disturbing; it begs for clear 
consideration of the logics through which such collective outrage is mobilized and 
articulated, the ways in which it both reflects and reinscribes particular cultural attitudes, 
practices, and beliefs. Certainly, Suleman is a complicated figure. I am less interested in 
staking a claim in the debates that surround her personal decision-making or parenting 
than I am in exploring how her story figures in contemporary configurations of 
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reproductive technologies and politics, and what it suggests about the possibilities and 
problematics of reproductive justice. As such, I wish to bracket her victimization and 
vilification in the press, and the extent to which she may have participated in it, to ask a 
different set of questions about the ongoing significance and function of her story. The 
boundaries transgressed and disruptions provoked by Suleman, as well as by her fertility 
specialist Dr. Kamrava, offer opportunities not only to explore the conditions and 
constraints of culturally legible maternity, but also to critically investigate the significant 
rhetorical labors central to the codification of these borders. Such critical opportunities 
also include, importantly, the possibilities of clarifying the role of assisted reproductive 
technologies in the project of reproductive justice. Such an inquiry clearly reflects the 
primary aims of my broader dissertation project, while also pointing to another cultural 
site at which the logic of emergency works on potentially maternal bodies and the body 
politic in specific ways. While other chapters attend to the rhetoric of emergency as a 
disciplining force in mainstream policy debates and risk tutorial in pop culture pregnancy 
narratives, the figures of Suleman and Kamrava illustrate another medium through which 
this logic operates in contemporary contexts. In the age of biological citizenship, the 
forms of governance are many; they include not only mainstream debates that shape 
public policies and media narratives that proffer technologies of the self, but also consist 
of privatized medicine and the fertility industry as a market and normative, directional 
force. 
In this chapter I argue that the decision making of Nadya Suleman, combined with 
that of Kamrava, triggered a significant rupture in the contemporary cultural terrain of 
assisted reproduction and reproductive politics from which a distinct form of discipline 
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emerged. Attempting to wed assisted reproductive technologies (ART) with public 
assistance, Suleman threatened to collapse longstanding and significant distinctions 
between “deserving” and “undeserving” mothers, between the trope of the (sym)pathetic 
infertile woman and the “welfare queen.” To the extent that her unauthorized 
reproductive decision making failed to conform to contemporary demands of biological 
citizenship, the figure of Suleman circulates as a reminder of gendered, ethopolitical 
responsibility, encouraging self-discipline and governance in the context of reproductive 
“choice” and neoliberal citizenship. Similarly, the unprecedented disciplinary actions 
against Kamrava were fueled and sustained by a steady campaign that marked his 
treatment of Suleman as repugnant and unethical. Such an indictment was less concerned 
with standardized practices within reproductive medicine than it was with the 
“worthiness” of the population served. Thus, his exile from the fertility industry asserts in 
new ways the responsibilities of medical experts to both define and police the borders of 
“life itself” (Rose). 
My argument unfolds in three sections. First, I offer a brief history of IVF and the 
regulation of ART in order to sketch the terrain in which Suleman and Kamrava acted, 
and to contextualize the subsequent disciplinary actions that proceeded to unfold. Second, 
I turn to the cultural boundaries transgressed by Suleman, focusing on her merger of two 
incompatible tropes, and her subsequent violations of “legitimate” choice and 
motherhood within contemporary ethopolitical spaces. Finally, I examine the rhetorical 
figuration of Kamrava, charting his expulsion from the fertility industry as a means of 
managing public perception of crisis while maintaining current models of self-regulation. 
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Assisted Reproductive Technologies 
The Suleman octuplets constitute the most recent iteration of longstanding debate 
regarding assisted reproductive technologies, albeit reinvigorated with exceptional fervor 
and malice. Indeed, the history of ART is nothing if not intensely controversial. In the 
1970s, the mere possibility of human conception in a science lab was met with a series of 
criticisms. Vested parties questioned the ethical dimensions of long-term experimentation 
on embryos and children, struggled with the notion of surplus embryos, and expressed 
deep concerns about the shifts that assisted reproduction might provoke in humanity as a 
whole, both to an individual’s sense of self, as well as a collective understanding of 
nature as malleable and subject to human whim and fancy (Kass; Ramsey). The Catholic 
Church issued its formal opposition to increasing forms of reproduction that threatened to 
divorce sex from childbearing, and humans from a sense of divinity or God’s will 
(Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith). To be sure, these technological innovations 
have provided significant and consistent fodder for bio/ethical consideration and 
sensationalized headlines, from cloning, genetic selection, and “designer babies” to the 
creation of “savior siblings” and “dead dads.”37 Even within communities that readily 
embrace the possibilities of assisted reproductive technologies, public debates have 
invariably surfaced around accompanying transformations in the meaning of family—
ART not only offering hope to infertile couples, but posing the possibility of parenting to 
single and LGBTQ peoples.  
                                                
37 A “savior sibling” refers to the use of preimplantation genetic screening (PGS) during an IVF cycle to 
select and implant a specific embryo based on its ability to provide a donor tissue match for a family 
member (often a sibling) with a life-threatening illness, particularly when no other match is identified. In 
the instance of “dead dads,” sperm cryopreservation has made possible the practice of widows—many of 
whom have lost husbands due to illness or war—to be inseminated with their deceased husband’s sperm. 
The U.S. Supreme Court is currently hearing arguments as to determine the eligibility of children 
conceived in this manner for Social Security benefits (Totenberg).  
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 Despite debate and concern, the practice of IVF has become increasingly 
mainstream since the first “test tube baby” made international headlines in 1978. To date, 
over four million children worldwide have been born as a result of IVF procedures, and a 
global multibillion-dollar industry has developed and flourished around assisted 
reproduction. This is particularly true in the United States, where over four billion dollars 
“is spent annually on fertility services and the number of IVF procedures has almost 
tripled to 142,000 since 1999” (Fourcade and von Schaper). Long-term studies have 
confirmed the health of children conceived through IVF, as well as the overall safety and 
success of the therapy in addressing infertility. Awarding the 2010 Nobel Prize in 
Physiology or Medicine to Dr. Robert Edwards, a primary architect of in vitro, the Nobel 
selection committee’s comments suggest the established repute of the practice and its 
standing in contemporary medical practice: 
His achievements have made it possible to treat infertility, a medical condition 
afflicting a large proportion of humanity including more than 10% of all couples 
worldwide . . . . A new field of medicine has emerged, with Robert Edwards 
leading the process all the way from the fundamental discoveries to the current, 
successful IVF therapy. His contributions represent a milestone in the 
development of modern medicine. (The Nobel Assembly at Krolinska Institutet)  
 
Thus, if anything might be asserted about in vitro fertilization and its attendant forms of 
fertility assistance, it is that it is both widely lauded and practiced, if also, and often 
simultaneously, subject to intense (bio)ethical, political, and cultural scrutiny. 
Currently in the United States, reproductive medicine and the use of ART are 
governed through several vehicles: regulations on both the federal and state level, and 
professional industry standards (American Society for Reproductive Medicine, 
Oversight). First, federal oversight is divided into three discrete entities. Since the U.S. 
Congress moved in 1992 to standardize industry definitions and enhance the quality and 
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reliability of fertility clinics under the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act, 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has been responsible for collecting 
and reporting annual clinic data regarding infertility procedures and their success rates in 
individual clinics. Compliance with CDC reporting procedures is optional; in 2008, the 
most recent year for which data is available, 91.7 percent of U.S. clinics supplied data in 
order to avoid being listed as a “non-reporting clinic” on the CDC website (United States 
Dept. of Health and Human Services, Assisted Reproductive Technology). The CDC has 
also developed a model program of embryology lab certification; the decision to adopt 
this protocol is left to individual states. In addition to the CDC, the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) has jurisdiction over which ART medications are available for use 
in the U.S., as well as federal requirements for the screening and testing of reproductive 
tissues such as eggs and sperm. Finally, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) govern all laboratory testing for human health assessment and prevention, 
diagnosis and treatment of disease in the U.S., including those used in reproductive 
medicine. CMS oversight is largely through lab certification and ongoing surveys to 
ensure compliance with regulations outlined in the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act 
of 1992.  
 Second, while specific practices and regulations vary from state to state, each 
exercises its available power in the licensing of physicians (as general practitioners; 
specializations are covered by professional industry board certifications), designating 
requirements for continuing medical education, defining the grounds for professional 
misconduct and authorizing requisite penalties or punishment. Oversight of this 
regulatory system is maintained through a medical licensing board or another state 
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agency, and based on laws passed by the state legislature and medical board. Thus, the 
vast majority of states have legislation that governs ART in some form; it is particularly 
common for states to use their authority in the licensing of fertility specialists and to 
eliminate the maternity/paternity claims of tissue (egg or sperm) donors. Beyond these 
more common forms of regulation, fourteen states currently regulate insurance coverage 
for infertility services (American Society for Reproductive Medicine, "State Infertility 
Insurance Laws").38 Nine states specify the terms for gestational surrogacy contracts,39 
while nine others, plus the District of Columbia, ban surrogacy contracts altogether 
(Morgan).40 
 Finally, working in tandem with state and federal regulations, professional 
organizations within the industry of reproductive medicine maintain their own set of 
standards and protocols through three regulatory forms. Beyond state licensure for 
general medical practice, specialists undergo further training and certification through 
physician boards, such as the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology (ABOG) or 
the American Board of Urology (ABU). Each board sets its own standards for physician 
training, performance, and continuing education: “To become certified by ABOG 
requires four years of training, plus two years in clinical practice and passage of both 
written and oral examinations before certification is complete” (American Society for 
Reproductive Medicine, Oversight 8). Specialists in reproductive medicine often obtain 
post-board certification training in reproductive endocrinology and infertility.  
                                                
38 Including Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, and West Virginia. 
 
39 Including Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Nevada, New Hampshire, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. 
Additionally, California and Wyoming have laws that state the legality of gestational surrogacy, but specify 
that no contract is required for its practice. 
 
40 Including Arizona, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, New York, and North Dakota.  
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An additional layer of industry self-regulation is afforded through the American 
Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM), a professional organization for specialists in 
reproductive medicine and fertility. The ASRM issues regular reports and guidelines for 
ART use and practice, while disclaiming efforts to standardize or heavily legislate the 
profession: “These guidelines have been developed to assist physicians with clinical 
decisions regarding the care of their patients. They are not intended to be a protocol to be 
applied in all situations, and cannot substitute for the individual judgment of the treating 
physicians based on their knowledge of their patients and specific circumstances” 
(American Society for Reproductive Medicine "Practice Committee Guidelines"). ASRM 
guidelines include recommendations on specific procedures designed to treat infertility—
for example, how many embryos should be implanted during a single IVF cycle—as well 
as suggested procedures for the use of more controversial technologies like 
preimplantation genetic screening and diagnosis. While the ASRM has an ethics 
committee, its publications tend to focus more on the associated risks and rates of success 
of ART, and less on broader bio/ethical considerations often raised by various advocacy 
groups (Galpern).  
Lastly, rounding out physician board certification and professional guidelines, the 
industry maintains a measure of self-regulation through embryology laboratory 
accreditation, which was developed as a partnership between ASRM and the College of 
American Pathologists. Labs are regularly inspected for compliance with national 
standards, and these standards dictate “the education, certification, and expertise of 
laboratory personnel, as well as their authority and responsibilities” (American Society 
for Reproductive Medicine, Oversight 8).  
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Thus, the practice of reproductive medicine in the United States is managed 
through an intricate web of federal oversight, state regulations, and self-imposed industry 
standards of professionalism. Several vested parties—including the CDC and the 
American Society of Reproductive Medicine (ASRM)—maintain “that ART is already 
one of [the] most highly regulated of all medical practices in the United States” 
(American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Oversight). This claim, however, is 
widely contested (Cho; Deech; Galpern; Meyer). Regardless, the question of regulation is 
perhaps better assessed as one of kind, rather than degree. Careful consideration of these 
regulations reveals that they attend only to specific, somewhat limited and technical, 
matters—certification and licensure of physicians and labs, personnel training, tissue 
handling, reporting and publishing data. For better or worse, current oversight measures 
explicitly refuse legally enforceable protocols on issues of ethics, access, and medical 
practice, in favor of codes established by a privatized industry and the professional 
judgments of individual physicians and clinics. Additionally, the guidelines issued by 
ASRM are understood more or less as suggestions; strict compliance with these 
guidelines is approximated at less than 20 percent (Sivinski). Other governments—
including those of Canada, Australia, and many in Europe—have opted for nationally 
uniform and enforceable protocols that determine, for example, under what circumstances 
parents might select for genetic characteristics (such as gender, birth defects, disabilities, 
or donor tissue matches), or in the assertion (or refusal) of certain populations’ access to 
ART, such as single women or LGBTQ families (Cho). In the United States, questions 
such as these are determined by individual fertility clinics, informed by the preferences of 
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doctors, patients, and the market, legally unenforceable even when addressed through 
ASRM guidelines and recommendations.  
This form of laissez-faire oversight has provoked substantive criticism from a 
host of strange bedfellows—the religious right, progressive advocacy organizations, and 
various parties within international communities (Cho; Deech; Ponnuru; Weiss). Interests 
reflect a range of ethical and political concerns, from the safety of ART and the well-
being of women, to embryo protection, the ethics of genetic selection, and the troubling 
bio/political possibilities of brave new worlds. While assisted reproductive technologies 
have provided regular fodder for startling headlines and public criticism: “‘Fertility 
Expert: I Can Clone a Human Being,’ and ‘A Baby Please. Blond, Freckles—Hold the 
Colic’,” (Meyer 2) in the wake of the birth of Suleman’s octuplets, the debates over ART 
resurged with heightened intensity and venom. Thus, having sketched the regulatory 
dimensions of ART and its attendant political volatility, I turn now to the figure of Nadya 
Suleman in contemporary imaginaries as a site where the politics of motherhood unfold. 
Beggars Cannot Be Choosers41 
“Octocrazy.” “Cheap slut.” “Pathological liar.” “Sociopath.” “Tramp.” “The 
poster child for immoral, unconscionable behavior.” The public condemnation of 
Suleman has been feverish and widespread. It urges careful exploration of the logics 
through which such fury is marshaled and how it is subsequently deployed. I argue that 
the controversy over Suleman is due, in part, to her uneasy, and ultimately untenable, 
merger of two culturally familiar and resonant tropes—that of a woman trying 
desperately to conceive and that of the single mother receiving public assistance. In this 
                                                
41 I am indebted to Rickie Solinger for the use of this phrase in this particular context; see Solinger, 
Beggars and Choosers. 
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section, I chart the meanings and histories of these two figures in collective imaginaries, 
and attend to the ways in which Suleman threatened to undo and dissolve significant 
distinctions between the trope of the (sym)pathetic woman struggling with infertility and 
that of the “welfare queen.”  
(In)Fertility and the Politics of Motherhood 
 While the medicalization of infertility42—or indeed, the widespread phenomenon 
of infertility itself—is commonly thought to have emerged in conjunction with the 
development of ART in the 1970s, feminist scholars have traced its origins back several 
centuries (Marsh and Ronner). The historical continuities here are significant—first, 
despite contemporary narratives that suggest a spike in the rates of infertility in the last 
few decades, the overall infertility rate has remained remarkably stable in the last 
century, roughly between nine and thirteen percent (Marsh and Ronner). Significant 
shifts in the rates of infertility for married, middle-class couples indicate a downward 
trend since the mid-1960s, while the only demographic to experience a rise in these rates 
since the mid-1960s is young women under twenty-four, largely due to a rise in sexually-
transmitted infections that, left untreated, may cause significant reproductive damage 
(United States Cong., Infertility: Medical).43 Yet, it was neither young women nor 
women disproportionately impacted by infertility—namely, women of color and low-
wealth women—who became the primary site for cultural panic, empathy, and malaise 
regarding infertility in recent years. Arising in response to feminist and anti-racist 
                                                
42 According to ASRM, approximately 7.3 percent of women and their partners suffer infertility in the 
United States, which is medically defined as the inability for couples to conceive after one year of 
unprotected intercourse. However, the twelve-month marker is recent, embraced by fertility specialists, but 
contested by demographers who point to comprehensive studies suggesting the former definition, set a five-
year marker, is a better indicator (Faludi).  
 
43 Untreated STIs are responsible for roughly fifty percent of preventable infertility in women (United 
States Cong. Infertility and Prevention).  
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struggles of the 1960s and 70s, the naming of a contemporary infertility epidemic reflects 
a set of gendered and racialized attitudes with regard to maternity and reproduction. 
Charting the emergence and influence of backlash mythology, Susan Faludi cites 
the infertility myth as a prominent theme in pronatalist 1980s narratives that worked to 
discipline feminist gains, attitudes, and women themselves. In February of 1982, a study 
published in the New England Journal of Medicine chronicled plummeting rates of 
women’s fertility after age thirty; the report made international headlines overnight:  
...exhorting women to “reevaluate their goals” and have their babies before they 
started careers. The New York Times put the news on its front page that day, in a 
story that extolled the study as “unusually large and rigorous” and “more reliable” 
than previous efforts. Dozens of other newspapers, magazine, and TV new 
programs quickly followed suit. By the following year, the statistic had found its 
way into alarmist books about the “biological clock” . . . . [and] as the 40 percent 
figure got passed along, it kept getting larger. A self-help book was soon 
reporting that women in their thirties now faced a “shocking 68 percent” chance 
of infertility—and promptly faulted the feminists, who had failed to advise 
women of the biological drawbacks of a successful career. (Faludi 43) 
 
The study, disproved shortly thereafter but nonetheless exceedingly socially and 
politically resonant because it flew in the face of established research by asserting a 
decline in fertility eight to twelve years earlier than previously suggested, decisively wed 
infertility to a specific demographic: the educated, thirty-something, professional white 
woman.   
Such a claim has considerable historical precedent; anti-feminist backlash has 
long informed and animated discussions of women’s inability to conceive or bear 
children (Marsh and Ronner). Indeed, interrogating the assumed origins of infertility 
reveals a striking degree of continuity in cultural attitudes over time, as infertility has 
repeatedly been attributed to women’s unruly, non-conforming, or otherwise 
“unbecoming” behavior: “The idea that inappropriate behavior causes infertility…was 
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dominant in [the 1870s] and has recurred periodically ever since . . . . The young woman 
who sought a college education—or worse, a career after she earned her degree—would 
most likely find herself suffering from sterility brought on by ‘uterine inflammation’” 
(Marsh and Ronner 81-82). In other words, not unlike rape culture scripts, when it comes 
to infertility, women have asked for it. In their refusal to adhere to gendered norms that 
posit motherhood as the ultimate expression of white femininity—in pursuing education 
and careers in lieu of traditional family life—women have brought about their own 
demise. Despite considerable evidence that women’s reproductive health has only been 
enhanced as a result of greater gender equality and opportunities for women, the myth of 
feminism as the root of infertility persists. 
The depiction of selfish, career-driven women and their (deserved) infertility is 
markedly racialized, positioning middle-class, white women’s (in)fertility at the center of 
the national panic and marking this trend as in need of redress. This is true, in spite of 
consistent evidence of the disproportionate impact of infertility on low-income 
communities and communities of color as a result of institutionalized racism and health 
care disparities: 
National data indicates that 6.4% of white women are infertile at compared to 7% 
of Hispanic women, 10.5% of black women and 13.6% of other racial groups. 
Additionally, 8.5% of married women without a high school education or its 
equivalent are infertile as compared to 5.6% of married women with a bachelor’s 
degree or higher. Some experts believe that due to underreporting, the prevalence 
of infertility among minorities may be even higher. (Elster) 
 
Despite the evidence, cultural myths maintain infertility as a site of crisis for the affluent, 
a disease of privileged, professional women and couples who delay childbearing to their 
own detriment. But the damage is not imagined as exclusively private or individualized; 
rather, cultural discourses constitutive of the infertility epidemic are also wed to the logic 
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of white supremacist culture. Dorothy Roberts points out that conservative public 
figures—such as Ben Wattenberg, Charles Murray, Richard Herrnstein, and Pat 
Robertson—gained widespread repute in forecasting a crisis in American health and 
identity that was explicitly articulated to the unmet maternal obligations of educated 
white/Western women and the reproductive excesses of “undesirable” populations: “The 
Birth Dearth, for example, predicted that reproduction in the industrialized world could 
not keep pace with population growth in the Third World unless [white] American 
women took measure to have more children . . . . [The Bell Curve] foretold increasing 
social disparities within the United States owing to the higher birthrates of groups with 
inherently lower intelligence” (Roberts, Killing the Black Body 270). Thus, Roberts 
astutely concludes, the logic of eugenics is decisively present, not just in the crafting of 
an infertility epidemic in contemporary collective imaginaries, but also as a backdrop 
to—and in the concomitant cultural investment in—the burgeoning business of assisted 
reproduction. 
Indeed, a multi-billion dollar industry has emerged alongside, and in response to, 
the cultural crisis of infertility that both reflects and perpetuates inequities. While CDC 
reporting requirements include a range of information regarding clinic practices, success 
rates, patient ages, medical histories and reasons for pursuing ART, demographic 
information concerning race and ethnicity, education, income, sexuality, and source of 
payment for services are conspicuously absent. There is a comparative paucity of data 
regarding the use of infertility services, with the exception of the National Survey of 
Family Growth, which has been compiled a total of seven times since 1973 by the 
National Center for Health Statistics (United States Dept. of Health and Human Services, 
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National Survey). This survey, in all of its iterations, demonstrates that women who use 
infertility services are disproportionately privileged with regard to education, income, 
race, marital status, and age because primary barriers to access are economic, 
geographical, and cultural factors (Bitler and Schmidt; Elster; Stephen and Chandra).44  
Such are the barriers that Suleman managed to transgress in seeking treatment for 
infertility, and for which she received considerable public scorn and ridicule. Thus, in the 
midst of intense criticism following the birth of her children, Nadya Suleman appeared in 
a few televised interviews in which she attempted to recast herself in a favorable light—
as a responsible, degree-seeking woman who, like many others, struggled with infertility 
and desperately wanted children. Talking with NBC’s Ann Curry, Suleman underscores 
her more conventional, if increasingly rigorous, attempts at motherhood: “I did get 
married . . . . I went through about seven years of trying [to conceive]. And through 
artificial insemination. And through medication. And all of which was unsuccessful” 
(Suleman "Her Side"). Eventually, Suleman explains, an ectopic pregnancy revealed 
extensive medical complications: “I had so many reproductive problems from 
fibroids…[and] lesions in my fallopian tubes. It turned out that my tubes were scarred” 
(Suleman "Her Side"). IVF, it seemed, was the only option. This history of struggle, 
Suleman insists, is often neglected in the public rendering of her story: “[critics] are not 
taking into consideration my past history. Seven years of infertility, seven years,” in 
addition to an individual IVF record that resulted in the birth of one child for every five 
or six embryos implanted (Suleman "Octuplets' Mom"). In short, when pressed to explain 
                                                
44 While fourteen states currently require health care insurers to cover infertility treatments, and there is 
mounting political pressure for more states to follow suit, virtually no program of public assistance covers 
infertility services. Indeed, such a proposal seems nothing short of ludicrous in contemporary neoliberal 
paradigms. 
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or otherwise justify her decision making, Suleman consistently referred back to her 
troubled history with conception, drawing on culturally familiar and resonant notions of 
maternal desire and the right to choose: “I feel as though I've been under the microscope 
because I've chosen this unconventional kind of life. I didn't intend on it being 
unconventional. It just turned out to be. All I wanted ... was to be a mom. That's all I ever 
wanted in my life” (qtd. in "Octuplets' Mom: All").  
But Suleman’s continuous attempts to rhetorically situate herself squarely within 
mainstream frameworks for infertility and reproductive choice proved an exercise in 
futility, as the sym/pathetic trope of the infertile woman was simply unavailable to her. 
Indeed, tracing the social histories of assisted reproduction and infertility both illuminate 
and underscore significant incongruities among those who struggle with infertility, those 
who seek medical assistance, and those who are culturally believed to be the (worthy) 
beneficiaries of that assistance. The legacy of the infertility epidemic—its investments in 
anti-feminist backlash and the perpetuation of white/Western culture—forms the milieu 
within which the trope of the sym/pathetic infertile woman emerges. It is both for and 
because of this figure that the fertility industry thrives—she is white, professional, 
affluent, established in age and most often in marriage as well. Her figure might 
otherwise prove threatening—the embodiment of mainstream women’s lib itself—if it 
were not for her deep-seated desire for motherhood. Positing an aggressive claim to the 
rhetoric of reproductive choice, while articulating that choice back to raced and classed 
notions of maternity, cultural assumptions regarding infertility and its victims embody a 
postfeminist logic that codes privileged women as rightful mothers and legitimate choice-
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makers. Nadya Suleman, as a single mother on public assistance, was deemed neither, a 
point best illuminated through a juxtaposition of infertility with the politics of welfare. 
Welfare and the Politics of Motherhood 
 The meaning of welfare has experienced profound transformations in the last 
century (Gordon, Pitied but Not Entitled; Solinger, Beggars and Choosers). Historically 
indicative of prosperity and well-being, as well as an apt descriptor for a range of 
governmental and social services designated for the health and security of the people, 
welfare is rooted in the social transformations wrought by the New Deal. Still, such 
programs have been deeply stratified and exclusionary since their inception, with 
considerably disparate values accorded to Social Security versus public assistance 
programs (Gordon, Pitied but Not Entitled; Solinger, Beggars and Choosers). With the 
vast majority of social welfare programs folded into Social Security by the early 1970s—
including, for example, pensions for retired workers, aid to senior citizens, unemployed 
workers, and people with disabilities—Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
became the sole program of public assistance, deeply stigmatized and publicly maligned 
as “welfare.”  
The stigma attached to AFDC (and its most recent incarnation, Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families or TANF) is in part about gender—it reflects and 
perpetuates institutionalized sexism, the devaluation of gendered forms of labor, and the 
disciplining of “deviant” family structures that place women at the head of households. 
But “welfare” is also about race. Initial arguments in the 1930s and 40s supported a 
system that offered security to white widows as mothers and deliberately excluded 
women of color, immigrants, and never-married women; it was a form of public 
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assistance generally well received, if also less prioritized than other dimensions of Social 
Security (Mink, Wages; Moller; Nadasen; Solinger, Beggars and Choosers). A series of 
profound, midcentury cultural and economic transformations in American public life 
provoked shifts in public perceptions of welfare. Struggles for civil rights, welfare rights, 
women’s rights, and the War on Poverty combined to challenge institutionalized barriers 
to welfare, and to strengthen rights for women, impoverished communities, and 
communities of color under the law, as modifications in federal law simultaneously 
provided widows with social security insurance, removing “deserving” mothers from the 
welfare rolls. As a result, explains historian Premilla Nadasen, “the politics of welfare 
converged on the stereotypical image of a black unmarried welfare mother with a child 
born out of wedlock. This image, more than any other, fed the fires of the welfare 
controversy” (Nadasen 10). Public responses to single mothers, and particularly single 
African-American mothers, on welfare drew on existing stereotypes of black women as 
sexually promiscuous and unfit for motherhood and, lacking structural analysis that might 
account for institutionalized racism and the disproportionate impacts of 
deindustrialization, reduced single mothers’ economic plight to poor individual choices 
and personal (ir)responsibility.  
Despite the fact that most welfare recipients remained white, black single mothers 
were increasingly imagined as beneficiaries, which intensified public hostility toward 
these programs. The racialization of welfare created the context in which the reviled 
image of the “welfare queen” came to dominate contemporary discussions of poverty and 
state assistance. Increasing public aggression toward welfare demonstrates clearly the 
deep-seated racialization of maternity and the cultural devaluation of black mothers and 
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children: “Poor Black women’s welfare eligibility meant that many chose to stay home 
and care for their children, thus emulating White middle-class mothers. But because these 
stay-at-home moms were African American and did not work for pay, there were deemed 
to be ‘lazy’” (Collins 132). In short, ever since black women successfully campaigned for 
full inclusion and entitlement to programs that benefitted their white counterparts, their 
exclusion has been ensured through a relentless campaign of opposition. The trope of the 
welfare queen—as lazy, promiscuous, excessively fertile, loud, aggressive, matriarchal, 
and African-American—not only masks the structural origins of poverty and the 
effectiveness of governmental programs in alleviating it, but also functions to silence the 
voices of women and families struggling to survive on welfare.  
The figure of the welfare queen is, in this way, decidedly invested in obscuring 
and eviscerating low-wealth women’s claim to reproductive or maternal choice. Unpaid 
for her caregiving, a single mother who lacks a formal relationship with the labor market 
is marked as an illegitimate consumer and choice-maker—an undeserving beneficiary of 
public assistance—a trend that has only intensified since the passage of the 1996 Personal 
Responsibility Act (PRA). Findings attached to the prelude of the PRA stress that only 
women with adequate resources should be mothers, that low-income women are 
illegitimate mothers who give birth to inferior children, who themselves are likely to 
become dependent on welfare, and ought to be prevented from reproducing at all 
(Solinger, Beggars and Choosers). The “welfare queen’s” childbearing is deemed 
parasitic for society as a whole; as a result, “many Americans have been increasingly 
unwilling to acknowledge the rights, the motherhood status, or the citizenship status of 
poor mothers. Instead, most have chosen to support public policies designed to be ever 
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tougher on incorrigible women bent on taking the taxpayer for a ride” (Solinger, Beggars 
and Choosers 182). Thus, the image of the welfare queen as a public pariah—an 
illegitimate consumer who cheats the system and is a poor parent to her children—stands 
in direct opposition to the figure of the sym/pathetic woman who struggles with 
infertility. Each becomes the site for the naming of a public crisis; indeed, the collectively 
imagined crises are two sides of the same coin, as each posits precisely the same socially 
unbalanced, even poisonous, reproductive equation. On one side resides a well-to-do 
white professional unable to conceive and, on the other, an unruly breeder who bears 
children to avoid employment and abscond with public resources.  
Nadya Suleman was promptly and aggressively articulated as the latter. It is 
significant that in a sea of negative publicity, the most optimistic report on the octuplet 
birth was published prior to the release of Suleman’s identity. Featuring an interview with 
the Chukwu family, which includes the only other set of octuplets born in the United 
States, the uplifting narrative focuses on the current health and well-being of the Chukwu 
children, and solicits advice that the “First Family” of octuplets might offer the “new 
parents of eight” (Inbar, emphasis added). Throughout the report, Suleman is assumed to 
be partnered; medical concerns tempered with a kind of comparative optimism: “The 
newest set of eight may have an easier road toward survival than Nkem [Chukwu]’s now-
thriving brood . . . . While two of the babies were initially put on breathing tubes, the 
hospital says all are doing well—and could be home with their parents in eight to ten 
weeks” (Inbar). The content of the article seems to promise a bright future for the 
Suleman children, while the overall tone indicates a promising trajectory for the Suleman 
story as one of heart-warming public interest. But within days, as various dimensions of 
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Suleman’s character were revealed, the tenor of reporting shifted dramatically, featuring 
headlines such as: “A Mom’s Controversial Choice,” “The Ethics of Octuplets,” “When 
Eight is Seven Too Many,” and “Where in the World is Octodad?”.45 
This public refrain proved caustic and unyielding, drawing on multiple 
dimensions of the “welfare queen” trope. Under the guise of “responsibility,” Suleman 
was regularly—and uniquely—interrogated for her failure to adhere to normative 
sexuality and maternity, as decisively wed to the labor market if not to a man: “Why is it 
responsible for a single woman without a job with six kids to bring eight more children 
into this world . . . how is it not selfish to bring children in the world that you cannot 
actually afford?” (Curry qtd. in Suleman "Her Side"). For others, Suleman’s decision 
making exceeded questions of (ir)responsibility, and constituted an audacious 
appropriation of unearned and illegitimate privilege: “If you’re not making it with six, 
then you don’t have the sev-, you don’t have the right to have the seventh. You haven’t 
earned the right to have the seventh, you can’t provide for the seventh, so you don’t do it, 
right?” (McGraw qtd. in Suleman "Octuplets' Mom"). Speculations concerning 
Suleman’s mental health ranged from depression to a kind of pregnancy “obsession” 
similar to “[b]ody dysmorphia. Where [the individual] just want[s] more and more of the 
surgeries to feel better [sic]” (Dr. Jeff Gardere qtd. in Suleman "Her Side"). In addition, 
references to the taxpayer monies Suleman has repeatedly received in food stamps, 
student loans, and disability were framed and compounded by allusions to her 
(inadequate) standard of living and parenting: 
                                                
45 See Kay Hymowitz, "Where in the World Is Octodad?," The Wall Street Journal February 20, 2009, 
Alison Motluk, "When Eight Is Seven Too Many," New Scientist 201.2695 (2009), Bonnie Rochman, 
"Octuplets Fallout: Should Fertility Doctors Set Limits?," Time February 2, 2009 February 2, 2009, Jill 
Smolowe, Johnny Dodd, Howard Breuer and Lorenzo Benet, "A Mom's Controversial Choice," People 
February 16, 2009 February 16, 2009. 
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At the small three-bedroom house in suburban Whittier . . . . leaves and dead ficus 
branches were scattered across the hard-packed dirt yard; a cracked kitchen 
window was held together with duct tape. Inside…two cribs were strewn with 
clothes and towels, and the window was covered by a bedsheet [sic]; another 
bedroom, equipped with bunks beds, showed knee-high mounds of clothes 
tumbling from a closet. (Smolowe et al., "The Challenge of Her Life")  
 
Thus, Suleman is indicted for a lack of economic resources and proper domestic 
competence and, consequently, marked as unworthy of public assistance. In this way, she 
is rhetorically figured as the quintessential “welfare queen”—irresponsible, dirty, 
reckless, lazy, and mentally unstable, a woman impoverished in myriad dimensions of 
culturally legible maternity—in short, an undeserving mother. 
The initial embrace of the Suleman octuplets as a spectacular feat of modern 
medicine quickly dissolved as representations of Nadya Suleman’s character emerged. A 
woman who dared wed public assistance to IVF, she came to represent the uncomfortable 
articulation of two incongruous tropes that, when combined, led to a series of assumed 
paradoxes—a low-income woman struggling with infertility? A welfare recipient able to 
gain financial access to IVF? The strict social and economic barriers to assisted 
reproduction were simultaneously revealed and decisively breeched—the modern miracle 
transformed into monstrosity, an appropriation of resources that besmirched the narrative 
of technological progress.46 Suleman’s story suggests a cultural crisis of inconceivable 
proportion—the possibility of low-wealth women reproducing themselves, the possibility 
that ART has fallen into the “wrong” hands. Indeed, Suleman’s voluntary actions 
threatened to collapse distinctions between deserving and undeserving mothers, to 
disappear significant cultural categories that have long fixed legitimate maternity as a 
privilege earned through status and capital. And in this moment, a particular mode of 
                                                
46 I am indebted to Ken Hillis for this insight. 
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discipline, one suited well to the contemporary politics of “life itself,” became entirely 
necessary, a point to which I now turn. 
Ethopolitical Authority and the Engineering of Choice 
 In response to public outrage over the Suleman octuplets, a few states considered 
additional legislative attempts to regulate the fertility industry, with greater emphasis on 
questions of bioethical significance. A bill proposed in Georgia would have limited the 
number of embryos transferred per IVF cycle to two for any woman under the age of 
forty, and three embryos for women over the age of forty (Meyer). In Missouri, proposed 
legislation would have mandated that all ART clinics and specialists comply with ASRM 
guidelines, or risk losing medical licensure. Given the manic media attention to the 
Suleman saga and high degrees of public outrage, this could have become a pivotal 
moment for the regulation and oversight of ART in the U.S. It was not. Despite 
overwhelming public anger voiced over Nadya Suleman’s pregnancy, legislative redress 
was met with significant resistance from fertility specialists, professional organizations, 
and clients, and failed to gain much traction in broader communities.47 Rather than 
legislative reform, a demonstration of industry discipline became necessary to quell 
public perception of the crisis. In this section, I explore the ethopolitical forms of 
governance affirmed and codified through the discursive figuration of both Suleman and 
Kamrava.  
                                                
47 In Georgia, the bill was quickly criticized for its retooled definition of an embryo as a “biological human 
being who is not the property of any person or entity” (Meyer 13). But the Missouri bill avoided abortion 
politics altogether, sticking strictly to the enforcement of ASRM guidelines, so the grounds for its refusal 
are less clear. 
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Beyond (Il)Legitimacy: Suleman as Irreverent Choice-Maker 
In theorizing the technological shifts and cultural transformations that inform 
contemporary biopolitics, Nikolas Rose argues that “biomedical technique has extended 
choice to the very fabric of vital existence, [and] we are faced with the inescapable task 
of deliberating about the worth of different human lives—with controversies over such 
decisions, with conflicts over who should make such decisions and who should not, and 
hence with a novel kind of politics of life itself” (Rose 254). Reproductive decision-
making is inextricably embedded within the form and cadence of new biopolitical 
regimes and, as such, is accompanied by its own set of constraints and responsibilities, 
especially for women. Feminist scholars have questioned the availability of autonomous 
choice within these frameworks, and have interrogated the presence and functioning of 
the forms of authority emerging within (bio)medical spaces (Roberts, "Race, Gender"; 
Samerski): “[i]n the twenty-first century, not only knowledge and skills but also 
deliberation and decision making are being refashioned as scientific objects. Freedom, 
choice, and autonomy are being redefined in a way that requires scientific input and 
guidance services in order for them to be appropriately exercised” (Samerski 755). In 
short, new biotechnological horizons are accompanied by a set of social and cultural 
technologies that carefully delineate the borders of legitimate, “responsible” choice: 
“This new kind of self-determination does not increase the pregnant women's freedom. 
On the contrary, it entangles her in paralyzing contradictions. She is urged to make a 
decision that is mediated by technoscience and that requires professional services” 
(Samerski 736). 
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 Understanding contemporary biopolitical configurations in this way strengthens 
our ability to understand the significance (as well as the brutal vilification) of Nadya 
Suleman in public discourse. For it is not simply that she threatened to collapse 
significant cultural distinctions between “deserving” and “undeserving” mothers, 
between “beggars” and “choosers,” although this did provide considerable fuel for the 
fire. Suleman’s violation was much more substantial than this, for not only did she gain 
access to a space of reproductive choice that was never meant for her (i.e. the infertility 
clinic), but once there, she proceeded to make all of the “wrong” choices, to violate the 
conditions of biological citizenship as tied to responsible decision-making.  
Two particular facets of Suleman’s decision-making within this elite space of 
biological citizenship received extraordinary attention, namely, the risks associated with 
multiple births and selective reduction as an ethical responsibility. Indeed, in the wake of 
the Suleman octuplets, the biological risks of multiple births received unprecedented 
publicity. The logic of risk is articulated to both mothers and infants: “For the mother, it's 
less severe; diabetes and hypertension…There can be months and months of bed rest with 
clots and embolisms. For the infant, the risks are lifelong: prematurity, cerebral palsy, 
blindness, months in intensive care” (Dr. Robert Stillman qtd. in James). The potential 
for, or likelihood of, disability is frequently referenced as the primary site of concern 
regarding multiple births; women are chastised within these discourses for their lack of 
knowledge and adequate “risk prevention” in this regard: “Many are so keen to ensure the 
health of their future child that they overhaul their diets and cut out all caffeine and 
alcohol. Yet they remain under the impression that it is okay to allow their fetus to do one 
of the most dangerous things possible: share a crowded womb” (Motluk 24). Suleman is 
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regularly admonished for taking indefensible risks, as evidenced in Phil McGraw’s (a.k.a. 
“Dr. Phil”) comments to her during an interview: “It was a risk you shouldn’t have taken, 
because of the risk to your health and the risk to these babies’ health. And you don’t even 
know what that is yet, until they start growing and you find out what it is. But the chance 
of all eight of them being fully normal with development courses, is probably zero” 
(McGraw qtd. in Suleman "Octuplets' Mom"). 
 Here and elsewhere, the persistence of these messages demands critical attention: 
“the construction of risk, both immediate and ongoing, can be used to create an urgent 
desire to control such risk and even opportunistically profit from it” (Scott, “Kairos as 
Indeterminate Risk” 119). In other words, risk is neither neutral nor objective. Rhetorics 
of risk contribute meaningfully to the imagining of crisis and mobilization of action 
toward a particularized end. As Alonzo Plough and Sheldon Krimsky argue, “Those who 
control the discourse of risk will most likely control the political battles as well” (4). 
Signaling reproductive emergency, as the rhetoric of risk does in this case, marks the 
disciplining of ART as immediate and necessary, and facilitates the process of doing so. 
Thus, to the extent that multiple births are figured through the rhetoric of pre- and post-
natal risk, then selective reduction is discursively framed as the ethical decision that 
invariably follows and relieves such risk. Also referred to as selective abortion—although 
remarkably (perhaps strategically) bereft of abortion politics—the procedure is 
recommended in many cases of multifetal pregnancy to minimize risks to the woman and 
her future child(ren). An op-ed in Newsweek featured a lengthy and prominent lead-in: 
“Lost in the octuplets saga is the scary medical reality: without selective reduction, lots of 
lives are at risk” (Evans). The practice of selective reduction is largely disarticulated from 
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abortion, in part because the woman continues to carry a (desperately wanted) pregnancy 
to term. Suleman, reportedly, would not consider selective reduction an option: “The 
sheer number of [embryos] created profound risks for their health—and Nadya’s. At this 
point some doctors recommend ‘selective reduction’ of the fetuses. Nadya wouldn’t hear 
of it” (Suleman "Her Side"). 
Myriad considerations raised here are, indeed, significant. They involve questions 
of medical risk and safety—how much one might rightfully assume as a patient, either for 
oneself or on behalf of others. They provoke a range of social justice issues, perhaps most 
clearly in the dis/ability politics of genetic selection and reduction, an issue continuously 
referenced and troubled through the rhetoric of fetal harm and “risk.” Also included are 
the reproductive and maternal choices of women and families (including, for example, 
when termination is figured as an ethical choice and when it is not), and the role of 
medical experts in this complex terrain. But of particular significance, and often 
overlooked, within this set of complexities is the way by which we come to ask these 
questions. Suleman’s disruption—the circulation of her story as a public crisis of 
endemic proportion and the naming of her pregnancy as careless, dangerous, risky—says 
less about what constitutes actual risk or risky behavior than it suggests about who is 
allowed access to the assumption of risk through ART and the range of reproductive and 
maternal options it initiates.  
Nonetheless, Nadya Suleman’s story—and the host of ethical quandaries that it 
incites—functions also as a logic through which new forms of biological citizenship are 
made visible, salient, exigent. The continual, public circulation of the figure of Suleman 
functions as a warning to women because it underscores the constraints that accompany 
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new forms of reproductive freedom and autonomy. Indeed, in contemporary ART and 
pre-natal practice, heavily imbued with repro-genetic technologies, “characteristics of the 
new autonomy are at odds with precisely those abilities once implied by the notion of 
self-determination inasmuch as they tend to mitigate against freedom of action, trust in 
one's own senses, and independent judgment” (Samerski 736). At the same moment in 
which assisted reproductive technologies are discursively wed to an expansion of choice, 
they are simultaneously accompanied by new forms of governance. With greater choice 
comes greater responsibility; with greater access to information, a more expansive set of 
biological imperatives. The figure of Nadya Suleman serves as a reminder of gendered, 
ethopolitical responsibility, encouraging self-discipline and governance in the context of 
reproductive “choice” and neoliberal citizenship. 
Beyond (Il)Legalities: Dr. Kamrava and the Demonstration of Industry Discipline 
 Suleman’s failure to make culturally legible maternal choices—to exercise proper 
self-governance as a condition of neoliberal citizenship—generated heated international 
criticism, much of which was aimed at the U.S. fertility industry for its lack of regulation 
and oversight. British professor of law and bioethics and former chair of the United 
Kingdom’s ART regulatory authority, Ruth Deech, asserts that: 
In the United States, assisted reproduction is nearly an unregulated black market, 
guided by toothless ‘rules’ from non-regulatory bodies—fertility clinics can offer 
sex selection at their own discretion, for example . . . . The reports from the US 
national council on bioethics are no substitute for a regulatory body such as 
HFEA [the U.K.’s Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority], which 
combines reflection with statutory powers of inspection and enforcement. (Deech 
280) 
 
Lacking a set of rigorous regulations akin to those in Canada, Australia, and many 
European countries, U.S. assisted fertility professional organizations, clinics, and 
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specialists were pressed to defend their practices to an incredulous international 
community. Writing for New Scientist, Canadian journalist Alison Motluk concludes: “It 
is time to ask what the fertility industry is up to. Indeed it’s worth asking why it has taken 
the birth of octuplets to shake us from our complacency” (Motluk 24).  
American publics were similarly outraged, but the intense scrutiny expressed in 
mediated forums is more discriminating in its target—aimed specifically at the individual 
fertility specialist who worked with Suleman. Keith Olbermann of MSNBC displayed a 
kind of candor that reflected considerable collective sentiment: “What kind of whacked-
out quack of a fertility doctor implants at least six embryos in one womb?” (qtd. in 
Suleman "Her Side").48 Indeed, in the weeks immediately following the Suleman births, 
hypotheses as to how her pregnancy occurred in the first place regularly returned to rogue 
and inferior medical practice. Dr. Mark Sauer, Professor of Reproductive Endocrinology 
at Columbia University surmised: “My best guess is that there was a flagrant violation of 
the, you know, professional standard of how many embryos to transfer in a young 
woman” (qtd. in Suleman "Her Side"). Sauer’s remarks simultaneously disarticulate 
Suleman’s fertility specialist from the rest of industry and sidestep the issue of 
(un)enforceable guidelines for reproductive specialists. Thus, and perhaps not 
surprisingly, much of the professional discourse surrounding the Suleman narrative 
labored fervently to mark it as anomalous and distinguish the medical specialist from the 
fertility industry at large. In an interview with Time, Shady Grove Fertility Center 
                                                
48 In the early weeks of the octuplets’ lives, the identity of Suleman’s fertility doctor was unknown; indeed, 
this is entailed in guarantees of medical privacy. It is only through Suleman’s regular public appearances 
that the identity of Dr. Michael Kamrava was eventually discerned. Calls for a formal investigation into his 
actions were quick to follow. 
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Medical Director Robert Stillman referred to the octuplet story with aversion and marked 
professional distance: “I think the word cowboys comes to mind” (qtd. in Rochman).  
Once Kamrava’s identity was revealed, the dissociation between his practices and 
those of the industry at large became a pivotal rhetorical move in shielding the U.S. 
fertility industry from attack—legislative, public, or otherwise. As such, Kamrava has 
been consistently discursively figured as unprofessional, rogue, cavalier—a threat to 
normative practice and procedure in the profession of assisted reproduction. A March 
2009 article in Time reported on his controversial methods of implanting embryos, 
referring not just to the number of embryos transferred, but also to the patient’s age and 
social status as further indication of Kamrava’s poor judgment: “[T]he Los Angeles Times 
reported that a 49-year-old uninsured woman was pregnant with quadruplets after being 
treated by Kamrava a few months after he helped Suleman become pregnant. In that case, 
Kamrava transferred at least seven embryos made from younger donor eggs” (Stateman). 
Several reports in the wake of the birth of Suleman’s octuplets featured former Kamrava 
patients and colleagues who were frustrated by his comparatively low success rates and 
experimental methods, functioning in concert to undermine his professional credibility 
and distance him from the rest of the industry (James; Rochman; Stateman). 
This rhetorical labor set the foundation for what was to come—a demonstration of 
industry discipline through the investigation, prosecution, and eventual license revocation 
of Kamrava himself. In October 2009, Kamrava was “expelled from the American 
Society for Reproductive Medicine for a ‘pattern of behavior’ detrimental to the industry” 
(Yoshino) and, in June 2011, the Medical Board of California officially revoked his 
license to practice ("California: Fertility"). According to the petition filed by the Medical 
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Board, Kamrava was accused of three violations of California law in his treatment of 
Suleman: gross negligence (including excessive numbers of embryos transferred, 
repeated initiation of a fresh egg stimulation/retrieval when frozen embryos were 
available, and failure to refer her for mental health evaluation), repeated negligent acts 
(including high doses of hormones for ovarian stimulation, as well as the violations listed 
above), and inadequate records to demonstrate that Kamrava had sufficiently conversed 
with Suleman about “the specific risks and benefits associated with IVF stimulation and 
embryo transfer . . . [and] the risk of multiple gestation despite the transfer of excessive 
[embryos] or her willingness to undergo multi-fetal reduction if faced with a higher order 
multiple pregnancy” (Medical Board of California). In addition, Kamrava was cited for a 
failure “to appropriately document [Suleman’s] social situation,” (Medical Board of 
California) indicating that, had he done so, professional standards of care would have 
mandated a mental health referral.49 
 The petition filed against Kamrava does not solely address Suleman’s treatment, 
but also accuses Kamrava of negligence and incompetence in his care for two other 
patients. To be sure, some of these accusations seem to constitute clear and egregious 
violations of the health and well-being of his patients, if not the law itself.50 I wish to 
focus less, however, on Kamrava’s case in its entirety in favor of a sustained 
interrogation of the violations he is accused of with regard to Suleman, to better 
illuminate how his public figuration/circulation is similarly implicated in the normative, 
                                                
49 ASRM does not issue guidelines or requirements for mental health referrals, but suggests that all clinics 
have “a consultant/mental health professional with expertise in reproductive issues” (American Society for 
Reproductive Medicine “Revised Minimum” 165). 
 
50  For example, Kamrava’s failure to recognize abnormal/cancerous cell growth in one of his patients, 
despite multiple opportunities to do so, is evidence of his medical incompetence, which, in turn, 
compromised a patient’s care. 
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directional functioning of ethopolitical decision-making and contemporary forms of 
somatic expertise. Drawing on the ways in which Suleman’s deviant behavior functioned 
on two discrete levels—first, the transgression of social and economic barriers between 
beggars and choosers and, second, the violation of “responsible” decision-making within 
elite ethopolitical space—we can better understand the form and function of the resulting 
discipline exercised publicly on both Kamrava and Suleman.  
First, that the Suleman births resulted in Kamrava’s professional dismissal from 
the ASRM, and an investigation and license revocation by the Medical Board of 
California is unprecedented. As ART has become increasingly common, so too have 
multiple births. The incidence of twin births in the U.S. rose seventy percent between 
1980 and 2004 (Mathews et al.), and the most recent vital statistics available reveal a 
record high in the rate of twin births—32.6 per one thousand births in 2008 (Martin et 
al.). While the rate of triplet and higher-order multiple births is down from its 1998 peak 
(193.5 per 100,000 births), this “rate climbed more than 400 percent from 1980 through 
1998,” (Martin et al.) and remains remarkably high at 147.6 per 100,000. The Suleman 
octuplet birth was only the second in United States history, but a few things are worth 
noting here—namely, that both Suleman and her medical team believed the octuplets to 
be septuplets until the very last moment of delivery. And, while high order multiple births 
are rare, they are not unheard of, nor are they generally the grounds for investigation, 
prosecution, or license revocation. Indeed, Jon and Kate Gosselin and their eight 
children—birthed in two sets, as twins and sextuplets—were featured on one of the 
highest-ranked reality programs on TLC, which ran for seven successful seasons.51 While 
some public conversation about the risk of high order multiple births ensued shortly after 
                                                
51 Re-titled Kate Plus 8 following Jon and Kate’s 2009 divorce. 
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the Gosselin sextuplet birth, the discussion was largely limited to fertility specialists, and 
was certainly not accompanied by an investigation and dismissal of the doctor 
responsible.  
Second, while much of the public discourse surrounding Kamrava actively works 
to divorce him from the industry, his care for Suleman is, as some have argued, in 
keeping with the standards of the industry itself. The guidelines issued by ASRM are 
carefully articulated as only ever complimenting, even secondary to, a specialist’s 
trained, professional judgment in treating patients. As noted earlier, they emphasize the 
importance of assessing needs on a case-by-case basis and disclaim efforts to standardize 
or heavily legislate the profession: “The recommendations in these guidelines may not be 
the most appropriate approach for all patients. Medical science and ethics are constantly 
changing, and clinicians should not rely solely on these guidelines” (American Society 
for Reproductive Medicine "Practice Committee Guidelines"). In short, the 
recommendations of the ASRM are neither mandates nor directives, and they are most 
decidedly not legally enforceable. As several fertility specialists called to testify on 
Kamrava’s behalf have pointed out, his decision to implant twelve embryos was 
unorthodox, but it was neither illegal nor entirely uncalled for given Suleman’s medical 
history: “[Dr. Jeffery Steinberg] said he found the records justified Kamrava’s aggressive 
treatment of Suleman . . . . ‘[Kamrava] was trying very hard to help this woman get 
pregnant. I can’t fault his judgment,’ Steinberg said. ‘I can question maybe how 
aggressive he can be, but again, I wasn’t in the room with the patient’” (Hennessy-Fiske). 
Thus, while Kamrava has been relentlessly ostracized from the industry as a whole, 
careful study of his investigation and prosecution adds several layers of complexity, 
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which include low clinic compliance rates with ASRM guidelines overall, industry-wide 
privileging of doctor-patient relationships and judgments, and the elusive and largely 
ineffectual dimensions of current ART regulations and oversight. So the question 
becomes—why Kamrava? Why now?  
Given a lack of historical precedence for investigating high order multiple births, 
the investigation into Kamrava’s medical practice suggests that there is something else at 
stake in Suleman’s case. Indeed, the grounds for his license revocation suggests 
violations of a distinctly ethopolitical variety. Kamrava, it seems, failed to properly 
execute “somatic” expertise, failed to adequately administer “microtechnologies for the 
management of communication and information that are inescapably normative and 
directional…[that] blur the boundaries of coercion and consent” (Rose 29). In spite of an 
industry that regularly espouses the discourse of “choice” and “informed consent,” the 
charges levied against Kamrava hinge, at least in part, on an assumption that a more 
socially desirable and normative outcome would have been ensured, had he properly 
calculated and conveyed the appropriate risk factors, discussed the option of selective 
reduction, and/or referred Suleman to a mental health professional: “When given the data 
[by medical professionals], most people make the right decision [regarding multiples],” 
explains Dr. Jamie Grifo of the New York University Fertility Center (qtd. in James). In 
short, medical expertise, properly exercised and dispensed, inches closer toward medical 
dictate under the guise of greater freedom and autonomy in reproductive decision 
making. 
 Indeed, the new biological citizenship is a form of discipline that adheres not 
simply to making the “right” choices within elite ethopolitical spaces, but also suggests 
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the responsibilities of medical experts in codifying the boundaries of such a space. There 
are, perhaps, many dimensions of Kamrava’s practice that are “unorthodox,” his 
willingness to provide fertility assistance to a low-wealth single mother invariably resides 
at the top of that list. To be clear, I do not wish to suggest a benevolent or charitable 
impulse informing his actions; more likely, Suleman simply managed to pay for the 
services she wanted. But what remains worthy of mention is that this anomaly served as 
the point of initiation for widespread public outrage and calls for a formal investigation. 
The naming of this as a public crisis and the rhetorical figuration of Kamrava as an 
exception within the industry works, on the one hand, to demonstrate industry discipline, 
allowing the market to continue functioning without legislative interventions or greater 
forms of oversight. It also, concomitantly, sends a clear message to other fertility 
specialists in the figure of Kamrava, which has less to do with the violations of technical 
practices in reproductive medicine than it has to do with the population served. This is 
expressed clearly by Dr. Arthur Caplan, Director of the Bioethics Center at the University 
of Pennsylvania: “With all due respect, the idea that doctors should not set limits on who 
can use reproductive technology to make babies is ethically bonkers” (qtd. in S. J. 
McGee). 
The Suleman story is nothing if not infinitely complex. Yet, it provides a unique 
opportunity to examine contemporary forms of ethopolitical governance under the guise 
of reproductive autonomy and freedom, to understand and interrogate the significant 
rhetorical labors aimed at constraining the meaning—and subsequent use—of emerging 
reproductive technologies. Even as these technologies are celebrated as expanding 
“choice” and “self-determination” in motherhood, instances like Suleman suggest a clear 
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delineation between biological enhancement and distortion; a designation that seems to 
hinge less on bio(techno)logical capacity than it does on cultural legitimacy. The public 
discord provoked by Suleman’s story, the culturally incomprehensible linkage of 
infertility and public assistance that she came to represent, and the persistent vilification 
of her fertility specialist across a range of public discourses, signal the strict requirements 
and responsibilities of legitimate choice-making in the age of biological citizenship. And 
in the context of struggles for maternal dignity and reproductive justice, it offers a painful 
example of the ways in which culturally legible motherhood remains a privilege of 
income, class, cultural capital, and other markers of difference, perhaps differently, but 
no less now than ever before.  
This analysis, foregrounding the discursive conditions under which such 
relationships of privilege and power are made possible, is articulated to a much broader 
project of possibility, which aims to locate, understand, challenge and revise the politics 
of motherhood toward the ideal of reproductive justice for all women. Thus, I turn now to 
an exploration of the presence and significance of crisis teen pregnancy narratives in 
popular culture. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
TELLING CAUTIONARY WHALES 
 
Yet fiction, the zone where objective truth is not told, paradoxically becomes the 
site where one specific kind of truth is best articulated.  
Susan Merrill Squier, Liminal Lives 
 
 I'm like a legend. They call me the Cautionary Whale.  
Juno MacGuff, Juno 
 
 
 In recent years, the cautionary whales are everywhere. Emerging with surprising 
force and frequency amidst profound cultural shifts that readily animate post 9/11 
imaginaries, a series of fictional films and television shows52 surfaced mid- to late-decade 
with recurring themes of unintended pregnancy and its implications. Although variable 
with regard to specific plot lines and characters, each narrative expressed and embodied 
similar themes: a white, middle-class postfeminist protagonist, an unplanned pregnancy, 
and a more or less complex masking of traditional values and conservativism through the 
appropriation of a particular brand of class- and race-privileged feminism. Not to be 
outdone in shock and awe programming, reality television quickly followed suit, placing 
“crisis” teen pregnancy at the center of MTV series 16 and Pregnant, with spin-off Teen 
Mom premiering shortly thereafter.  
Contemporary obsessions with “crisis” teen pregnancy resuscitate a tumultuous 
and troubled dimension of reproductive histories and politics in the U.S. The maternities 
                                                
52 These fictional films and series are many, and include the following widely-acclaimed narratives: Saved, 
Juno, Secret Life of the American Teenager, and Glee.  
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of young, unmarried women have long been imagined to threaten the “ideological and 
material production of the nation” (Tapia 10). From unwed motherhood in post-World 
War II America to the “epidemic” of teen pregnancy emerging in the late 1970s, 
collective response to these socially constructed phenomena are inextricably wed to a set 
of cultural anxieties that hinge on national identity, racial purity, and citizenship.53 
Within contemporary contexts, the recent fixation on crisis teen pregnancy signals 
another site where the discourse of emergency performs a particular kind of labor on 
reproductive bodies and the meaning of motherhood.  
 The pop trend has not gone unmarked. Film critics have noted the emergence of 
an unplanned pregnancy, or “pregsploitation” subgenre, while scholars have named a 
“Juno effect” (Seery) and studied points of postfeminist articulation among films like 
Juno, Knocked Up, and Waitress (Hoerl and Kelley; Thoma). This recent work has 
illuminated unintended pregnancy narratives as postfeminist texts that work to 
commodify maternity (Thoma), depoliticize reproduction, and “valorize pregnancy and 
motherhood as women’s imperatives” (Hoerl and Kelley 360). I wholly agree with many 
of the critical insights and assessments of these scholars, and, simultaneously, wish to 
build on the existing scholarship to explore the unique and considerable, if overlooked, 
attention bestowed on teenage women within these narratives. Unintended pregnancy as a 
broader cultural phenomenon is a significant trend, but the insistent and dedicated focus 
on teen pregnancy is worthy of scholarly exploration on its own terms. Juno is not just 
another example of a postfeminist articulation of choice, labor, and citizenship (Thoma), 
although it certainly is that, but it also emerges alongside numerous cultural narratives 
                                                
53 See, for example, Roberts, Killing the Black Body, Solinger, Beggars and Choosers, Ruby C. Tapia, 
"Impregnating Images: Visions of Race, Sex, and Citizenship in California's Teen Pregnancy Prevention 
Campaigns," Feminist Media Studies 5.1 (2005). 
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explicitly concerned with crisis teen pregnancy. To be sure, these narratives are distinct 
from one another in many ways—some are entirely fiction, some claim “reality” status—
but they share critical overlaps that force the question: What is going on here? What is at 
stake in the telling of these stories? How are we to make sense of a set of discourses that 
attend explicitly and relentlessly to young women’s sexuality and maternity? What are 
the contingent choices made available to, and foregrounded for, young women? What are 
the choices that are ultimately offered in support of the construction of “proper” 
motherhood in contemporary imaginaries?  
 The popular attention to this particular form of reproductive labor must be 
understood alongside broader cultural trends and phenomena. The notion of crisis teen 
pregnancy carries a significant historical baggage of its own of course, but its recent 
prominence coheres with trends in redressing the “epidemic” of infertility explored 
briefly in chapter four, and emerges at a particularly charged moment within the social 
history of adoption in the U.S. It also coincides meaningfully with other contemporary 
discourses of emergency and crisis that focus on the body politic, national identity, 
homeland security, and the state. The logic of emergency, vested in the differential 
protection and proliferation of domestic bodies, is once again present within crisis teen 
pregnancy narratives in the (re)production of national identity through the bodies of 
certain women and families.  
Thus, I argue that the rise of popular media concerned with “crisis” teen 
pregnancy both expresses and attempts to resolve a set of contemporary cultural anxieties 
regarding reproduction and maternity. Taken as a whole, crisis teen pregnancy narratives 
function as a form of surveillance and governance particularly suited to the conditions of 
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neoliberalism and biological citizenship. In lieu of a juridical form of governance that 
forcibly disappears young women to maternity homes (a historical cultural practice to 
which I will soon return), contemporary crisis teen pregnancy narratives offer young 
women tools for self-governance that emphasize empowerment through (pre)maternal 
prudence and responsibility. Within these narratives, normative values and logics are 
recast through the discourse of choice and consent, individual responsibility, self-
determination and autonomy. And this is precisely the functioning of the new biological 
citizenship—it may signify shifts in contemporary modes of governance and discipline, 
transforming modalities of power in ways that collapse certain distinctions between 
coercion and consent, but it is, of course, no less normative, prescriptive, and regulatory.  
My analysis demonstrates how a set of fictional and “reality” discourses works in 
tandem to circulate “informal ‘guidelines for living’ that…are not abstract ideologies 
imposed from above, but highly dispersed and practical techniques for reflecting on, 
managing, and improving the multiple dimensions of our personal lives with the 
resources available to us” (Ouellette and Hay 2), and specific to the management of 
postfeminist teenage maternal lives. Media scholars have explicitly theorized reality 
programming as a form of discipline and surveillance uniquely posed in service of a post-
9/11 neoliberal state, for their steady integration of surveillance and security into the 
fabric of popular culture and everyday life.54 As Mark Andrejevic explains: 
                                                
54 See, for example, Mark Andrejevic, "The Kinder, Gentler Gaze of Big Brother: Reality TV in the Era of 
Digital Capitalism," New Media and Society 4.2 (2002), Mark Andrejevic, "'Securitainment' in the Post-
9/11 Era," Continuum: Journal of Media and Cultural Studies 25.2 (2011), Ron Becker, ""Help Is on the 
Way!": Supernanny, Nanny 911, and the Neoliberal Politics of the Family," The Great American 
Makeover: Television, History, Nation, ed. Dana Heller (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), Rachel E. 
Dubrofsky, "Therapeutics of the Self: Surveillance in the Service of the Therapeutic," Television & New 
Media 8 (2007), Rachel E. Dubrofsky, "Surveillance on Reality Television and Facebook: From 
Authenticity to Flowing Data," Communication Theory 12 (2011), Galit Ferguson, "The Family on Reality 
Television: Whos' Shaming Whom?," Television & New Media 11 (2010), Jennifer Gillan, "Extreme 
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Against the background of the ‘global war on terror’, it is possible to trace a 
constellation of popular culture formats that might be loosely grouped in the 
category of ‘securitainment’—a hybrid genre that provides instruction in 
strategies for risk management and security training as adjuncts to its 
entertainment content. (“Securitainment” 167) 
 
Thus, reality programming functions as a kind of “risk tutorial”, retooling the parameters 
of national security within the jurisdiction of individual households and communities, 
codifying notions of risk and responsibility as private and everyday.  
“Crisis” teen pregnancy narratives play a significant role in this broader cultural 
project of securing the state. Contextualizing pop culture obsessions with white teen 
pregnancy within this broader discursive and cultural terrain offers the opportunity to 
suspend dominant discussions of media “effects” on teenage behavior, and interrogate 
instead the rhetorical figuration and circulation of a narrowly defined neoliberal teenage 
citizenship and its relationship to “legitimate” motherhood. Single, teenage pregnancy 
has long been figured as a threat to traditional domesticity and “family values” (Roberts; 
Solinger; Tapia); particularly in the midst and aftermath of political conflict, investments 
in nation-building and securing borders against “outside aggressors” includes a rigorous 
domestic agenda that tends to the intricacies and intimacies of kinship and family. To 
focus on the degree to which these narratives dis/incentivize teen pregnancy and/or 
parenthood misses an opportunity to investigate contemporary forms of governance as 
articulated to notions of risk and security, including the ways in which these narratives 
function simultaneously as pedagogies of citizenship, invested in the reproduction of 
particular bodies, mothers, and families.   
                                                                                                                                            
Makeover Homeland Security Edition," The Great American Makeover: Television, History, Nation, ed. 
Dana Heller (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), Laurie Ouellette and James Hay, Better Living 
through Reality TV (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), Gareth Palmer, "On Our Best Behaviour," 
FlowTV 5 (2006), 12 March 2012 <http://flowtv.org/2006/12/on-our-best-behaviour/>. 
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Within white teen pregnancy narratives, adoption is figured as the most legitimate 
mechanism by which postfeminist teen heroines might resolve crisis within their 
individual lives. Adoption also functions on a macro level, as a social technology that 
reproduces a normative vision of family and national identity in contemporary American 
life, and, simultaneously, polices the borders of “legitimate” maternity and family under 
the co-opted banner of reproductive “choice.” Like the discourses mobilized to legitimize 
the use of EC and the disciplining figures of Suleman and Kamrava, this, too, becomes a 
site at which the logic of emergency and crisis exerts a particular force on women and the 
attendant possibilities for reproductive justice. Its form and function demand critical 
interrogation on their own terms, as a mode of initiating redress. 
This chapter, then, is centrally concerned with the significance of contemporary 
“crisis” teen pregnancy narratives as pedagogies of (pre)maternal citizenship in post-9/11 
imaginaries—including a full-length feature film (Juno), a critically acclaimed television 
show (Glee), and two hit reality series (16 and Pregnant and Teen Mom).55 This list does 
not exhaust the presence of “crisis” teen pregnancy narratives in popular culture. It does, 
however, study those narratives that have achieved a certain degree of salience—
evidenced through critical acclaim, award nominations, celeb magazines, and a 
widespread audience. Given the expansiveness of these texts, my focus is less on 
providing a close textual analysis of each than it is on charting spaces of overlap, 
coherence, and discord among them, to better understand what is at stake in the telling of 
these stories, to consider how teen pregnancy comes to signify and resonate within 
                                                
55 My analysis of Glee is largely limited to its first season, as this is the season that features crisis teen 
pregnancy—and adoption—prominently in its unfolding narrative. In the case of reality programming, 
rather than provide too brief of superficial analysis of several seasons, I limit my study of 16 and Pregnant 
and Teen Mom to their first seasons, and, for the purposes of continuity, tend specifically to the four teens 
that bridge the series. 
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contemporary settings, while working to manage and differentially discipline young 
women. First, I attend to the cultural fixation on crisis teen pregnancy and its 
accompanying narratives, introducing the teen protagonists and exploring crisis teen 
pregnancy as a postfeminist (racialized, classed) set of discourses. I then turn to the 
figuration of adoption both as a postfeminist heroine’s choice in both adoptive and birth 
mothers’ lives, as well as a social technology that works to reproduce certain kinds of 
families. Finally, I explore the ways in which these discourses work in tandem to 
delineate the borders of “legitimate” maternity—to reinscribe cultural attitudes and 
beliefs about what it means to be a mother and who is considered most “fit” for maternal 
labor. In this way, motherhood is articulated not as a biological tie, but as a social status 
and cultural designation. 
Crisis Teen Pregnancy in Contemporary Imaginaries 
In this section, I work to sketch an introduction to contemporary “crisis” teen 
pregnancy narratives, attending to the construction of postfeminist teen heroism through 
the negotiation of crisis pregnancy. Juno MacGuff of Juno and Quinn Fabray of Glee 
serve as exemplar protagonists of postfeminism teen heroism; reality series 16 and 
Pregnant and Teen Mom work to clearly designate the borders of this heroism.  
The story of a small town Minnesota teen who unexpectedly finds herself 
pregnant after a one-time encounter with her best friend Bleeker, Juno has been lauded 
for traversing the complexity of teen pregnancy and adoption to the beat of her own 
drum. Touring the film festival circuit in the fall of 2007 and released in theaters later 
that year, Juno was virtually an overnight success. It was embraced by the film 
industry—selected for both the Telluride Film Festival and Toronto International Film 
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Festival, and showered with thirty-six nominations and fifty-three awards, including an 
Oscar for Best Original Screenplay and nominations for Best Actress, Best Director, and 
Best Picture (IMDb: The Internet Movie Database, "Awards for Juno"). It boasts an 
offbeat, indie-hipster/mainstream-alternative soundtrack by the Moldy Peaches, and a 
similarly crafted lesser-known cast including Ellen Page, Michael Cera and Jason 
Bateman (from cult series phenomenon Arrested Development). Film reviews from The 
Wall Street Journal to The Village Voice hailed Juno as “crisp” and “mordant,” “a thing 
of beauty and grace.” Ellen Page (“Juno”) has appeared on Saturday Night Live, The 
Ellen DeGeneres Show, and Barbara Walters’ 2008 Annual Oscar Special. All in all, 
Juno is undoubtedly the most critically acclaimed and culturally lauded teen pregnancy 
film to date. Juno herself exhibits a certain degree of alt quirkiness and postfeminist 
independence—she listens to indie music, dons eclectic hipster clothing, shrugs at typical 
high school sociality with slight disdain, and demonstrates effortless cleverness and wit 
in dialogue.   
Glee, a musical television series about the struggles and successes of a high 
school glee club, has earned similar critical accolades and commands a significant 
presence in pop culture. Since its premier in May of 2009, the show and its cast members 
have won over seventy awards and been nominated for over one hundred and fifty, 
including Emmys, Golden Globes, People’s Choice Awards, Teen Choice Awards, 
GLAAD Media Awards, and even a Grammy, with guild recognitions ranging from 
costume designers and art directors to the Directors Guild of America (IMDb: The 
Internet Movie Database, "Awards for Glee"). Critically lauded as “bold,” 
“transcendent,” and “thrilling,” Glee has defied precedent not only in its successful 
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integration of musical theater and choreography into primetime television, but in 
addition, is rapidly redefining the scope of television as an enterprise. Glee is not simply 
a show, but a brand, encompassing everything from the most popular iPad app in the 
country to its own line of clothing and Sephora nail polish (Halperin). With its third 
season in full swing and elevating the show’s ratings far beyond industry expectations, 
Rolling Stone critic Rob Sheffield asserts that Glee has “taken its place at the heart of pop 
culture, where radio and MTV used to rule supreme” (Sheffield). Central to the plot of 
the first season is high schooler Quinn Fabray and her unintended pregnancy. If Juno is 
the quirky and endearing teenage outcast, Quinn is the opposite, the “it” girl in high 
school. Quinn is a petite blonde, captain of her high school’s nationally ranked 
cheerleading squad, dating the quarterback of the football team, and, in the spirit of 
Bristol Palin, also serves as president of the school’s celibacy club.  
While both Juno and Glee have enjoyed significant accolades, other critics 
maintain that these narratives are unrealistic and facile; that they in fact work to 
normalize premarital sex and teen pregnancy, glamorizing the struggles of carrying (and 
possibly parenting) a child at such a young age. While rates of teen pregnancy in the U.S. 
have been on the decline since the early 1990s, studies indicate a troubling reversal of 
this trend in 2006 (Kost, Henshaw and Carlin). Most recent data suggest that the 2006 
reversal was brief and anomalous (Kost and Henshaw); nonetheless, the media frenzy 
that ensued was significant. MTV executive producer Liz Gateley states that these 
statistics, in concert with the high-profile pregnancies of Jamie Lynn Spears and Bristol 
Palin, encouraged the network to produce a reality series that would deal with the 
significant challenges that pregnancy and motherhood present to teens (qtd. in Kinon). 16 
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and Pregnant premiered in June 2009 with mixed reviews, some critics describing it as 
yet another instance of reality programming’s “working-class voyeurism” (Bellefante), 
while others characterized the effort as “reputable, well-intended and potentially helpful” 
(Shales). The programming has been referred to as the most controversial in MTV history 
(Essany); to be sure, the blogosphere abounds with accusations that the series makes teen 
parenting look sexy and pregnancy seductive. Nonetheless, the show delivers huge 
ratings, particularly amongst its target demographic of people under the age of thirty-
four, and a report released in December 2010 by the National Campaign to Prevent Teen 
and Unplanned Pregnancy specifically cites the show in its findings: “Among those teens 
who have watched MTV’s 16 and Pregnant, 82% think the show helps teens better 
understand the challenges of teen pregnancy and parenthood and how to avoid it” (Albert 
6). Each documentary-style episode chronicles the trials and tribulations of a pregnant 
teenager, generally from fifteen weeks through the first few months of parenthood. 
Boasting record viewership, spin-off series Teen Mom continues to follow the lives of 
some of these teens through the first few years of parenting.  
Taken together as a set of artifacts that contribute to the fabric of contemporary 
culture, the stories told in Juno, Glee, 16 and Pregnant, and Teen Mom are remarkably 
distinct, yet, share a fixation on “crisis” white teen pregnancy and prominent articulations 
of its proper care and negotiation. They emerge in an historical moment punctuated by 
increasingly voiced affective investments in motherhood, a resurgence of “family values” 
neoconservative politics, and frequent public struggles over teen sexuality and access to 
education and health services. The examples are diverse and many. They include 
attention to (white, wealthy) pregnant teens, for example, the 2008 “pregnancy pact” in 
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Massachusetts and the high-profile, celeb-pregnancies of teens Bristol Palin and Jamie 
Lynn Spears, which continue to function as fixtures in teen and tabloid publications. 
Indeed, Bristol’s teen motherhood (combined with her family’s political status) has 
launched her permanently into the public spotlight, at first as a tangent (and occasional 
liability) to her mother’s career, but more recently as a highly-paid spokesperson for 
abstinence-education, co-author of a memoir released in June of 2011 that made the New 
York Times bestseller list, contestant on Dancing with the Stars and subject of an 
upcoming documentary series on Lifetime television, Life’s a Tripp.  
Palin’s celebrity gestures toward a second dimension of the complex discursive 
terrain of “crisis” teen pregnancy in America—increasing investments in and obsessions 
with asserting teen purity and virtue. As discussed in earlier chapters of this dissertation, 
post 9/11 “family values” politics have helped to resuscitate enthusiastic support for teen 
virginity pledges and father-daughter “purity balls.” Public policy has followed suit—for 
example, abstinence-only education received unprecedented federal funding during the 
Bush Administration, exceeding one billion dollars in spending between 1996 and 2008, 
despite significant evidence of its ineffectivity and potential harm to young people’s 
health and safety (Boonstra).  In addition, while laws mandating parental consent or 
notification for minors seeking abortion are active in forty-four states, each year new 
restrictions are introduced that range from requiring notarized parental consent to making 
it illegal for teens to cross state lines for abortion services (National Abortion 
Federation). In short, teens have been increasingly vulnerable to attacks on access to 
information and health care in recent years, and have been the objects of intense scrutiny 
and public debate when it comes to sex, sexuality, and pregnancy. 
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Thus, “crisis” teen pregnancy narratives emerge and circulate alongside broader 
pop culture trends and phenomena. These narratives are decidedly postfeminist; they 
privilege whiteness, class mobility, and express a certain degree of complexity with 
regard to each teen’s individualized struggle with reproductive and maternal decision-
making. I argue, however, that this semblance of nuance belies a more subtle and 
insidious (conservative and regressive) subtext; it provides both the safety and the 
freedom to adhere to traditional understandings of family and proper, or culturally 
legitimate, motherhood. Indeed, it is within these spaces of strategic, postfeminist 
ambiguity and complexity that the most profoundly unsettling and problematic politics 
arise. For that is, in fact, the tricky thing about postfeminism in popular culture—it 
sneaks in and packs a punch between all the witty comebacks, endearing quirky 
characters, and catchy soundtracks. Thus, the critical project of engaging postfeminism is 
to locate and interrogate the ways in which the undermining and evisceration of feminist 
struggle is often done right under our noses, and under the banner of feminism itself: “the 
master’s house has not, in fact, been dismantled but instead has added additional rooms 
and annexes in which to harbor oppressive variations of racist, sexist, classist, and 
heterosexist themes . . . As modes of exploitation change to continue to accommodate 
oppression, our critiques also need to adapt in language and practice, making ‘post’ 
political configurations critical sites of analysis” (Springer 273-274). As postfeminist 
texts, there is a careful and strategic form of ambiguity at work within crisis teen 
pregnancy narratives. Ultimately, my analysis demonstrates that the extent to which these 
stories are culturally palatable, even laudable, is determined by a particular kind of 
response to crisis, through its normative and regressive articulation of proper maternity 
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that simultaneously assigns and constrains young women’s agency within the broader 
cultural terrain of reproductive politics.  
This overview serves to sketch the parameters of contemporary “crisis” teen 
pregnancy narratives and anticipate the direction of my argument; I turn now to the 
careful crafting of adoption as a postfeminist teen heroine’s choice. Over and over again, 
what is made exceptionally clear is that adoption is the proper technology for the 
negotiation of “crisis” white teen pregnancy and the subsequent constituting of 
(pre)maternal citizen-selves, and that bona fide motherhood is not a biological 
determination, but a cultural designation.  
A Postfeminist Heroine’s Choice 
“Crisis” teen pregnancy narratives give velocity to an unambiguous hierarchy of 
women’s reproductive “choices,” offering teenage (pre)maternal citizens a set of 
differentiated tools for the negotiation of their unintended pregnancies. While crisis 
pregnancy is presented, at least nominally, as difficult and complex, some choices are 
undoubtedly posited as better than others.  I argue, therefore, that by providing a certain 
degree of lip service to a range of reproductive “choices,” the films and series are 
permitted free reign in articulating the kinds of choices women ought to make as proper 
(pre)maternal citizens.  More specifically, the excessive focus on individuality and 
personal decision-making by these teen protagonists, in concert with the overt and 
strategic expression of ambiguity with regard to reproductive choice, conceals a more 
subtle and ideologically-driven agenda; indeed, this is precisely what allows Juno, Glee, 
and others to function successfully as postfeminist texts. In Juno and Glee, both teen 
parenting and, to a lesser extent, abortion, are given explicit, if entirely superficial, 
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treatment. The alternatives to adoption are presented as straw caveats to the primary 
narrative; they work to underscore the importance (and ultimate rightness) of both teens’ 
final decision to surrender their babies for adoption. Reality programming substantiates 
similar messages via an alternative route. Ignoring abortion almost entirely, and depicting 
teen parenthood as a continued state of unending crisis, adoption is codified as a 
responsible choice, a proper mode of self-governance in contemporary imaginaries. Let 
us consider each in turn. 
A Crisis Incomprehensible 
The absence of abortion within the “crisis” teen pregnancy subgenre has been 
critiqued by feminist activists and scholars alike (Hoerl and Kelley; Thoma; Valenti). 
While adoption and, to a lesser extent, parenting are cast as defensible decisions, abortion 
is rarely even mentioned by name, let alone positioned as an actual option for young 
women facing unintended pregnancy. It is largely ignored and, when broached at all, is 
adamantly refused, whether in “reality” or fictional programming, and always by the 
teens themselves. To be sure, Juno dedicates the most screen time to the consideration of 
abortion. While the attention is brief and facile, it works to integrate the requisite abortion 
discussion into the unfolding narrative, if only to undermine its validity and to dismiss it 
altogether. As Hoerl and Kelley explain: “sex may not be shameful, but the decision to 
terminate a pregnancy is; to maintain her moral virtue, Juno decides to carry her 
unplanned pregnancy to term” (366). Indeed, Juno’s character development and growth 
hinge on her visit to the abortion clinic—where, through a series of dramatized antics that 
parody and undermine contemporary abortion politics, Juno is visibly terror-stricken by 
the choice she has (almost) made. Before the receptionist can loudly call for a “Miss 
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MacGoof” (a Freudian mispronunciation of Juno’s name, to be sure), Juno has flown out 
the door and down the street. The clinic scene proves pivotal to the storyline; it both 
encourages profound personal growth for Juno (and, concomitantly, her increasing 
endearment to the viewer) and underscores the non-choice that is abortion in a thoughtful, 
caring, and loveable teen’s life. 
This characterization of abortion as inconceivable is evidenced throughout the 
“crisis” teen pregnancy subgenre; Quinn Fabray of Glee provides an additional example. 
As the president of the Christ Crusaders and the Celibacy Club, Quinn leads workshops 
of her peers in chaste forms of intimacy, or “immaculate affection.” Quinn’s screen time 
is minimal, save her prominence in scenes featuring religious and cheerleading 
extracurricular activities, until she breaks the news of her pregnancy to boyfriend Finn. 
This narrative moment largely unfolds from Finn’s perspective; his initial mental 
fogginess obscures Quinn’s tearful explanation. Finn recovers, stammering, “Are you 
gonna…?” Before another word can escape his lips, Quinn cuts him off with a resolute, 
“No.” The circumstances of her pregnancy are somewhat more convoluted, as the father 
of her child is, in actuality, her boyfriend’s best friend, Puck. Despite having never had 
sex with Finn, Quinn is determined to maintain that Finn is the father, telling Puck: “I 
only had sex with you because you got me drunk on wine coolers and I was feeling fat 
that day.” The question of consent goes completely unaddressed here. But the suggestion 
performs a particular kind of rhetorical labor, as Quinn’s abject refusal to consider 
abortion then carries more considerable significance. While other characters suggest the 
possibility of abortion, mostly through euphemism, Quinn’s unwavering commitment to 
carrying her pregnancy to term is, like Juno’s, a reassertion of moral fortitude and 
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reclamation of virtue in the face of potential shame. Abortion is figured as an exponential 
intensification of the crisis at hand—a technology that threatens to dismantle the 
possibility of postfeminist teen heroism. What, then, of the other “choices” available to 
young women? 
A Crisis Continued 
 If abortion is coded as inconceivable, then teen parenting is simply a crisis 
continued. Glee and Juno underscore this point by continually referencing teen 
immaturity and positing adoption as unequivocally providing a better life for the children 
of teens, a point to which I will soon return.  
For now, the unending crisis of teen parenting is exemplified and best explored 
through a close reading of contemporary reality programming, which, in keeping with the 
generic tendencies of the medium, functions clearly as a pedagogy of citizenship, risk 
tutorial, “securitainment” (Andrejevic, “Securitainment”; Dubrofsky; Ouellette and Hay). 
To a certain extent, 16 and Pregnant and Teen Mom may normalize teen sexuality and 
pregnancy, as many popular critics claim, but these series consistently return to a framing 
of teen pregnancy and parenting as undeniably difficult, compromising, problematic, and, 
ultimately, untenable. Presented in documentary form, each teen’s story is told through 
an assemblage of vignettes that highlights struggles with family, friendships, 
relationships, and school, and is punctuated by voice-over narration culled from the 
teens’ video diaries. Much like a caption to a photograph, the voice-over narration 
anchors each documentary scene, offering insight into the teens’ thoughts and 
experiences, and crafting a set of tools for the management of crisis teen pregnancy. The 
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take-home message is resounding and clear—parenting involves a level of hardship and 
sacrifice that teens are ill-equipped to manage or meet.  
The sacrifice is all-encompassing, wholesale; the very notion of teen parenting 
itself becomes a contradiction in terms. Take, for example, Maci, a white, upper-middle- 
class teen mom from Chattanooga, Tennessee, who wistfully watches her closest high 
school friends move away to college as she moves back in with her parents to raise her 
son, while fielding parental pressures to form a lasting relationship with her disinterested 
boyfriend, Ryan. As if in summation of the entire series, Maci muses in her video diary: 
“I’m starting to see how much I’ve given up to be a mom.” Each voice-over recalls this 
familiar refrain, framed as a series of life lessons that emphasize various dimensions of 
sacrifice—from these young women’s education and independence to their relationships 
and social lives.  
Getting an education is a continual site of struggle for these teen moms, with 
varying degrees of difficulty according to how much support each is afforded through 
kinship networks. Maci enrolls in an accelerated high school to finish her degree before 
her son Bentley is born, but the series readily highlights the ways in which her desire to 
continue her education has been stymied by the realities of parenting and a lack of 
support from Ryan. Farrah, a wealthy teen from Council Bluffs, Iowa, opts to complete 
high school online after a sequence of high school hardships, including her expulsion 
from the cheerleading team and the cruelty of the teen gossip mill. Farrah’s ability to 
pursue a culinary degree after high school is due in large part to continual financial 
support and free childcare services provided by her parents.  
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But perhaps the clearest example of educational struggle is Amber, a working-
class teen from Anderson, Indiana. After dropping out of high school to have daughter 
Leah, Amber seeks out a career counselor for guidance in earning her diploma. This 
desire is quickly tempered with a reality check—unemployed and economically 
dependent on her lackluster boyfriend Gary, she cannot afford the fees associated with 
enrolling in high school classes online, and is advised to seek a GED instead. Amber 
dissolves into tears at the counselor’s suggestion, but quickly resigns herself to this fate 
as a result of her own mistakes and poor choices, stating that she has “screwed up” her 
life and will just have to make do. Sadly, the compromise doesn’t seem to lessen 
Amber’s burden—throughout the first season of Teen Mom, we witness her failed 
attempts to persuade Gary to “watch” his own child in order for Amber to attend a GED 
prep class and, even when able to secure childcare, she struggles with a car that 
continually breaks down and prohibits her from getting to class. Amber’s voice-over 
highlights her feelings of utter helplessness and despair, compounded by her parenting 
responsibilities: “It’s not as easy to leave when I have to think about Leah too.” 
This statement refers also to another significant theme within the lessons offered 
through “crisis” teen pregnancy reality programming—namely, the sacrifice of teen 
romance and friendships for relationship turmoil at every turn, including friends, family, 
and boyfriends. While Maci’s friends and parents are relatively supportive of her 
parenting, Maci’s relationship with the father of her child is on the rocks despite her 
desperate efforts to make it stable and permanent. Ryan is regularly depicted as a typical 
teenage guy unable to fulfill adult commitments. He ignores Bentley and Maci, stays out 
all night with friends, and refuses to seek employment after losing his job—all of which 
 137 
compound Maci’s difficulty in juggling school, work, and—at least for a brief period of 
time—wedding planning, while taking sole responsibility for their child. Ryan’s character 
is on full display after Maci withdraws from her online college coursework. In a rare 
moment of uttering more than a few syllables in a row, he offers his unsolicited opinion, 
calling Maci “lazy as fuck” and stating that she likely will not get through college due to 
her own lack of effort. His behavior is, at best, immature and diminishing, but perhaps 
more accurately described as delusional and abusive. It is a painful moment pivotal to the 
narrative trajectory, clarifying to Maci the need to prioritize herself and Bentley, as hard 
as that may be without a partner.  
Farrah’s story provides another example of relational sacrifice. The father of 
Farrah’s daughter is entirely absent,56 so Farrah lives with her parents while completing 
school and caring for baby Sophia. The first season of Teen Mom, however, is largely 
focused on Farrah’s pursuit of a boyfriend and social life despite her family’s objections. 
Her voice-over regularly attends to this dilemma: “I wish my parents would stop telling 
me to a be a better mom and let me be a normal teenager;” or, perhaps a bit more 
optimistically, “being a mom while going to school and working makes it hard to have a 
social life, but I’m determined to make it work.” Regular conflict with Farrah’s mother is 
captured on screen as Farrah pursues a series of relationships—only to have young men 
flee in the opposite direction a few dates in—while her mother is left with regular 
childcare duties. Farrah is accused by her mother and sister of “farming out motherhood,” 
“acting unmotherly” and “irresponsible”; the excessive footage of Farrah’s nights out on 
the town, dating drama, and sleeping through Sophia’s morning care rituals would seem 
                                                
56 An estranged ex-boyfriend, he died in a car accident during Farrah’s pregnancy and is seldom mentioned 
in the series. 
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to suggest the same. The season evolves along with Farrah’s lessons in self-discipline and 
responsibility, eventually leading her to agree to dedicate more energy to parenting 
Sophia and prioritizing her education and economic self-sufficiency.  
If reality television, as a whole, offers governing technologies of self-help and 
DIY possibilities for transforming productive citizens (Ouellette and Hay), then 16 and 
Pregnant and Teen Mom are markedly successful in their craft. Each episode offers a 
wealth of “televised tutorials” (Palmer)—life lessons and tools for neoliberal citizenship 
through the surveillance of teen mothers struggling to negotiate the complexities of 
parenting. In short, the story of teen parenting is one of invariable sacrifice and hardship, 
unfolding in a context affectively marked by and defined through continual teen drama 
and crisis. To critically interrogate these narratives is not necessarily to take issue with 
this depiction; indeed, it is difficult to deny the struggles and challenges that teen 
parents—and particularly teen moms—must face. Those are substantive and real. But 
what becomes exceedingly apparent over the course of these series is the untenable 
paradox that is teen parenting. No amount of sacrifice is enough. No matter how many 
educational opportunities are foregone, social outings eliminated, relationships 
surrendered or maintained through sheer willpower, these young women will never fulfill 
the requirements of “legitimate” maternity. Reality programming plays a significant role 
in naming and (re)inscribing this paradox in contemporary cultural settings, all the while 
producing docile, knowable (pre)maternal citizens through modes of surveillance that 
enable a governable populace through individual assumption of discipline and risk. 
Lest this message of incommensurability be somewhat opaque as the seasons of 
16 and Pregnant and Teen Mom draw to a close, the season finales clarify this in no 
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uncertain terms. Hosted by Dr. Drew Pinski (“Dr. Drew”), the finales for both series 
consist of a teen mom panel and a live audience for a question and answer session. Dr. 
Drew previews each teen interview with a video montage that recaps the ups and downs 
of the season, followed by an emotionally wrought discussion that tends to hone in on 
particular struggles and hardships. What is made remarkably clear is the inability of these 
young mothers to sacrifice enough. Despite the camera’s clear depiction of Ryan’s 
abusive behavior, Maci is lectured on how “men are different” (read: inept) when it 
comes to parenting and relationships, and chastised for not trying hard enough to make 
things work “for Bentley’s benefit.” Farrah is told that she lost the privileges to her 
carefree life when she decided to have a child. Amber’s public shaming is more complex, 
as MTV aired a fight between her and boyfriend Gary in which Amber shoves, slaps, and 
chokes him, and for which she was charged with domestic battery. While substantive 
indeed, I am less interested here in the differences between the teens’ individual struggles 
than I am in the series’ clear depiction of continuity. Whether the victim or perpetrator of 
violence, it seems, these teen moms are rhetorically figured as indiscriminately at fault. 
Amber and Maci are offered as polarities on a singular continuum of teen parenting that 
is defined through endless crisis and never-enough sacrifice. As an inevitable extension 
of teen pregnancy, the decision to raise a child is to dwell in an endless state of crisis. 
Teen parenting, itself, becomes an absolute contradiction in terms.  
 But my analysis thus far neglects one teen mom who, like Maci, Farrah, and 
Amber, bridges the first season of each series. Unlike the other three teens, however, 
Catelynn’s reception by Dr. Drew is one of deep empathy and heartfelt expressions of 
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support. Indeed, what her story reveals is the possibility that teen moms might just make 
the greatest sacrifice of all—choosing adoption. 
A Crisis Resolved 
Consistent across these popular narratives is the assumption that adoption is the 
superior—or only—responsible choice for pregnant teens in attempting to manage and 
negotiate crisis. Catelynn’s story on 16 and Pregnant and Teen Mom, widely discussed 
and lauded in the blogosphere and in critical reviews of the series, works to underscore 
this point. A rosy-cheeked teen from a working-class community in northern Michigan, 
Catelynn and her endlessly supportive boyfriend Tyler seem to exemplify a real life Juno 
story, if only intensified by their remarkable resilience in the face of adversity. Multiple 
points distinguish their story from others in the series. First, despite the inevitable strain 
of unintended pregnancy, Catelynn and Tyler are never shown in serious conflict with 
one another. In striking contrast to their peers, their relationship is the singular aspect of 
stability in these teens’ lives. The young couple demonstrates unwavering love and 
support for one another, even in the midst of regular geographic upheaval (Catelynn’s 
voice-over explains that she has moved thirteen times in her short life) and strained 
parental relations, as Catelynn’s mother (April) and Tyler’s father (Butch) seem to use 
most of their screen time antagonizing and berating their children, a point to which I will 
soon return.  
Of course, Catelynn and Tyler’s decision to give up their baby for adoption also 
distinguishes their story from that of their peers. It also seems to have inspired their 
embrace by multiple blogging audiences, from skeptics of the show that claimed 
Catelynn and Tyler’s story “totally redeemed” the entire series, to one blogger’s review 
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that captures much of the popular sentiment: “Catelynn and Tyler are the only ones who 
seem to understand the gravity of their situation…it quickly becomes apparent that these 
two teenagers develop a deep love for their child, and that is why they’re giving her up. 
At times their journey is so brave and raw and touching, it is almost unbearable to watch. 
But it is worth it” (Cinnamon). Indeed, the show captures a series of heartfelt dialogues 
between Catelynn and Tyler, as they consider the options available to them. While they 
meet significant resistance from peers and family members, Catelynn and Tyler 
continually return to the same refrain—they want to provide their child with the kind of 
life they feel ill-equipped to offer; as Catelynn explains to her friend, “How am I 
supposed to raise a kid when I’m a kid myself?”  
In opting for an open adoption, Catelynn and Tyler are able to select the family 
that they feel is best for their daughter—a mid-thirties, white, educated, traditional, 
Christian couple named Brandon and Teresa, who have struggled for years in their 
attempts to have children. In an emotionally intense and poignant first meeting, Catelynn 
tearfully restates her (and Tyler’s) decision to Brandon and Teresa: “I just want her to 
have better than what I had, and I know that I can’t do that. So I’m just doing the thing 
that I think is the best. I know that you guys can provide for her a lot more than I can.” 
As the adoptive parents, Brandon and Teresa are given more screen time over the course 
of the series; their relationship to Catelynn and Tyler seems to grow stronger and closer 
in unexpected ways, if also constrained by the emotional hardship of their situation. In 
this way, Brandon and Teresa possess a rhetorical function within the narrative itself. As 
one of two sets of adults in Catelynn and Tyler’s life, they are juxtaposed with April and 
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Butch, and work to synecdochally underscore the validity of Catelynn and Tyler’s choice 
to surrender their daughter for adoption.  
Thus, the adoption is both dramatized and affirmed by Catelynn and Tyler’s 
parents’ stubborn refusal to accept it. This fundamental disagreement might have 
afforded an opportunity to work through the inevitable complexities of adoption, and yet 
the portrayal of this conflict functions more as a foil that reinforces the validity of 
Catelynn and Tyler’s position. Throughout the series, April and Butch function as 
caricatures of the working poor—continuously depicted as lazy, uneducated, unfit 
parents, ill-equipped to advise their children—or anyone else for that matter—on 
parenting. We are introduced to April in a scene where she slams the door on her 
daughter, calling Catelynn a “bitch.” She refuses to stand up against Butch as he 
relentlessly attacks Catelynn’s decision to relinquish her baby, at times joining in the 
chorus. Butch, a sinewy figure with a long, graying mullet and lively moustache, is a 
recovering addict who has been in prison for most of Tyler’s life; he admits to Tyler 
himself, in one of their many altercations regarding the adoption, his own shortcomings 
as a parent. April and Butch’s staunch opposition to adoption—asserting the immorality 
of surrendering a child and the necessity of Catelynn and Tyler “bucking up” to 
responsibility—serves a burlesque function. It parodies the argument in defense of teen 
parenting and, ultimately, affirms through a kind of hyperbolic (anti-)example Catelynn 
and Tyler’s decision to surrender their daughter for adoption as the best possible option.  
Fictional narratives underscore the take-home message of reality programming. 
The positioning of adoption in Glee as an ideal choice is carefully constituted over the 
course of the first season through an intricate web of storylines. Initially, Quinn plans to 
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raise her baby with Finn, but even before true paternal status is revealed, Quinn decides 
to give the child up for adoption. There are a series of moments that contribute to and 
affirm this decision—from the continued emphasis on not wanting to become trapped—a 
“Lima loser,” “caged with no future”—to a scene in which Quinn is cornered and 
overwhelmed by an impromptu lecture on proper prenatal care, lest her “baby will be 
ugly.” But Quinn’s decision is largely upheld and extolled by proxy.  
An intricate storyline emerging much later in the first season—not-so-
coincidentally, just before Quinn gives birth—features star Glee-clubber Rachel Berry, 
and rival club coach, Shelby Corcoran. Although Rachel’s parents have never appeared 
on the screen, she regularly refers to her “two gay dads” who had her via a surrogate. 
Shelby, witnessing Rachel’s talent on stage, recognizes her instantly as the daughter she 
gave birth to many years ago. Bound by a surrogacy contract prohibiting any initiation of 
contact, but nonetheless desperate to reach out to Rachel, Shelby hatches a plan for her 
star pupil to befriend Rachel. Rachel has long dreamed of meeting her birth mother, and 
once she discovers Shelby’s identity, she approaches her immediately, if with a degree of 
apprehension unprecedented for this unusually self-assured teen. Despite the strength of 
each character, and their deep, mutual desire to connect with one another—or, perhaps, 
precisely because of these things—their meeting is deeply uncomfortable, overwhelmed, 
painful. Sitting several rows from one another in an empty auditorium, Rachel asks 
Shelby if she ever regretted her decision, and Shelby replies, “Yes, then no…so much.” 
After a brief, stilted conversation, Shelby has a change of heart. Apologizing to Rachel, 
she hastens to leave; Rachel’s face betrays feelings of rejection and disappointment. Still, 
Rachel continues to seek Shelby’s guidance as a mother. Shelby resists, and finally 
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explains: “It’s too late for us. Anything that we share is going to be confusing for you. 
I’m your mother, but I’m not your mom.”  
Certainly, this narrative is somewhat distinct in that Shelby was a surrogate—
purposefully inseminated and legally bound to surrender her child. And yet, surrogacy is 
rarely mentioned by name; when it is, the disparities between it and adoption are 
minimized. Shelby is continually referred to as Rachel’s “mother,” in lieu of a surrogate, 
egg donor, or even birth mother. Rachel’s dads have yet to appear on the screen. As 
Shelby narrates her own experience, she emphasizes her deep remorse in missing out on a 
relationship with her daughter. The brief and complex encounters between Rachel and 
Shelby illustrate, on the one hand, dimensions of the emotional terrain of adoption that 
are too often overlooked—the struggles of birth mothers to come to terms with their 
decision, and the struggles of adoptees to connect to their own sense of history, place, and 
identity. Even still, the narrative ultimately reaffirms the cultural, in lieu of the biological, 
designation of family. Shelby’s response to Rachel was strikingly brash, selfish, even 
childish; in it, we are metonymically reminded that Shelby is not, cannot be, a parent to 
Rachel. Adoption, it seems, is clear, definitive, and best left alone. In the final episode, as 
if for narrative reinforcement, Shelby becomes the adoptive parent of Quinn and Puck’s 
daughter. Finally able to realize her deep desire for a child—one that Rachel could not 
fulfill—Shelby surrenders her career—and, the series seems to suggest, her characteristic 
competitive/brash edge—in order to affirm her maternal nature, to get back what she lost 
in starting anew.  
Similarly, Juno’s decision to find an adoptive home for her baby is affirmed 
throughout the film in various ways. For now, one scene is of particular interest—the one 
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in which Bren, Juno’s stepmother, adamantly defends Juno’s right to parent her own 
child to an ultrasound technician who demonstrates significant bias against teen mothers. 
At first, the technician’s demeanor is detached and aloof, but her condescension is 
clarified in her questioning of Juno throughout the appointment. Upon learning that Juno 
plans to give up her child for adoption, the ultrasound technician verbalizes her relief in 
no uncertain terms: “I just see a lot of teenage mothers come through here. It’s obviously 
a poisonous environment for a baby to be raised in.” While Juno and her friend Leah 
respond, it is Bren who has the final word with the ultrasound tech: “They [the adoptive 
parents] could be utterly negligent. Maybe they’ll do a far shittier job of raising a kid than 
my dumbass stepdaughter ever would. Have you considered that?” A brief, heated 
exchange ensues, with Bren silencing the ultrasound tech by telling her to “stick to what 
she knows” and belittling her professional expertise: “You think you’re special because 
you get to play Picture Pages up there? My five year-old daughter could do that.” The 
technician leaves in a huff, and Bren is congratulated by Juno for being a “dick.” 
Marking this scene is exceptional tactlessness and immaturity in response to the 
ultrasound tech’s prejudice. Bren’s last word: “So why don’t you go back to night school 
in Manteno and learn a real trade,” exemplifies not only individual immaturity in this 
particular moment, but synecdochally functions to undermine the argument in defense of 
teen parenting altogether as outrageous and childish. While this scene plays on (and 
seemingly against) the malicious and erroneous assumptions often made about teen 
mothers, in ways similar to the abortion clinic scene, the ultrasound exchange functions 
as an overt caricature that not only reinscribes the attitudes it ostensibly attempts to 
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unseat, but it also concomitantly provides free license to the rest of the film to subtly 
reinforce those same stereotypes.  
Thus, the postfeminist treatment of abortion, teen parenting, and adoption in white 
“crisis” teen pregnancy narratives ultimately clarifies the decision to bear and give up a 
child as the right(eous) choice for postfeminist teen protagonists. Offering a pedagogy of 
teenage and maternal citizenship, these narratives function on several levels to strip 
reproductive “choice” of its political import and significance; the treatment of adoption 
providing a clear example of this. Not simply an individual choice that some women or 
couples might make, adoption is also an institution—one that has long functioned to 
ensure the reproduction of certain kinds of mothers and families (Fessler; Solinger, 
Beggars and Choosers). Thus, I turn now to the history of adoption as a reproductive 
technology that configures families and mothers in a particular way. 
Adoption and the New Biological Citizenship 
 Not unlike other dimensions of reproductive politics, the social histories of 
adoption as an institution illustrates the relationship between choice and choicelessness, 
freedom and coercion, within reproductive decision-making, both within the United 
States and on a global scale. In this section, I work to situate “crisis” teen pregnancy 
narratives within these broader historical and cultural terrains. This brief sketch attempts 
to clarify the character of adoption as a political institution, and to make visible the 
human dimensions largely ignored within contemporary adoptive imaginaries, 
specifically, the women whose children are transferred into other families. Such 
deliberate focus reveals a system of injustices that trouble collective imaginings of 
adoption as selfless child-rescue, humanitarian aid or philanthropic enterprise.  
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Locating my analysis here is not an exercise of judgment against, nor is it an 
indictment of, all adoptions. It is, however, an attempt to complicate common and overly 
facile treatments of adoption, which is often depoliticized through affective articulations 
of (certain) individualized experiences, and commonly figured rhetorically as a process of 
rescue or charity. But adoption does not exist in a vacuum. It functions also on a macro 
level—as a system of child transfer and a political institution, complete with unequal 
access to resources and systematic abuses of power. Much like other institutions, 
adoption reflects cultural, social, historical, economic, and political inequities and biases, 
and as such, demands critical structural analysis to more fully understand its form and 
function. The experience of largely resourceless or culturally oppressed women may be 
only one aspect of a multi-faceted issue; it is, however, an aspect of significance, as well 
as the one that is most readily overlooked and easily dismissed. Thus, I offer here an 
overview of the recent history of adoption in the U.S., foregrounding two specific 
trends—institutionalized, forcible surrender by unwed women post WWII and the trends 
in international adoption since Roe v. Wade. In so doing, I work to complicate 
mainstream articulations of adoption as a “choice,” to interrogate the social and political 
conditions under which child transfers are authorized, and to suggest the ways in which 
adoption, as an industry, has been transformed in an age of biological citizenship. 
Adoption as Institution and Technology 
 Adoption as a formal, institutionalized practice in the United States can be traced 
to the mid-nineteenth century and, much like the complex histories of reproductive 
politics, it has long been mired in race and class politics. Beginning in 1854, state 
governments enacted modern adoption laws for the purposes of “child welfare” and 
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social agencies began to place children from low-wealth (and often immigrant) 
communities in private homes deemed “upstanding” and “American” in lieu of 
orphanages. The examples of structural inequities and biases are devastating and many—
from the infamous “orphan trains” that “rescued” impoverished Catholic and Jewish 
children from urban northeastern settings and relocated them to middle-class Anglo-
Protestant homes further west in the mid-nineteenth century, to the Indian Adoption 
Project, which, by 1975, had aided in the removal of one out of every four American 
Indian children from their homes, and placing them in the care of while families, 
boarding schools or state-run institutions (Arrillaga; Solinger; The Adoption History 
Project). Historian Rickie Solinger has written extensive social histories of adoption in 
the U.S. (Wake Up; Beggars and Choosers), highlighting the experiences of culturally 
vulnerable women and families, and charting the structural forces that empowered some 
women’s claim to motherhood and reproductive choice at the expense of others. Her 
research reveals that, prior to 1945, while unmarried mothers were stigmatized as social 
deviants, they were still assumed to possess a rightful claim to maternity. In other words, 
the definition of motherhood was decidedly biological, and “fallen” or “wayward” 
women were ostracized—thought to possess inferior moral and physical fiber that they 
then, in turn, passed along to their children. Their motherhood, though sharply criticized, 
was not denied. 
In the years following WWII, however, as Freudian theories found broader 
cultural resonance and childless white couples were recognized as a significant “market,” 
the biological explanation of white single motherhood ceded to psychology—severing the 
tie between biology and motherhood and newly defining babies born to white single 
 149 
women as both desirable and adoptable. Simultaneously, premarital sex and unintended 
pregnancies were on the rise, and as the sexual revolution took flight, birth control was 
tightly restricted, sex education nearly non-existent, and abortion inaccessible, even life-
threatening. In The Girls Who Went Away, Ann Fessler carefully documents how young 
women found themselves caught in the midst of significant cultural struggle and 
upheaval, as strict codes for middle-class conformity evicted white, unmarried, pregnant 
young women from their families, schools, and communities. Kicked out of school, 
shamed by religious leaders and family members, these young women were exiled to 
maternity homes and forced to wait out their pregnancies in isolation—to give birth, 
surrender their babies, and return to their old lives in silence, as if nothing had happened. 
From 1945-1973, one and a half million newborns were adopted in the U.S. (Fessler 8), a 
significant number of them forcibly surrendered by young women who found themselves 
pregnant and powerless.57  
 As an industry, adoption underwent significant transformations in the early 1970s, 
with domestic adoption rates plummeting and transnational adoption on the rise (United 
States Dept. of Health and Human Services, Voluntary Relinquishment). The timing is 
not arbitrary. In 1973, Roe v. Wade overturned state and federal restrictions on access to 
abortion and affirmed a woman’s constitutional right to privacy, inclusive of reproductive 
“choice.” This decision relates to adoption politics in at least two ways. Perhaps most 
                                                
57 Precise statistics on adoption have been, and continue to be, scarce and incomplete. The federal 
government tracked data between 1945 and 1975, but their methods excluded informal adoptions and 
“tended to obscure trends that were as important as total figures” (The Adoption History Project). This 
federal data does not discriminate between relative and stranger adoption, independent and agency 
adoptions, infant and older child adoptions, and a range of other significant issues. Thus, while exact 
figures prior to 1945 are difficult to locate, available data suggest that adoption in the U.S. peaked at 
175,000 in the year 1970. At present, states continue to collect information on the adoption of children 
through public foster care; data on adoptions outside of the foster care system after 1975 are available only 
through by private organizations.  
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obviously, many young single women chose to terminate their unintended pregnancies. 
But Roe also affirmed women’s independence and encouraged women to assert control 
over their reproductive lives in a much more holistic sense. Empowered by feminist gains 
of the 1960s and 1970s, young single women were simply less likely to allow parental or 
governmental authorities to exert influence over their decision whether to bear or parent 
children. In other words, when women decided to carry their pregnancies to term of their 
own volition, they were much less likely to offer their babies to strangers. As Solinger 
explains, “[d]ignity and independence are, in fact, the life-enhancing ingredients that tend 
to be incompatible with relinquishing a child” (Beggars and Choosers 23). 
Several studies of international adoption reveal similar trends and dynamics; they 
chart relationships among desperation, powerlessness, and high rates of child transfer 
abroad, and reveal rampant abuse of vulnerable peoples and communities through 
coercive and fraudulent adoption operations (Brice; Fieweger; Graff; Smolin). In some 
countries, adoption processes are less mired in fraud and corruption than they are 
reflective of a complex of dire social and political circumstances that have torn families 
apart and left many children institutionalized. In other countries, systemic inequities such 
as poverty, marginalization, and powerlessness are frequently capitalized upon, and 
compounded by, an adoption industry driven by profit. Recent investigations by 
governments and NGOs have documented serious problems in: 
[Cambodia,] Liberia, Nepal, the Marshall Islands, Peru, Samoa, [Vietnam] and 
most notably, Guatemala, whose processes were so riddled with corruption that it 
was finally closed to adoption in 2009, after 10 years during which Americans 
adopted more than 30,000 of its children, in some years bringing home an 
astonishing one of every 100 babies born there. (The Schuster Institute for 
Investigative Journalism, “The Baby Business”) 
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To this day, it remains remarkably simple to falsify paperwork and manufacture an 
“orphan” in many countries: “The birth mothers are often poor, young, unmarried, 
divorced, or otherwise lacking family protection. The children may be born into a locally 
despised minority group that is afforded few rights. And for enough money, someone will 
separate these little ones from their vulnerable families, turning them into ‘paper orphans’ 
for lucrative export” (Graff).  
A few examples serve to illustrate this point. First, “orphanages” in countries such 
as Liberia and Vietnam are more often temporary boarding schools for families 
struggling with poverty or illness, or even just during harvest season in farming 
communities. In some instances, illiterate birth mothers or families sign away their 
children under false pretenses, in others the children are simply disappeared by the time 
their families return for them. In another example, at the peak of U.S. adoption of 
Guatemalan children in 2007, Guatemalan mothers were assaulted in the streets by armed 
men, their infants kidnapped and sold for baby finder fees that far exceeded the nation’s 
per capita GDP. Finally, corruption and fraud are rampant within the agencies 
themselves. Prominent American adoption agent Lauryn Galindo was indicted in 2004 
for arranging adoptions of Cambodian children who were not orphans, paying poor 
women and families to give their babies to American couples.58 While documented 
instances such as these tend to be dismissed as isolated, and the orphan myth is rigorously 
marketed to hopeful and wealthy Western couples, many of the international markets 
continue to be riddled with coercion, laundering, and kidnappings; when one country 
                                                
58 Cambodian human rights organization LICADHO (a Khmer acronym for the Cambodian League for 
Promotion and Defense of Human Rights), launched an industry-wide investigation into Cambodian 
adoptions that raised significant questions about many recent U.S. adoptions of Cambodian children, 
eventually forcing a U.S. moratorium on Cambodian adoptions that continues to this day (The Schuster 
Institute for Investigative Journalism, “Adoption: Cambodia”).  
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closes its doors due to exposed fraud and trafficking, adoption agencies simply move on 
to another. International adoptions are often articulated as “safer” because they are most 
often closed and imagined as more predictable, but as E.J. Graff points out, “international 
adoptions are no less risky; they’re simply less regulated.” Safer for whom, then? 
Because Western monies far surpass the number of healthy infants orphaned or 
voluntarily surrendered, transnational adoption is presently a demand-driven industry in 
which profitability and corruption are endemic, an industry in which the traffic flows 
decidedly in one direction. 
 But dramatic shifts are underway. Since peaking in 2004 at 22,990, there has been 
a steady decline in international adoptions to the United States. Widespread reports of 
trafficking and fraud have spurred ongoing investigations that have significantly slowed, 
and at times shut down entirely, the process in several countries. In fiscal year 2011, the 
most recent data available, transnational adoptions fell to 9,320 (United States Dept. of 
State). This figure has been impacted not only by criminal investigations, but also by 
regulations set by the Hague Convention. An international agreement designed to create 
global standards for intercountry adoption and to safeguard against unethical or coercive 
activities, the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and Co-operation in 
Respect of Inter-Country Adoption governs any adoption between countries that have 
signed in support. The United States joined the Convention in 1994 and the regulations 
took effect in April 2008, at which point the already declining rate of adoption fell to its 
lowest point in over ten years (United States Dept. of State).59 Taken together, these 
                                                
59 Nonetheless, a large loophole in the Hague Convention allows Western signatories, such as the U.S., to 
continue adoptions from non-Hague countries. Only 81 nations have committed to the Hague Convention, 
and “[m]ore than two-thirds of U.S. citizens’ international adoptions come from ‘non-Hague’ countries, 
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statistics and stories underscore the largely invisible characteristics of adoption that both 
define and render it possible. As a widespread practice and demand-driven industry, 
adoption hinges on the powerlessness and invisibility of some women and families. As an 
institution that privileges economic means and leverage, it remains centered on the 
desires of wealthy Western couples, and often at the expense of the health and livelihoods 
of impoverished families and communities. In short, adoption functions as a political 
institution and social technology that invests in the creation and reproduction of wealthy, 
Western(ized) families, a process that is obscured and depoliticized through the rhetoric 
of individual reproductive “choice” and the affective complexities of infertility and 
networks of kin.  
In the wake of a recent reversal in trends, with international adoptions stymied by 
tighter regulations and governmental oversight, it seems more than mere coincidence to 
witness mediated obsession with “crisis” teen pregnancies in the U.S. The defining 
characteristics of the crisis have shifted slightly since 1945—white, middle-class teen 
pregnancy no longer provokes the profound and immediate shame that necessitates exile, 
although if the mediated narratives are any indicator, the mere suggestion of abortion 
certainly seems to. Despite these changes, the careful crafting of a postfeminist teen 
heroine through unambiguous articulations of “responsible” reproductive choice indicate 
significant contemporary continuities and overlaps with a previous era marked by secrecy 
and maternity homes. But the modes of governance have since been transformed; in the 
age of biological citizenship, the “girls who went away” no longer require exile but 
exhibition and surveillance (via reality programming), their teenage peers no longer 
                                                                                                                                            
including Russia, Korea, Kazakhstan, and Ethiopia” (The Schuster Institute for Investigative Journalism, 
“The Baby Business”).  
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shamed into silence but offered excessive voice as a tool of neoliberal self-governance 
and the crafting of responsible citizenship. 
Governing “Choice” in an Age of Biological Citizenship 
As discussed in earlier chapters of this dissertation, Nikolas Rose has artfully 
theorized the form and cadence of biopolitics in the twenty-first century; his work has 
been usefully engaged and extended by contemporary feminist explorations of 
reproductive politics and technologies (Roberts, "Race, Gender"; Samerski). Of particular 
relevance to this chapter is his articulation of ethopolitics as markedly distinct from other 
forms of governance: “If ‘discipline’ individualizes and normalizes, and ‘biopolitics’ 
collectivizes and socializes, ‘ethopolitics’ concerns itself with the self-techniques by 
which human beings should judge and act upon themselves to make themselves better 
than they are” (Rose 27). Centrally concerned with crafting biological citizens 
individually responsible for their own futures, as well as that of their families and 
children, ethopolitical principles emphasize “informed consent, autonomy, voluntary 
action, and choice and nondirectiveness . . . . blur[ring] the boundaries of coercion and 
consent” (29).  
While this form of governance is markedly dispersed and expressed at myriad 
cultural sites, reality television is uniquely instrumental to it: “At a time when 
privatization, personal responsibility, and consumer choice are promoted as the best way 
to govern liberal capitalist democracies, reality TV shows us how to conduct and 
‘empower’ ourselves as enterprising citizens” (Ouellette and Hay 2). Reality 
programming affords the merger of surveillance and entertainment, security and leisure, 
risk and responsibility assigned to individual citizens (Andreje
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this way, “the quintessential technology of advanced or ‘neo’ liberal citizenship” 
(Ouellette and Hay 4). In addition, circulating within a broader discursive apparatus that 
includes fictional media, myriad cultural forces cohere meaningfully in this task of 
governance. The confluence of mediated frenzies rhetorically situating crisis teen 
pregnancy functions in precisely this manner, as a set of ethopolitical technologies for 
shaping a responsible, ethical teen citizen-self.  
To be clear, this is less a claim about the ideological effects of media than an 
effort to attend to the ways in which television and film are “becoming more useful to a 
rationality of governing that emphasizes self-empowerment as a condition of citizenship” 
(Ouellette and Hay 6-7). In the instance of premarital motherhood, in lieu of sending 
teens and single women to maternity homes for a nine-month period of silence and 
isolation under the watchful gaze of medical workers and social agencies, contemporary 
surveillance and governance is more easily circulated through popular mediated forms 
that provide exemplars of responsible biological citizenship and, simultaneously, subject 
young pregnant women to an authoritative gaze that mobilizes discipline and docility as a 
“therapeutics of the self” (Dubrofsky, “Therapeutics”). The shift is, in some ways, 
dramatic—crisis teen pregnancy is no longer hidden but exceptionally visible, no longer 
silenced but excessively voiced. The stories are directive and normative; they indicate 
proper behavior by designating a range of reproductive choices for young women and 
marking some as more culturally legitimate than others.  
Teen pregnancy narratives also participate in a broader cultural project that 
delineates and codifies the borders of maternity, reinscribing cultural attitudes and beliefs 
about what it means to be a mother and who is best able to perform maternal labor. 
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Suturing the “crisis” in teen pregnancy to possible redress for the “crisis” of infertility or 
delayed/rejected motherhood, what is clear is that the claim to authentic and legitimate 
maternity is anything but biological, an argument to which I now turn. 
Maternity as a Cultural Designation 
In the age of the gene, when scientific investments in the body are exceptionally 
attendant to “life itself” (Rose) and contemporary reproductive technologies like 
gestational surrogacy (as discussed in chapter two) seem to reinforce this logic, it may 
seem ironic to posit maternity as culturally designated. Close examination of the 
continual presence of crisis teen pregnancies in popular culture, however, challenges us 
to better understand motherhood as it relates to questions of power, access, and cultural 
capital. What emerges from this study is a set of narrative themes and technologies of 
governance that indicate the borders of “authentic,” or otherwise culturally legible, 
maternity in no uncertain terms. While this chapter has gestured toward the cultural 
construction of legitimate maternity in a variety of ways, in this final section I explore 
mediated juxtapositions of biological/birth mothers and adoptive mothers. In charting 
character traits and development, the boundaries of contemporary maternity and female 
citizenship emerge. 
 Juno is perhaps the quintessential postfeminist teen heroine. She embodies a 
select set of postfeminist qualities—white, middle class, sharp, witty—and she purports 
to live by only her own rules. Adhering to the tenets of postfeminism, however, which are 
“anchored in consumption as a strategy (and leisure as a site) for the production of the 
self” (Tasker and Negra 2), consumer culture is the significant site for the expression of 
Juno’s “feminism.” Her independence is written largely through dress and style, which is 
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markedly hipster and alternative, as is her retro/alt taste in music. Indeed, it is largely 
through her outward appearance—clothes, attitude, musical preference—that Juno 
exemplifies the kind of self-reliance and resolve that is too readily equated with 
feminism. Certainly, Juno’s performance of gender is slightly unorthodox—she doesn’t 
often wear skirts and is far from demure—but the overall narrative trajectory and Juno’s 
character (consumption aside) cohere meaningfully with conventional views and 
expectations of girls and women.  
In this case, feminism functions as a kind of popular branding mechanism; it has 
been selectively appropriated and applied; what is discarded is all of the transformative 
politics feminism entails. Because for all of Juno’s sassiness and wit, at the end of the 
day, she is still desperately searching for a meaningful connection with a man (as an 
authority figure or romantic possibility), she is willing to bear but unable to raise her 
baby, and her life after pregnancy goes back to the way it was—light and easy, and this 
time with Bleeker as her boyfriend. Hers is a story that bears eerie resemblance to the 
“girls who went away”—the only updates being that Juno is presented as making her own 
decision to give up her child, and was able to stay home during her pregnancy. The story, 
then, gets rewritten in accordance with the tenets of biological citizenship, but this is 
hardly feminist transformation. As is clearly indicated within Juno, and consistent across 
Glee, 16 and Pregnant, and Teen Mom, still powerfully at work are the assumptions that 
good girls do not have abortions, that they cannot and should not parent their own 
children. As postfeminist texts, crisis teen pregnancy narratives delineate the boundaries 
of proper maternity under the banner of feminism, and many of these teen protagonists fit 
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the “perfect” biological profile—white, young, healthy, and upwardly mobile. But to be 
culturally coded as maternal, a few additional social markers are necessary. 
 Tied to the sym/pathetic trope of the infertile woman, adoptive mothers within 
“crisis” teen pregnancy narratives offer a clear solution to an “unbalanced” reproductive 
equation. Their struggles are intimately bound to those of the teen protagonists; indeed, it 
is often difficult to ascertain just who is in crisis. Take, for example, Vanessa Loring, the 
adoptive mother in Juno. Vanessa is a white, upper-class, thirty-something, married 
woman with a successful career and a white picket fence—the whole nine yards, it would 
seem, except for the baby. It is evident early on that a child is what Vanessa desperately 
wants. For her husband Mark, life is reasonably complete without children, minus having 
his own rock band, of course. Vanessa’s character is noticeably uptight and anxious 
throughout the film, the common caricature of an adult woman who has no children. For 
example, when Vanessa says goodbye to Juno after their first meeting, she poses a steady 
stream of questions with regard to Juno’s commitment: “So, then, you really think you’re 
going to go ahead with this?” With increasing urgency, Vanessa prompts: “How sure? 
Percentage-wise, would you say you’re eighty percent sure, ninety percent sure?” If her 
insecurities and obsessive personality traits were somehow lost on the viewer prior to the 
film’s close, here they would be highlighted and remarked upon in their absence. In 
Vanessa’s final scene, she is cuddled up on the bed in the nursery with the baby, post-
adoption. Hair disheveled, clothes notably rumpled, Vanessa’s face expresses only joy 
and sincere serenity. It is a side of Vanessa we have not yet witnessed; it is a side of 
Vanessa that is brought into being through maternity. Adhering to traditional gendered 
scripts, a thirty-something childless woman is pitiful, neurotic, and incomplete—a 
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caricature that at once undermines the labors of women outside of motherhood, while 
simultaneously trivializing the profound pain and hardship that women and couples 
endure in struggling with infertility. Vanessa may have spent her twenties “acquiring it 
all,” but becoming a mother is the ultimate expression and fulfillment of normative (and 
desirable) womanhood.  
As both a birth mother and, much later, an adoptive one, Shelby Corcoran of Glee 
offers a unique opportunity to explore the character transformations that make culturally 
legible maternity possible. She first appears on screen more than halfway through the first 
season and, prior to the revelation that she is Rachel’s birth mother, Shelby is portrayed 
as the ruthless coach of local competitor Vocal Adrenaline, the reigning national glee 
club champions. Her life seems, at first, decidedly dissimilar from that of Vanessa 
Loring—she has never been married and is entirely career-driven. While neither anxiety-
ridden nor perfectionist like Vanessa, Shelby nonetheless embodies stereotypes that 
diminish childless women who reject motherhood and/or marriage as overly self-assured, 
brash, and excessively competitive. She holds rehearsals for hours on end, with students 
breaking away only when entirely necessary (for example, to vomit from exhaustion in 
trashcans outside of the auditorium), and coaches her students in unapologetic terms: 
“Ladies, I don’t want to hear complaints about chafing because you’re being forced to 
wear metal underwear.”  
As the season continues, Shelby’s restlessness and dissatisfactions with her life 
become increasingly unambiguous. They seem to hinge, at first, on her inability to 
connect with Rachel but, as noted earlier, this relationship is quickly dismissed as 
implausible and rightly distant. In the end, much like Vanessa, a child is all that Shelby 
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needs to be complete. In the final episode, just before deciding to adopt Quinn’s 
daughter, Shelby explains to Rachel that she needs a new life: “It took meeting you to 
realize all this stuff that I missed out on…I need a house and a garden and a dog—family. 
I missed out on my chance with you, and it kills me. I can’t let that happen again.” 
Shelby’s final scene in the series is remarkably similar to Vanessa’s: Shelby stands in the 
hospital, her gaze lovingly fixed on the bundle she holds in her arms as a nurse finalizes 
the adoption paperwork before her. Once again, motherhood is the definitive embodiment 
of white, class-privileged femininity, the solution to the malaise and neurosis brought on 
by too much independence, in short, by too much feminism.  
The resolution to “crisis” teen pregnancy, conveniently, resolves the “crisis” in 
infertility or single women’s rejection of motherhood and/or marriage through child 
transfer. In this way, the significance of adoption as a social technology within crisis teen 
pregnancy narratives is also concretized through its relationship to a differentiated 
con(tra)ceptive crisis, namely, the childlessness of educated, professional white women. 
Additionally, the juxtaposition of these potentially maternal figures clarifies the narrow 
circumference of proper maternity in contemporary imaginaries. Rather than existing as a 
kind of biological tie, motherhood is aggressively articulated as a social status and 
cultural designation. Those individuals determined most “fit” for motherhood inhabit a 
myriad of privileged social locations and adhere strictly to the status quo. They are white, 
educated, heterosexual, wealthy, most often married, and mature (in age and demeanor). 
Regardless of their physical ability to bear children, these women are culturally coded as 
rightful and authentic mothers.  
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In this chapter, I have argued that the recent fixation on pregnant white teenagers 
in “crisis” signals significant cultural anxieties regarding domesticity and the perceived 
role of “legitimate” pregnancy and motherhood in the securitization of the state. The 
sudden score of fictional narratives clearly reflect and reinscribe a set of attitudes and 
expectations while simultaneously offering pedagogies of citizenship and governance, 
and reality programming enhances these efforts through surveillance of actual teenage 
mothers. “Crisis” teen pregnancy narratives function as forms of governance that reflect 
the conditions of biological citizenship, emphasizing self-empowerment, informed 
consent, and autonomy through a narrow articulation of reproductive discernment and 
(pre)maternal responsibility. Within these narratives, adoption is figured as the best, or 
indeed, the only, means by which postfeminist teen heroines, and their adult postfeminist 
counterparts, might resolve crisis within their individual lives. But as a social technology, 
adoption also works to redistribute maternal labor according to notions of cultural 
worthiness. Thus, it functions here as a tool for redress, as a means of reinscribing a 
normative vision of family and gendered identity in contemporary American life, policing 
the borders of legitimate maternity under the guise of choice and self-determination.  
As in the long and disquieting histories of reproductive politics in the U.S., so too 
in contemporary postfeminist culture and “crisis” teen pregnancy narratives—
motherhood is conceived not as a right, but as a privilege. Throughout this project, I have 
suggested that another world is possible—one in which we might realize the possibilities 
of reproductive justice. It is to that end which I now turn. 
 
  
 
CHAPTER SIX 
TOWARDS A REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS OF POSSIBILITY 
 
 [I]n demonstrating that no single future is written in our present, it might fortify 
our abilities, in part through thought itself, to intervene in that present, and so to 
shape something of the future that we might inhabit. 
Nikolas Rose, The Politics of Life Itself 
 
 Feminism has been reduced to choice at its own peril. This reduction, while not 
necessarily limited to reproductive politics, is perhaps most visible and forceful within 
cultural conversations regarding motherhood, reproduction, and sexuality.60 The crude 
equation of feminism with individual choice—any individual choice—strips feminist 
theories and politics of their ongoing salience, force, and transformative potentials. What 
began decades ago as an earnest and resonant claim to self-determination—jurisdiction 
over one’s body, fertility, sexuality—has been depoliticized through myopic obsessions 
with individual preferences and subsequently mobilized in defense of a range of practices 
that may or may not serve a vision of social justice or feminist politics. The examples are 
many and subject to fierce debate, but might include, for example, attempts to reclaim 
                                                
60 I use the term “sexuality” here with caution, referring to a limited vernacular of (hetero)sexual liberation 
and expression that infused U.S. social movements of the 1960s and 70s. Contemporary, mainstream 
LGBTQI politics are remarkably dissimilar in their vociferous rejection of “choice” as an explanatory or 
defensible dimension of sexual identity. The “born this way” movement within queer politics has, 
somewhat successfully, leveraged the logic of biological difference as a platform for human rights. In other 
words, choicelessness has become a mechanism for claiming social, political, and legal recognition. This 
trend comes at the profound and troubling expense of inclusion and radical queer commitments; and yet, 
the strategy itself highlights the broader problematic of “choice” as too readily equated with frivolity and 
excess, to easily dismissed to bear the weight of human rights. While this line of inquiry clearly exceeds the 
limits of this dissertation, I mark it here for further consideration and study. 
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“slut” as a term of empowerment—a move that has been critiqued as exclusionary and 
dismissive of black and brown women’s experiences with gendered violence in white 
supremacist culture (“An Open Letter”). It might include certain strains of third wave 
feminisms or postfeminism for their celebrations of consumer culture and traditional 
norms of feminine beauty. Or, as I explore throughout this project, it includes the defense 
of individualized reproductive choices that masks a complex politics of entitlements and 
obligations, and reinforces an elite vision of motherhood and family. If feminism offers a 
vision of a world free from domination and oppression, then individual actions and 
“choices” must be understood within broader structures of power and justice. To be sure, 
not every individual choice is political. But some choices are just bad politics. We need a 
rhetorical strategy that can better account, not only for the reasons why such choices are, 
in fact, “bad politics,” but also for the diversity of women’s reproductive experiences and 
needs, one that can challenge the logic of neoliberalism and advance the possibility of 
reproductive justice in the twenty-first century. 
In an effort to develop grounding for a possibility of reproductive justice, this 
study critical engaged the profound cultural shifts and transformations made possible 
through recent con(tra)ceptive innovations—the sexual revolution, reproductive freedom, 
and, more recently, forms of high-tech prenatal management and assisted reproduction. 
Perhaps for better and worse, or perhaps as just a statement of fact, reproductive 
technologies have ushered in unprecedented opportunities to exercise various freedoms 
and controls—over and on individual bodies and the body politic, to disarticulate sex 
(and sexuality) from reproduction, to re-envision the meaning of family and motherhood 
and its attendant “choices” and responsibilities. This dissertation builds on a significant 
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body of existing scholarship that struggles with the myriad questions emerging in 
contemporary moments, situated at the nexus of profound repro-technological 
innovations, deepening neoliberalism, postfeminism, and biological citizenship in post-
9/11 America. This study, however, investigates and addresses a significant, if 
overlooked, dimension of these problematics, to ask how discursive practices contribute 
to the way con(tra)ceptive technologies come to mean and function within our collective 
and individual lives, and how this shapes attendant possibilities for reproductive justice. 
In other words, innovation matters. But so, too, do the communicative practices that 
anchor, discipline, and render it legible. 
 Thus, in this study, I have dedicated critical attention to those cultural moments 
surrounding innovation that are both widely articulated and understood as deeply 
unsettling, and to the discourses of “emergency” and “crisis” that are effectively 
mobilized to fix the meaning and significance of such techno-cultural disruptions. 
Charting the ways in which rhetorics of “emergency” prefigure our understandings of—
and political responses to—a number of different con(tra)ceptive technologies, propels a 
number of related and substantive investigations. First, it affords an opportunity to 
examine how the logic of emergency works. As a suspension of normative practice in 
favor of exceptional practice, it codifies the borders of maternal legitimacy and deviance, 
working to define and bracket our collective understandings of who is fit for, and 
deserving of, motherhood. This is evidenced, for example, within teen pregnancy 
narratives that configure adoption as a social technology for crisis management and 
resolution. Working simultaneously within individual and collective paradigms of 
“crisis,” these narratives adhere to and encourage systems of neoliberal self-governance. 
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They function on a macro level to reproduce certain kinds of families, and define 
maternity not as a biological tie, but as a social status and cultural designation—a 
noteworthy and considerable feat in the age of biological citizenship.  
 Second, this focus on the discursive dimensions of con(tra)ceptive technologies, 
and specifically its accompanying logics of emergency, allows for an examination of the 
subsequent modes of action made desirable, undesirable, or otherwise un/available. It 
illustrates the ways in which invoking the concept of emergency exerts a set of political 
effects that inhibit “choice” and authorize coercion, all under the (postfeminist) banner of 
reproductive self-determination. The discursive figuration of Suleman and Kamrava in 
the wake of the octuplets’ birth, their public/professional disciplining and accompanying 
cultural articulations of responsible decision-making in an age of biological citizenship, 
allow for the fertility industry as a whole to skirt difficult questions of medical ethics and 
care and to continue (not) to regulate itself. The latter is perhaps most unsettling 
considering the nature of this industry, which remains so deeply invested in the 
(re)production of (certain kinds of) lives that it continues to exercise profound judgment 
regarding which kinds of patients are worthy of care, which genetic factors carry (too 
much) “risk,” which kinds of decisions are deemed “responsible” and thereby defensible, 
and who is deemed worthy of parenthood. As in the histories of reproductive politics, so 
too the questions that emerge within these settings are inextricable from a politics of 
wealth, class, race, ethnicity, ability, gender, and heteronormativity. 
 Attention to the discursive conditions under which such material effects might 
unfold highlights the actual labor involved in the process of codifying innovation, and 
suggests a range of possibility for intervention on behalf of reproductive justice. To the 
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extent that contemporary forms of governance work on and through women’s bodies, and 
the collective body politic, through a postfeminist appropriation of the language of choice 
and consent, we are equipped to rhetorically critique and re-imagine resistive strategies, 
as well as those that might enable an advancing of more just and inclusive politics. In 
fact, as women with greater degrees of cultural capital and privilege are increasingly 
interpolated by/within the tyranny of “choice”—in other words, within processes of 
governing through freedom and responsibility, caught amidst dissolving categories of 
coercion and consent—cultural configurations of reproductive “duty” offer a space for 
shared ground in struggle: “Both population control programs and genetic selection 
technologies reinforce biological explanations for social problems and place reproductive 
responsibility on women, thus privatizing remedies for illness and social inequity” 
(Roberts, "Race, Gender" 785). The opportunity for solidarity is certainly not new, but 
perhaps as we stand in the wake of significant feminist and antiracist struggle, and on the 
shoulders of those who fought tirelessly on its behalf, the willpower and capacity to do so 
may be. 
 It is to this end that this project is ultimately articulated, towards the possibility of 
a richly diverse and robust struggle for reproductive justice and maternal dignity—a 
struggle that is thoroughly invested in the building of strong alliances with other 
movements and communities for justice. As an organizing tool and critical paradigm, the 
concept of reproductive justice is inspired in part by the global women’s health 
movement, and draws directly on strategies utilized by women of the Global South in 
advancing reproductive rights as part of a broader human rights agenda (Ross, "The 
Color of Choice"). It offers “a theory, strategy and practice for organizing 
 167 
against…multiple, interlocking reproductive violences…by placing Indigenous women 
and women of color at the center of [its] lens” (Ross, "The Movement" 8). Thus, 
reproductive justice advocates center their work on the belief that each “woman has the 
right to have a child, not have a child, and parent the children she has” (Ross, "The 
Movement" 8), illuminating one of the primary distinctions between reproductive justice 
and mainstream pro-choice advocacy. Mainstream movements fight almost exclusively 
for the right to decide not to bear children—a reflection of the ways in which whiteness 
and class privilege inform the experience, or possibility, of (compulsory) motherhood. 
The histories of women marginalized by and within heterosexist white supremacist 
culture are decidedly dissimilar to compulsory motherhood, and in fact reveal the 
opposite—sustained, institutionalized efforts to curtail or prohibit their fertility or 
maternity. Reproductive justice takes this as its starting point, and interrogates 
contemporary issues with a cultivated sensitivity to these histories and experiences.  
 I wish to draw on this established framework to offer a working definition of 
reproductive justice and consider a set of questions regarding its possibilities and 
requirements within the context of shifting technological terrains. Inextricably bound to a 
broad range of social justice struggles including wealth disparities, the prison-industrial 
complex, unequal access to education and health care, environmental injustice, and 
inequities grounded in race, class, gender, nationality, immigration status, citizenship, 
age, dis/ability and sexuality, reproductive justice affirms the right of every human to 
decide whether, when, and with whom to create intimacy and family (Asian Communities 
for Reproductive Justice; Ross, “The Movement”; Pro-Choice Public Education Project; 
SPARK Reproductive Justice Now; Young Women’s Empowerment Project; Young 
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Women United). It supports the full and unique expression of gender and sexuality as a 
critical dimension of human dignity (SPARK Reproductive Justice Now; Young 
Women’s Empowerment Project). It includes challenging current systems of foster care 
and adoption, as well affirming access to knowledge of one’s social, familial, and 
biological origins, and the right to information regarding one’s body, health, and ancestry 
(Bastard Nation; Roberts, Shattered Bonds; Solinger, Beggars and Choosers; Trenka et 
al.). And, as a critical informant to each of the aforementioned tenets, reproductive justice 
necessitates access to the social, political, medical, and economic resources that enable 
health and prosperity for oneself and one’s family (Asian Communities for Reproductive 
Justice; Sistas on the Rise). In other words, we cannot simply refer to reproductive justice 
as a set of freedoms tied to dignity and self-determination, although the concept is 
certainly inclusive of that. Justice, however, demands transformation of the social 
conditions that create structures of inequity. It demands that we rethink, for example, 
wages, welfare, and wealth disparity. Thus, it is not solely about protecting or defending 
freedoms, but about actively supporting an expansion of possibility for disenfranchised 
communities, a project that would include free education and health care services and the 
dismantling of the prison-industrial complex, among other things (Asian Communities 
for Reproductive Justice; Davis; Roberts, Killing the Black Body; Ross, “The Color of 
Choice”). 
What, then, is the role of reproductive technology within this broad vision for 
reproductive justice? It cannot be reduced to unfettered access, for this would merely 
constitute an expansion of dominant thought. The reigning language and logic of choice 
permits access to technologies regulated solely through markets—supply bracketed 
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largely by privatized clinic policies and demand limited only by individual wealth. This is 
precisely the problem that the Suleman saga reveals—non-normative choices are deemed 
monstrous only when made by women culturally excluded from a cornucopia of choice-
making (in this case, low-wealth women). Under the tyranny of choice, we are unable to 
critique excess consumption or misappropriation of resources by women of means and, 
simultaneously, we are barred from defending the reproductive self-determination of 
women of lesser income or means. In short, the public shaming of Suleman and 
Kamrava, in lieu of a more substantive inquiry into medical practices and regulations, 
reinscribes the status quo, with one troubling exception. In the wake of Kamrava’s 
professional disciplining, fertility specialists will be all the more reticent to treat low-
income women for infertility. There are no formal regulations that prohibit doctors from 
serving low-wealth women, but the threat of public outrage and professional sanctions 
post-Suleman creates a climate of uncertainty and fear in which the likelihood of refusal 
for services is quite high. And the problem with current regulatory regimes (or lack 
thereof) is not simply concerned with low-wealth communities. Absent regulations that 
would bar clinics or practitioners from discrimination, single women and LGBTQ 
communities are often subject to exclusionary practices by private entities given the 
freedom to determine which clients are worthy of care. 
Market-based and industry self-regulations are clearly untenable in the struggle to 
envision a robust reproductive justice; thus, other forms of regulation must be explored in 
order to determine the limits and liberties for reproductive technologies within a justice 
framework. Such a project would be expansive and multi-faceted, and fundamentally 
concerned with disarticulating sexuality, reproduction, and motherhood from privilege. 
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The possibilities here are endless, but I offer the following as a set of considerations for 
further exploration and inquiry. Drawing on the work of Dorothy Roberts, we might 
begin with removal of economic barriers to ART, as well as state support for the 
reproductive decision-making of low-wealth women, inclusive of abortion and IVF 
(Killing the Black Body). The U.S. might initiate an overhaul of ART regulatory practices 
and regimes, perhaps drawing on the expertise and experience of other nations in crafting 
regulations that both prohibit discrimination and limit the use of resources available. 
Concrete and detailed recommendations for regulation far exceed the scope of this 
project, but we must begin by asking questions in order to situation this issue within a 
justice-oriented framework. For example, in the context of assisted reproduction, how or 
to what extent might we determine a limit for multiple births? Should there be a cap on 
the number of embryos in a singular transfer? Or perhaps an agreement to undergo 
selective reduction if the transfer results in a certain number of developing fetuses? What 
constitutes a misappropriation of technological resources? We need to question present 
cultural assumptions regarding technological (mis)use that hinge largely on individual 
economic resources and cultural capital; in short, working to eliminate the conditions that 
inform poverty in lieu of investing in the reproduction of bodies and families of privilege.  
In an age of biological citizenship and advanced forms of neoliberal governance, 
the project of reproductive justice also demands that we interrogate the discursive 
conditions under which reproductive injustices occur—for example, to examine the 
cultural designation of “deserving” or “fit” mothers, to explore how sexuality and 
reproduction are discursively constrained through policy debates, to understand the 
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and assisted fertility practices. This is precisely the work that this dissertation has sought 
to do. In tracing rhetorics of “emergency” and “crisis” as they intersect with reproductive 
technologies, we are better able to understand how cultural understandings of 
“legitimate” motherhood both shape and are shaped by technological innovation and its 
attendant cultural disruptions. In foregrounding an analysis of the discursive conditions 
that help to shape the meaning and use of con(tra)ceptive technologies, I have been no 
less interested in the cultural shifts provoked by these technologies; indeed, it is to that 
end that my project has been ultimately envisioned. I focused deliberately on a singular, 
critical dimension of those cultural shifts, namely, the rhetorical practices that work to 
anchor technology and its broader circulations and effects. Understanding con(tra)ceptive 
technologies as sites for the challenging or (re)inscripting of contemporary relationships 
of power affords the opportunity of provocation, disruption, and new ways of thinking 
and being; it provides an opportunity for the exploration and imagining of alternative 
possibilities. And from this, a politics of possibility for reproductive justice is born. 
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